SAFE FILE: Marshall, George C.; 1941 - 4/27/42

G-2/2657-283

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

March 10, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

Subject: The Mediterranean Situation.

Two German movements southward into the Mediterranean world are now in full swing.

A German army or army group, under General Field Marshal List, consisting of 16 divisions, three of which are motorized and five armored, has crossed the Danube and occupied Bulgaria. This movement southward, which is still in progress, has been covered by strong concentrations of the Bulgarian army in the upper reaches of the Maritza valley and to the north of Adrianople. The direction of the German advance is still obscure. However, a part of the German army appears to be taking position in the Struma valley to the northeast of Salonika and, hence, is constituting itself as a major threat to Greece. The German advance through Bulgaria is being protected by strong German air forces, the Fourth Air Fleet, under the command of General of Flyers Loehr. Twelve German divisions remain behind in Roumania. This latter force continues to receive reinforcements from interior Germany.

A second German army of undetermined strength is moving southward from Italy and Sicily into Libya. Very confused and contradictory reports from different European capitals speak of the strength of this army as being somewhere between 3 and 12 divisions, a large part of which are mechanized. Italian reinforcements are also being sent to Libya. The transport movement between Sicily and Tripoli is being covered by strong German and Italian air forces under the command of General of Flyers Geissler. British submarines have inflicted losses on the Italian ships comprising the convoys, but the German movement southward has not thereby been interrupted. At the present time there appears to be not more than two armored divisions of reduced strength in Libya.

German mechanized units are now in contact with British outposts to the southwest of Agheila. The German air force in Libya appears to have secure air supremacy as far east as Bengazi. The British state that, due to constant German air attacks, the

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port of Bengazi is no longer being used by their ships.

The German concentrations in southern Bulgaria should be completed by March 10, 1941. It may be expected that Hitler will shortly thereafter seek to occupy Greece, either by force or with imposed Greek consent. Strong German and Bulgarian forces, in the meantime, are taking position to the north of Thrace to prevent Turkey from interfering with German operations in the direction of Salonika. No immediate German attack on Constantinople is to be expected.

It is probable that the German reinforcements now in Africa have already added considerable strength to the Italian defenses of Tripoli. It is not believed that this strength is as yet sufficient to undertake a campaign for the re-conquest of Cyrenaica, unless the British should markedly reduce their forces in this province.

It cannot be predicted when German strength in Libya will reach a level which will permit offensive action toward Cyrenaica. Such will depend on the rate of movement of troops and supplies from Italy to Libya and the increase or diminution of British strength in Cyrenaica.

Whereas the weather is not likely to interfere with military operations in North Africa until September, the necessity of accumulating supplies would seem to bar any such extensive German operation as an attack on Egypt for some months.

The German movement into North Africa, however, has westward as well as eastward military and political implications.

With only Italians in Tripolitania, Weygand was not seriously threatened from that direction. With strong German forces in Tripolitania, Weygand is seriously threatened from that direction.

The threat is against his weakest flank, even though it has a good fortified line. Tunisia is vulnerable from land, sea, and air; also, supplies and troops are less numerous in Tunisia than in Algeria and Morocco. The fortified line (Mareth Line) could be turned by mechanized columns from Tripolitania or taken in rear by forces landed from Sicily under powerful air protection in case direct assault was considered unwise.

Weygand's troops are indifferently equipped, lack essential supplies, and are no match for a German force, even one considerably inferior in numbers. Moreover, a large part of Weygand's troops must remain distributed over a wide area to maintain order among the

natives, while still others must stand guard near the frontier of Spanish Morocco. While that flank is relatively safe at present, a potential threat exists because of Spanish relations with the Axis.

In view of the above, Weygand has lost, in large measure, the freedom of action which he enjoyed prior to the arrival of the Germans in Africa. Formerly, he could join de Gaulle or the British without being exposed to immediate effective attack. This is no longer the case.

The Germans exert this restraining influence by their mere presence near the frontier of Tunisia; they do not even have to move in Weygand's direction. Their arrival in Tripolitania also places them in a favorable position to dictate the division of the spoils in North Africa and facilitates the organization of Fifth Column activities among the natives. The advantages France gained by the stroke of sending Weygand to North Africa have largely been dissipated.

To sum up, arrival of German forces in Tripolitania, in addition to helping the Italians morally and materially and constituting a long-range threat to Suez, has the following effects:

(1) The chances of Weygand joining the British or of any establishment of an anti-German front in French North Africa are greatly diminished.

(2) France is forced one step closer to the Axis.

(3) Chances of eventual German occupation of Casablanca and Dakar are somewhat increased.

Sherman Miles

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.

PSF
Safe
Marshall

Port

March 8, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I received from General MacArthur this morning a recommendation that Brigadier General Albert N. Jones be promoted to the grade of Major General and that Colonel Lewis C. Beebe be promoted to the grade of Brigadier General (both temporary).

> He states: "These officers have been outstanding during the last three months. Jones is to be assigned to the command of the First Philippine Corps and Beebe is to be assigned as Deputy Chief of Staff at this headquarters (Fort Mills). These assignments are essential in the reorganization which you will understand. I request favorable action and radio information without delay."

I request authority to include these two names in the list of proposed promotions which General Watson has had for several days. If you approve I will have their names added to the formal list of nominations, rather than to the explanatory list now in General Watson's possession, which involves explanations and is seen by a number of people.

Pertinent to the above is a message yesterday from MacArthur which indicates March 17 as the date for the completion of compliance with your secret instructions to him.

Chief of Staff.

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Date- 4-3-59
Signature- Carl L. Spicer

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NLR/RAC 520.2 (9/27/82)

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
WAR PLANS DIVISION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

By authority of A.C. of S., WPD
7-21-41 WTF
Date Initials

May 21, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Seacoast Defense Guns at Newfoundland, Bermuda, and Trinidad.

1. Reference the President's inquiry of May 20th on the above subject, the following seacoast armament has been or is now being installed:

Newfoundland
One two-gun, 8-inch railway battery, range 21,000 yards.
Two two-gun, 155 mm batteries, range 17,000 yards.

Bermuda
Two two-gun, 8-inch railway batteries, range 21,000 yards.
Two two-gun, 155 mm batteries, range 17,000 yards.

Trinidad
Four two-gun,155 mm batteries, range 17,000 yards.

2. In addition to the above, tentative plans provide for the following fixed seacoast armament:

Newfoundland
Two two-gun, 6-inch batteries, range 27,000 yards.

Bermuda
Two two-gun, 6-inch batteries, range 27,000 yards.

Trinidad
Two two-gun, 12-inch batteries, range 29,000 yards.
Five two-gun, 6-inch batteries, range 27,000 yards.

3. The 12-inch batteries for Trinidad are to be removed from harbor defenses in this country. It is expected that they will be installed in about eight months. Carriages for all of the 6-inch batteries are now under construction. Emplacement of the 6-inch batteries will commence in October 1941, and all can be emplaced by the early summer of 1942.

L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

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BY AUTHORITY OF WPD DDE C. OF S., WPD

Date | Initials

March 10, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

The Chief of Staff directs that a secret message, as follows, be sent by the most expeditious means possible consistent with secrecy to the Commanding General, USAFIA, Melbourne, Australia:

PERSONAL FROM GENERAL MARSHALL TO BE SEEN BY DECODING CLERK AND GENERAL BRETT ONLY STOP WITH FURTHER REFERENCE TO THE SPECIAL MISSION MENTIONED IN MY FOUR THREE NINE COMMA IT APPEARS PROBABLE THAT GENERAL MACARTHUR WILL LAND IN AUSTRALIA ON MARCH SEVENTEENTH STOP UNTIL THAT TIME YOU ARE TO KEEP THIS ENTIRE MATTER ONE OF PROFOUND SECRECY STOP PARA THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS TO YOU FROM THE PRESIDENT COLON GENERAL MACARTHUR HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO TELEGRAPH YOU AT MELBOURNE IMMEDIATELY UPON LANDING IN AUSTRALIA STOP WITHIN THE HOUR YOU WILL CALL UPON THE PRIME MINISTER OR OTHER APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENTAL OFFICIAL OF AUSTRALIA COMMA STATING THAT YOUR CALL IS MADE BY DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT STOP YOU ARE TO NOTIFY THE PRIME MINISTER THAT GENERAL MACARTHUR HAS LANDED IN AUSTRALIA AND HAS ASSUMED COMMAND OF ALL U.S. ARMY FORCES THEREIN STOP YOU WILL PROPOSE THAT THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT NOMINATE GENERAL MACARTHUR AS THE SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA COMMA AND WILL RECOMMEND THAT THE NOMINATION BE SUBMITTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO LONDON AND

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WASHINGTON SIMULTANEOUSLY STOP YOU WILL INFORM THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THE PRESIDENT IS IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE PROPOSALS REGARDING ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND OF THE AUSTRALIAN AREA AS RECENTLY SUBMITTED BY THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT EXCEPT AS TO SOME DETAILS CONCERNING RELATIONSHIP TO COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AND AS TO BOUNDARIES STOP THESE MATTERS WILL BE ADJUSTED WITH THE INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS AS QUICKLY AS PRACTICABLE STOP UPON COMPLETION OF YOUR VISIT TO THE PRIME MINISTER YOU WILL INFORM THE WAR DEPARTMENT BY URGENT RADIO THAT THIS MISSION HAS BEEN COMPLETED STOP END OF PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS STOP PARA YOU WILL ARRANGE TO TURN COMMAND OF AMERICAN ARMY FORCES IN AUSTRALIA OVER TO GENERAL MACARTHUR AS SOON AFTER HIS LANDING AS PRACTICABLE AND WILL REPORT TO HIM AS HIS DEPUTY FOR COMMAND OF AIR FORCES COMMA THE U.S. IMMEDIATELY AND ALL AIR FORCES IF ARRANGEABLE STOP INFORM GENERAL MACARTHUR FULLY CONCERNING ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS AND OF ALL STEPS HERETOFORE TAKEN REFERENCE THIS AND OTHER MATTERS STOP REQUEST HIM TO INFORM THE WAR DEPARTMENT IMMEDIATELY AS TO THE NAME OF EACH INDIVIDUAL ACCOMPANYING HIM TO AUSTRALIA STOP

MARSHALL

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DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

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Safe: Marshall

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

June 26, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached is the map of fields in the Caribbean and South America which I had prepared for you. The two principal points <u>now</u> to be considered are:

(1) Requiring, and financing, Pan-American to expedite fields they are now improving or building in Brazil. (They had planned to transfer the machinery now being used by them in the Caribbean region to Brazil - but this involves too much of delay.

(2) The financing of Pan-American to expand existing fields or build new fields in Brazil between Recife and Rio and along the cut off from the mouth of the Amazon at Belem, via Carolina, Araguary to Rio.

These two operations will require between five and six million dollars.

The two fields we now have Pan-American developing in Paraquay permit safe movement of our large bombers across the Andes from coast to coast.

Chief of Staff.

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 18, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT:

The attached data may be of interest to you.

Chief of Staff.

encl.
Troop movements
since Dec.7/41

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Date- 4-3-59
Signature- Carl L. Spaeth

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WAR DEPARTMENT

HEADQUARTERS, SERVICES OF SUPPLY

WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

Subject: Troop and Cargo Movements since December 7, 1941.

George C. Marshall

1. The following number of troops were transported by rail between the dates shown below:

Dec. 7, 1941 to Jan. 13, 1942 .	572,677 troops
Jan. 13, 1942 to Jan. 31, 1942	423,359 "
Feb. 1, 1942 to Feb. 7, 1942	100,847 "
Feb. 8, 1942 to Feb. 14, 1942	112,905 "
Feb. 15, 1942 to Feb. 28, 1942	353,248 "
Mar. 1, 1942 to Mar. 15, 1942	340,905 "
Total since Dec. 7, 1941	1,903,941 troops.

2. The following amount of cargo, and numbers of planes and troops have embarked for overseas destinations:

	Cargo* (ship tons)	Planes	Troops	
Dec. 7, 1941 to Jan. 13, 1942	265,000	313	37,200	Month of January Approx. 58,000 Troops
Jan. 14, 1942 to Jan. 31, 1942	300,800	293	48,981	
Feb. 1, 1942 to Feb. 7, 1942	34,800	none	3,415	
Feb. 8, 1942 to Feb. 14, 1942	144,000	29	3,829	Month of February 43,591 Troops
Feb. 15, 1942 to Feb. 28, 1942	368,264	190	36,347	
March 1, 1942 to March 15, 1942	352,970	90	30,374	
Total since Dec. 7, 1941	1,465,834	915	160,146	



* Defense Aid shipments not included.

BREHON SOMERVELL,
Major General,
Commanding

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

March 18, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Transporting Troops on Cargo Boats.


General Somervell informs me that arrangements have been made, through the Maritime Commission, to make some small constructional alterations on United States flag cargo boats which will permit approximately a platoon of 50 men to be carried without undue hardships. These alterations can be accomplished during the routine turn-arounds in port and, therefore, will involve no delays.

The estimate is that for all overseas cargo movements some 20,000 men can be accommodated in this manner in a six-months' period. This estimate does not include a similar arrangement by the British, but we have them looking into the matter.

Chief of Staff.

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MILITARY AIRPORTS

EXISTING AND PROPOSED IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA AND NORTHERN SOUTH AMERICA

JUNE 24, 1941

[illegible] and Tanker Losses

[illegible] losses for the week ending [illegible]. This is 199,000 tons less than during [illegible]

[illegible] (maximum new construction) for the [illegible]. This is 221,000 tons less than during [illegible].

[illegible] losses for the three weeks ending [illegible] tons. This exceeded the losses for the [illegible] of losses of 630,000 tons. It was 384,000 tons greater than [illegible] for the whole month of January, and 265,000 tons greater [illegible] losses in February.

Location of Sinkings

[illegible] reports as to actual location of sinkings re- [illegible] that between April 1 and April 23, 307,000 [illegible], British, Allied and neutral shipping were lost [illegible] north of 30° N. and west of 45° W. Losses in the [illegible] of 30° N. and west of 45° W. were 89,000 tons. [illegible] were 135,000 tons.

The attached table shows new construction and losses for [illegible] vessels of 1,000 tons under United States and British control for the week ending April 23.

The chart attached shows the changes in the shipping situation from March 1 to date.

[illegible] losses by geographical areas from April 1-23 are also attached.

By Deputy [illegible]

By E. J. Fleming [illegible]

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		1-5,000' surfaced runway, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
27.	MANAGUA;	Lease to P.A.A. by Local Government; work not started; present field 2 dirt runways 2,800' and 1,328'. When completed will have 1-3,500' surfaced runway, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
28.	DAVID;	Owned by Local Government; concession to P.A.A.;action pending but funds available for 1-5,000' runway, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
29.	PANAMA DEPARTMENT;	3 Major Fields, 4 Auxiliary Fields in Republic of Panama and 6 Emergency Fields in Republic of Panama.
30.	BARRANQUILLA;	Owned by Avianca (Columbian Co.); 40% owned by P.A.A.; work not yet started; present field 2 runways 4,000' and 3,000'. When completed will have 2-3,500' surfaced funways, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
31.	MARACAIBO;	Local Government P.A.A. has operating contract, work not started; present field 3 runways 3,300', 3,000' and 2,400'. When completed will have 3-5,000' surfaced runways, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
32.	LA GUAIRA;	Owned by Local Government, P.A.A. has operating contract; work not started; present field 2,600' x 450'; sand and clay surface. When completed will have 1-3,500' surfaced runway, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
33.	CARIPITO;	Owned by Creole Oil Co. and private party; development by P.A.A.; work not yet started; present field 3 runways graded and oiled, 3,051', 3,077' and 1,739'. When completed will have fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.

ROUTE NO 3

1.	MIAMI;	
34.	GREAT EXUMA, BAHAMAS:	Location still under study; work not yet started.
35.	BERMUDA;	Two runways, 3,000' and 2,800' to be complete except surfacing by July 10.
36.	JAMAICA;	Surveys completed; work to start in the near future; Colonial Airport on Palasidoes available for military planes of all sizes.

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PSF Safe: Marshall

For the President:

Griffiss was an outstanding officer and rendered great assistance to me. Suggest bringing him home.

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From London

March 19, 1942

To The Adjutant General

No. 830, March 19:

A British Court of Enquiry found that Liberator Aircraft number AM 918 in the service of British Overseas Airways, carrying Lieutenant Colonel Townsend Griffiss and British military and civilian passengers, was shot down about 5 miles southwest of the Eddystone Lighthouse, near Plymouth, England, on Feb. 15, 1942 at about 8:50 A.M. British Standard Time. Plane was on non-stop flight from Cairo to England. Plane crashed into channel. Crew and all passengers were lost. No bodies have been recovered. Plane was shot down by 2 Polish pilots of the Polish Air Force who failed to identify it as friendly aircraft. Court also found that contributory cause was lack of exercise of proper and effective control of pilots by ground organization. Evidence is being taken with the view of bringing the 2 pilots before court martial. It is requested that no publicity be given to findings of Court of Enquiry. Formal certificate of death will be forwarded as soon as issued by British Casualty Section. Request this information be furnished also Chief of Army Air Forces.

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Safe: Marshall
PSF

FIELDS FROM NATAL TO RIO DE JANEIRO

The development of facilities by Pan American Airways under existing contract on the fields of Natal to Bahia, both inclusive, was reported to be five percent complete as of June 1, 1941. Except at Bahia, the landing fields in their present condition are reported by the Intelligence Division of the Air Corps to be suitable for the operation of all types of Army aircraft, to include B-18 Bombers: to have limited servicing facilities, radio, etc.

Between Bahia and Rio de Janeiro (727 miles) only one field at Caravellas will be required for the movement of short-range aircraft.

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ROUTE NO 1

1.	MIAMI;	
2.	CAMAGUEY;	Owned by P.A.A.; 32% complete; existing field, 2-3,000' runways, clay and sod surface. When completed will have 2-5000' surfaced runways, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
3.	GUANTANAMO;	United States Navy. Land and sea plane base.
4.	PORT AU PRINCE;	Leased by P.A.A.; 18% complete; existing field, 2 dirt runways, 1,850' and 2,200', sod surface. When completed will have 1-3,500' surfaced runway, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
5.	CIUDAD TRUJILLO;	Owned by Local Government; development by P.A.A.; 18% complete. When completed will have 2-3,500' surfaced runways, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
6.	PUERTO RICO;	2-Major Fields; 4-Auxiliary Fields, all in use.
7.	ST. CROIX;	Steel landing mat in use; field, 70% complete.
8.	ANTIGUA;	Temporary runway 3,200' in use.
9.	FORT DE FRANCE;	P.A.A. has operating contract, construction deferred.
10.	ST. LUCIA;	Temporary runway 3,000' in use.
11.	TRINIDAD;	Temporary field at Cumato Reserve (Ft. Read) ready for use July 15. 1 Bomb. Sq. (H) now stationed at Colonial Airport at Piarco. Pan American development. When completed will have seaplane base with 2 ramps, fuel, radio, and meteorological equipment.
12.	GEORGETOWN;	Temporary runway 3,000' completed. Garrison will arrive July 28.
13.	PARAMARIBO;	Small field at present; runway 2,625'. Owned by Local Government, to be developed by P.A.A.; 10% complete. When completed will have 2-5,000' surfaced runways, fuel, and lighting. Seaplane Base with ramp, fuel, radio and meteorological equipment.
14.	AMAPA (MACAPA)	Owned by Local Government; development by P.A.A.; 17% complete; present field 2,624' x 492'. When completed will have 1-3,500' surfaced runway, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
15.	BELEM;	Owned by Local Government; development by P.A.A.; 10% complete; present field 2 runways 5,000' and 4,000'. When completed will have 2-5,000' surfaced runways, fuel and lighting; seaplane base with ramp, fuel, radio, and meteorological equipment.
16.	MARANHAO; (SAO LUIZ)	Owned by Local Government; development by P.A.A.; 8% complete; present field 2 dirt runways 4,921' and 3,608'. When completed will have 1-5,000' surfaced

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runway, fuel, lighting, Seaplane Base with ramp, fuel, radio and meteorological equipment.

17. FORTALEZA; (GEARA) — Owned by Local Government; development by P.A.A.; 7% complete; present field 1 runway 3,280'. When completed will have 1-5,000' surfaced runway, fuel, lighting, Seaplane Base with ramp, fuel, radio and meteorological equipment.

18. NATAL; — Owned by Local Government; development by P.A.A.; 5% complete; present field 2 runways 5,576' and 4,264'. When completed will have 2-5,000' surfaced runways, fuel and lighting; seaplane base with ramp, fuel, radio, and meteorological equipment.

19. RECIFE; (PERNAMBUCO) — Owned by Local Government; development by P.A.A.; 5% complete; present field 1 runway 3,000'. When completed will have 1-5,000' surfaced runway, fuel, lighting, Seaplane base with ramp, fuel, radio and meteorological equipment.

20. MACEIO; — Owned by Local Government; development by P.A.A.; 5% complete; present field 2 dirt runways 3,600' and 2,624'. When completed will have 1-3,500' surfaced runway, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.

21. BAHIA; — Owned by Local Government; development by P.A.A.; 5% complete; present field 1 runway 2,328'. When completed will have 1-5,000' surfaced runway, fuel, lighting, Seaplane Base with ramp, fuel, radio and meteorological equipment.

ROUTE NO 2

22. BROWNSVILLE; — Commercial Field.

23. TAMPICO; — Owned by Mexican Nat. Co., in turn by P.A.A.; development by P.A.A.; 4% complete; present field 3 runways 3,100', 2,473' and 2,460'; all 300' wide. When completed will have 3-3,500' surfaced runways, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.

24. VERA CRUZ; — Same as Tampico; work not started; present field, 3 runways 3,700', 2,600', and 3,200'; all 300' wide. When completed will have 3-5,000' surfaced runways, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.

25. TAPACHULA; — Same as Tampico; 1% complete. When completed will have 2-3,500' surfaced runways, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.

26. GUATEMALA CITY; — Owned by Local Government; concession to P.A.A.; 29% complete; present field 2 dirt runways 4,920' and 1,200'; new field. When completed will have

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ROUTE NO 2 (Contd)

		1-5,000' surfaced runway, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
27.	MANAGUA;	Lease to P.A.A. by Local Government; work not started; present field 2 dirt runways 2,800' and 1,328'. When completed will have 1-3,500' surfaced runway, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
28.	DAVID;	Owned by Local Government; concession to P.A.A.;action pending but funds available for 1-5,000' runway, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
29.	PANAMA DEPARTMENT;	3 Major Fields, 4 Auxiliary Fields in Republic of Panama and 6 Emergency Fields in Republic of Panama.
30.	BARRANQUILLA;	Owned by Avianca (Columbian Co.); 40% owned by P.A.A.; work not yet started; present field 2 runways 4,000' and 3,000'. When completed will have 2-3,500' surfaced funways, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
31.	MARACAIBO;	Local Government P.A.A. has operating contract, work not started; present field 3 runways 3,300', 3,000' and 2,400'. When completed will have 3-5,000' surfaced runways, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
32.	LA GUAIRA;	Owned by Local Government, P.A.A. has operating contract; work not started; present field 2,600' x 450'; sand and clay surface. When completed will have 1-3,500' surfaced runway, fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.
33.	CARIPITO;	Owned by Creole Oil Co. and private party; development by P.A.A.; work not yet started; present field 3 runways graded and oiled, 3,051', 3,077' and 1,739'. When completed will have fuel, lighting, radio and meteorological equipment.

ROUTE NO 3

1.	MIAMI;	
34.	GREAT EXUMA, BAHAMAS:	Location still under study; work not yet started.
35.	BERMUDA;	Two runways, 3,000' and 2,800' to be complete except surfacing by July 10.
36.	JAMAICA;	Surveys completed; work to start in the near future; Colonial Airport on Palasidoes available for military planes of all sizes.

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PSF Safe : Marshall

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AIR
WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 28, 1942

The Honorable Harry L. Hopkins
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Harry:

During my absence at Wright Field your letter of March 6 in connection with the need for transports in Russia was studied by the interested divisions, particularly in relation to the request of the State Department that additional means for handling mail and providing passenger transport for Russia be developed if possible.

I have recently had occasion to go into the matter of the transport situation with the Air Service Command and the Ferry Command and I feel that a more responsive answer to your inquiry can be given you than has previously been made.

First, as to the need of the Russian Forces for a large number of transport aircraft. I think this is obvious in the light of our own, as well as British and Chinese experience in the war. In fact, I think their need must necessarily be critical.

Secondly, the tough part of your question is as to whether or not I think any can be given. Transport aircraft can only be supplied to Russia at the cost of either our own transport units which are in the most urgent need of equipment, or British or Chinese needs. In view of the fact that we are transporting so much stuff to the East, it seems to me that the question of a reallocation of transports currently scheduled for the British might be reasonable. We should have enough air traffic in the Middle East and Far East to answer a certain part of British needs which were stated prior to our involvement in the Far East.

They are presently scheduled to receive from production, beginning in June with nine DC-3 type, over 30 a month of this type alone for 14 months. In addition they get a few Lockheed twin-engine transports between now and June and continuing on through the rest of this year. In these circumstances, it is my opinion that through careful reallocation it might be possible to get, say, 100 transports for Russia by the end of this year.

(Army Air Forces Library) 520.9 (9/27/58)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 16, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL

I have heard from Winston Churchill advising me, in confidence, that General Auchinleck has been given full authority for the Air, as well as for the Army; this at such times as major operations are impending or in progress.

F. D. R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 7 1972

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT; NARS Date APR 5 1973

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In reply refer to Initials and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Inspection trip to the Canal Zone, Galapagos, and Cocos, March 6-28, 1942.

Enclosure: (A) Track Chart of Air Patrols.
(B) Diagram.
(C) Photos.

1. In accordance with orders, I have visited the following:-

Balboa, C.Z. — Headquarters of Caribbean Defense Command, and of Fifteenth Naval District.
Coco Solo, C.Z. — Naval Air Station, Submarine Base.
Galapagos — Army and Navy Advance Air Bases.
Salinas, Ecuador — Army and Navy Advance Air Bases.
Cocos Island — Future Base for Motor Torpedo Boats.
Gulf of Fonseca — Navy Sea-plane Base.
Guatemala City — Army Advance Air Base.

All travel was by air. At every place visited I conferred with the senior officers present and in addition I sought facts and opinions from all reliable sources. I submit herewith briefly my conclusions:-

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Paramount Duty

The most important present task of the Army and Navy in the Canal Zone is to defeat any attempted bombing attack on the Panama Canal. Such an attack from the Pacific side most probably would come from enemy carriers, launching their planes during bright moonlight and at a distance up to possibly 700 miles from the Canal. Dangers from submarine raids are secondary.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT; NARS Date APR 5 1973

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Paramount Duty (continued)

To insure the defeat of such a bombing attack, the enemy carriers must be discovered during daylight of the day preceding the attempted assault. This means, roughly, in the area between the 800 mile and the 1100 mile circles. See diagram.

The patrolling of this vast expanse of ocean can only be done effectively by long range planes

Consequently, the maintenance of this patrol on the Panama Sea Frontier is the most vital part of the war effort of the Army and Navy forces in the Canal Zone.

Army. — Under the aggressive leadership of Lieutenant General F. M. Andrews, USA, Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, the Army is doing a fine job. The personnel from top to bottom is grimly earnest and alive to the realities of the war situation and the importance of the tasks assigned to them.

Navy. — The Navy's war efforts, in some respects, have been sluggish because of lack of virile leadership. Lack of effective cooperation with the Army was evident.

Rear Admiral F. H. Sadler, USN, Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District, has been ordered relieved of his command. His successor, Rear Admiral Clifford Van Hook, USN, is an able, younger officer who has proven his ability to cooperate with the Army.

Aviation. — The organization of Naval aviation activities in the Fifteenth Naval District is neither logical nor workable. Recommendations made by me to the present Commandant were summarily rejected by Admiral Sadler on the grounds - among others - that to accept them would aid the Army in its alleged plot to gain and retain control of Naval aviation. Admiral Van Hook will correct this situation immediately upon taking command.

It is a pleasure to report that the high efficiency and splendid cooperation of Patrol Wing Three and its dynamic commander, Commander Arthur Gavin, USN, were highly praised by Generals Andrews, Johnson and Lyons.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT, NARS Date APR 5 1973

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Aviation (continued)

The Army Air Force also is on its toes. However, its tremendous expansion has necessarily diluted the skilled personnel to a greater extent than is yet the case in Naval aviation, and, in consequence, the Army is experiencing more difficulties in maintenance and upkeep.

ADVANCE AIR BASES.

Cocos. — Except for being sighted twice daily by patrol planes, no surveillance over, or use of Cocos was in effect when I arrived.

As of today, a striking force of four submarines is basing for patrol intervals of two weeks on Cocos. Also, 8 tuna boats are now stationed on a North-South line just west of Cocos to serve as aircraft warning posts.

About July 1st a squadron of motor torpedo boats with a tender will be stationed at Cocos. By July 1st the Army expects to have in operation a long range Radar installation on Cocos, and this will carry with it a radio set and personnel so that there will then be a small shore-based force on the Island. Navy aviators were unanimous in their opinions that seaplanes could not be based at Cocos except at irregular intervals. From my personal experience I concur in this opinion.

Galapagos.-- By May 1st the Army will have a fully fortified and equipped Advance Air Base on Seymour Island with approximately 1500 troops, one squadron of "Flying Fortresses" and one squadron of pursuit planes. Small dispersion air fields on other islands are under consideration by the Army. The Navy bungled its job in setting up a Seaplane Base on North Seymour Island. However, I persuaded the Commandant to discard his original plan and to take steps to get the Navy base properly and promptly implemented. By July 1st there will be facilities to support the operations of two squadrons of PBY's at the Navy base. A converted destroyer now serves as tender.

The Navy also plans to install a fuel oil depot, probably on Charles Island, so that cruisers, and destroyers on convoy or patrol duty can top-off their fuel tanks without returning to Balboa.

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By RT, NARS Date APR 5 1973

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Galapagos (continued)

Two long range Radar installations will be made on other islands in the Galapagos.

It is planned to base one squadron of motor torpedo boats with tender in the Galapagos by May 1st.

In view of the air patrols now in effect which cover parts of the Archipelago every day, the further air patrols to be inaugurated upon the completion of the Air Bases on Seymour Island, the basing in the Galapagos in the near future of a squadron of 12 motor torpedo boats, and the installing of two Radar stations (with radio), there appears to be no urgent need of lookout posts on shore or the employment of fishing craft to supplement the present surveillance.

Salinas, Ecuador. -- The Army is building an Advance Air Base to support two squadrons of "Flying Fortresses" and two pursuit squadrons. The work is well advanced: there are nearly 1000 troops there now, 6 inch guns are mounted; there is a Radar installation, and 8 heavy bombers and 8 pursuit ships are operating regularly from this Base.

The Navy's Seaplane Base will not be completed until June at which time two squadrons of PBY's can be handled. In the meantime, a converted destroyer serves as a seaplane tender at Salinas.

Gulf of Fonseca — The Navy has established a small Seaplane Base here that can serve as an over-night refueling stop. Further development must be done to make this a secondary operating base for either seaplanes or motor torpedo boats.

Guatemala City. — The Army is enlarging the airport there, and is now operating 12 heavy bombardment type planes and 8 observation and pursuit planes from this field. An emergency landing field for the Army's use is being built at San Jose on the Pacific Coast of Guatemala.

AIR PATROL OPERATIONS — At present the air patrol in the Panama Sea Frontier, Pacific Sector, is being carried on by 24 Navy PBY's and 20 Army B-17's and LB-30s.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT, NARS Date APR 5 1973

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By- April 25th
RADAR in Panama & C.Z.
11 - Long Range - 150 mi
4 - Canadian Type, low angle
10 - Short Range - 70 mi

Cape Gracias a Dios

Mosquito Cays

Providence Is.

St Andrews Is.

x Guatemala City — Army Air Base — 12 heavy bombers

x Navy Air Base

12 PTs (JULY)

GULF FONSECA

Managua

Or at Salinas (Ecuador)

Naval Air Station
24 PBYs

Cristobal

Balboa

David

Rio Hato — 6 Heavy Bombers

Aguadulce — 12 PTs

19 Tuna Boats

Cape Mala (AMS)

6 Converted yachts
10 110' or 173' PCs (MAY)

8 Tuna Boats

4 Submarines

Cocos

12 PTs (JULY)

400 MILES

12 PTs (MAY)

GALAPAGOS ISLANDS

Army & Navy Air Bases

12 more PBYs due in July
29 more B-17s or LB-30s due by September

All patrol planes being equipped with RADAR

RADAR - Long Range Stations to be immediately located at Salinas, Cocos, Galapagos (2); and later, along coasts of Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.

8-Heavy Bombers

Salinas — Army & Navy Air Bases

Talara

1040 MILES

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By RT; NARS Date APR 5 1973

Enclosure "B"

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AIRPLANE COMMANDER'S REPORT
Reconnaissance and Patrol Missions

Unit_____ Date_____

1. Indicate on map on reverse side point and time of take off and landing, track of airplane to include latitude, longitude, and time of all turning points, hourly positions, positions of air and surface craft sighted, bad weather areas, and mean altitude of each leg of track.

2. Were messages sent or received? _____ Attach copies of all messages.

3. In event of combat action, submit detailed report to include injuries and damage received and inflicted on enemy, ammunition expended, performance, characteristics and tactics of enemy. See Form F, Field Manual 1-40.

NARRATIVE ACCOUNTS WILL BE MADE HEREON OF THE FOLLOWING:

4. Observations enroute description, position, and time of all surface and air craft seen.

5. General weather conditions. Show bad weather areas and resultant change of course on map.

6. Difficulties experienced.

7. Remarks. Use additional sheets if necessary.


Signed_____
Airplane Commander

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[redacted]

[redacted]

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT, NARS Date APR 5 1973



ANNEX NO 1 TO F.O. NO. 10 PANAMA AIR TASK FORCE

PLOT OF PATROLS 16 MARCH 1942.

OVERLAY OF HYDROGRAPHIC OFFICE CHART V-200

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL LYON


F.G. ALLEN,
LT. COLONEL, AIR CORPS,
EXECUTIVE.

OFFICIAL:
J.E. Glantzberg
F.L. GLANTZBERG
LT. COLONEL, AIR CORPS
S-3

_____ NAVY
_____ ARMY

16 PLANES IN PACIFIC

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Enclosure A

SECRET

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Safe - Materials

PSF

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

File Confidential

January 14, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Since December 7th, the following military movements have occurred:

Rail Movements (largely to the West Coast):

572,000 troops, with armament and materiel
2,945,000 short tons of freight.

Ship Movements:

38,000 troops
265,000 ship cargo tons.

All this has been handled quietly, without confusion, largely due to the development during the past two years of our base port organization on the East and West coasts, with their depots for reservoirs of supplies; - also, through the vacating of cantonments in the Northeast which have been used as staging areas to accommodate troops enroute for overseas convoys. The Quartermaster General's section for coordinating rail movements has met the test.

The following comments regarding rail movements referred to above were made by the President of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company:

"I am hearing continuous praise of your Generals and their assistants in the handling of all the problems that come before our people.

"The railroads have never had more cooperation than they are now getting out of the armed forces. At this time, in the last war, we were already on the way to congestion on the Atlantic coast. By this time, in this war, there is little or no congestion in sight.

"The great thing that the armed forces have done is the establishment of the storage bases in the East, where it is possible to assemble, to store, and to dispatch

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materials as needed, equalizing the accumulation of continuous production and intermittent shipment in a way that has avoided congestion at the tidewater front."

Chief of Staff.

[redacted]

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
Authority of Letter of
May Gen J.C. Handy
of 30 May 1944
Albert M. Pierrepont
30 May 1944

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

SECRET UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED
CHIEF CLASSIFICATION BRANCH
BY TAG PER
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Marshall

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Basis for preparation of attached outlined plan for Invasion of Western Europe.

1. Western Europe has been selected as the theater in which to stage the first great offensive of the United Powers because:

It is the only place in which a powerful offensive can be prepared and executed by the United Powers in the near future. In any other locality the building up of the required forces would be much more slowly accomplished due to sea distances. Moreover, in other localities the enemy is protected against invasion by natural obstacles and poor communications leading toward the seat of the hostile power, or by elaborately organized and distant outposts. Time would be required to reduce these and to make the attack effective.

It is the only place where the vital air superiority over the hostile land areas preliminary to a major attack can be staged by the United Powers. This is due to the existence of a network of landing fields in England and to the fact that at no other place could massed British air power be employed for such an operation.

It is the only place in which the bulk of the British ground forces can be committed to a general offensive in cooperation with United States forces. It is impossible, in view of the shipping situation, to transfer the bulk of the British forces to any distant region, and the protection of the British islands would hold the bulk of the divisions in England.

The United States can concentrate and use larger forces in Western Europe than in any other place, due to sea distances and the existence in England of base facilities.

[redacted]

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...ION CANCELED
...rity of Letter of
Gen. J.C. Lambert of
Dec. 1961
By Albert H. Kesselman
Date 30 May 1964

The bulk of the combat forces of the United States, United Kingdom and Russia can be applied simultaneously only against Germany, and then only if we attack in time. We cannot concentrate against Japan.

Successful attack in this area will afford the maximum of support to the Russian front.

2. Decision as to the locality of the main effort must be made now. This is true even if the actual attack cannot be launched during this year. A major attack must be preceded by a long period of intensive preparation. Basic decision is necessary so that all production, special construction, training, troop movements and allocations can be coordinated to a single end. Until this process of coordinated and intensified effort is initiated it is difficult to calculate even the approximate date at which a major offensive can be undertaken.

The element of time is of the utmost importance. We must begin an offensive on a major scale before Russia, now practically alone, can be defeated and before Vichy France, Spain, Portugal and Turkey are drawn into the ranks of our enemies.

3. Gist of Plan.

The plan more fully outlined in later paragraphs provides for an attack by combined forces against Western Europe at the earliest possible moment that the necessary tactical forces can be accumulated -- estimated at April 1, 1943, provided decision is made now and our men, materiel and shipping are not further dispersed. (An earlier date for an "emergency" offensive is set for the fall of 1942 as will be explained later)

Combined forces required, exclusive of Naval support, are:

Three thousand fighter planes.
Twenty eight hundred planes (other combat types)
Forty eight Divisions (all types - 30 of them U.S.)
Paratroops; airborne troops; A.A. - etc.
Total U.S. personnel to be transported to England:
1,000,000 by the date of initiating the attack.

The plan contemplates three main phases.

a. - Preparatory. Beginning now, to date of initiating main attack.

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...TION CANCELLED
...nity of Letter
Gen. J. C. Lambert
...May 1964
By Albert Hennessy
Date 20 May 1964

b. - Cross channel movement and seizure of beachhead between Le Havre and Boulogne.

c. - Consolidation of beachhead and beginning of further operations.

4. An added feature of this plan is that, during the preparatory period it provides means to act promptly under either of the following eventualities:

(a) If the imminence of Russian collapse requires desperate action, a sacrifice attack could be made.

(b) If German forces are almost completely absorbed on the Russian front, a prompt movement to the continent might be undertaken with much smaller forces than would otherwise be justified.

Included, later in this paper, is an outlined plan for an attack about September 15, 1942.

5. Limitations as to time and as to strength of attack are imposed upon both plans by the shortage of shipping, and, secondarily, by the difficulty in the production of landing craft. Further limitations are imposed by the necessity for executing certain commitments and requirements, already of record, which absorb a certain amount of shipping. These include:

2 Divisions to Australia
1 Division to New Zealand
Sufficient shipping to England to transport 40,000 troops and equipment to the Middle East.
Continuance of material aid to Russia and to others of the United Nations.

PLAN FOR OPERATIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE

6. Assumptions.

a. That the line, Alaska - Hawaii - Australia will be held and Pacific garrisons increased from a present approximate strength of 175,000 to an approximate strength of 300,000.

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CANCELLED
per Gilly Mtg. Gen. Lambert 30 May 1964
Date 20 May 1964

b. That present U. S. commitments will be executed. These include dispatch of the 41st and one additional division to Australia, one division to New Zealand, and the loan of sufficient shipping to the British to move 40,000 troops to the Middle East, and the building up of a small air force in China - India. Providing the British furnish the necessary planes from aircraft now allotted to them, two groups pursuit, one group medium bombardment and two groups light bombardment should be sent to the Middle East as the only additional U. S. commitment to theaters other than Western Europe. This will have a corresponding effect in diminishing the U. S. planes available for the offensive in Europe.

c. That Russia is still effective in the war to the extent that the bulk of the German forces are required on the Russian front.

d. That Axis forces in Western Europe remain at approximately their present strength.

7. From an examination of the hostile situation, it is concluded that a successful attack can be made only with combat power as follows:

a. Adequate air superiority over the enemy involving the use by the Allies of a minimum of 3,000 fighters and 2,850 combat planes other than fighters. (Combined British and U. S.).

b. Ability to land in the first wave the major combat elements of an infantry and armored force of at least six divisions. At the beginning of the actual invasion, U. S. land forces in England or en route should be approximately : six armored, five motorized, 13 infantry and one air-borne division.

c. An ability to land on the western coast of Europe behind the leading wave, a weekly increment initially of at least 100,000 troops, and, after the invasion forces have landed, a continuous flow of reinforcements from the United States at the maximum rate that shipping will permit.

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ION CANCELED
by order of Lieut Gen J. L. Devers
Commdg 2d A/Army 1944
Lieut Colonel
Date 21 May 1944

8. Plan.

a. This plan provides for the movement to the British Isles of U. S. air and ground forces comprising approximately one million men to participate with the British in an invasion of France between Le Havre and Boulogne. Logistic factors fix the earliest possible date for an attack on this scale at about April 1, 1943. Bottlenecks, as to time, will be shipping and landing craft, which will not be available in sufficient quantity by the time that aircraft, ground equipment and ammunition can be supplied.

b. The operation proper is divided into three phases:

(1) Preparatory phase. (From now until April 1, 1943).
(2) The cross-channel movement and seizure of the beach head.
(3) The consolidation of the beach head with a view to further operations.

(1) Preparatory Phase.

During the preparatory phase maximum effort to be made to complete the organization, equipment and training of the air and ground forces involved, and to coordinate all productive effort toward this objective. This includes the early establishment of additional air installations in England, and the movement to the British Isles of air and ground forces to complete their training in conjunction with the British. A continued air offensive against vital Axis targets on the mainland of Europe should be carried out prior to April 1, 1943. In addition to the destruction accomplished this will enable American and British air forces to work together and so develop a coordinated combat team. Likewise, participation of U. S. ground troops in raids against the coast of continental Europe from Norway to the souther limits of occupied France will not only harass the German occupying forces, but will aid materially in the training of U. S. and British ground forces, and will obtain information concerning the organization of the German defenses along the coast. Above all, it will produce the coordinated combat methods vital to success. During the final two weeks just prior to the land invasion, an intensification of air activities against the invasion front will be carried out with the view to neutralizing the Axis air forces on that front and to beating down the Axis defensive system.

(2) The cross channel movement and later consolidation.

The invasion itself will consist of a cross-channel movement and the seizure of a beach head between Le Havre and Boulogne,.

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CANCELLED
Gillon 9 May Hon.
C.S.J.C. 7 & 9 May 1944
Brig. Gen. USA
30 May 1944

strongly supported by combat aviation. The main landing should be made on a six division front. Parachute and air-borne troops to be employed in addition to combat aviation in assisting the ground forces in establishing the beach head and in preventing rapid movement of German reinforcements toward the coast. As soon as a beach head is established, strong armored forces are to be ferried across the channel to break the German resistance along the coast and to seize the line of the Oise-St. Quentin. A movement towards Antwerp will then follow to widen the salient and permit the movement of additional forces across the channel between Boulogne and Antwerp. (See Map A).

c. U. S. and British forces as follows should be in Great Britain or en route when the land attack begins:

U.S. (can be available)		British (Numbers of British aircraft shown are minimum requirements. Information is not at hand as to how many the British can make available.)	
1, 450	Fighters) Modified by	1,550	Fighters
1,800	Combat other than) any planes	1,000	Combat other than fighters
	fighters) sent to Mid-		
400	Transport aircraft) dle East.	200	Transports. (It is estimated that the British can make available.)
18	Infantry Divisions	15	Infantry Divisions
6	Armored Divisions	3	Armored Divisions
5	Motorized Divisions	1	Parachute Brig.
1	Air-borne Division	3	A.A. Gps.
11	Parachute Bns.		
30	A.A. Regts.		

9. General Comments.

a. Some protective effect will be felt in the Atlantic Ocean as a result of a major attack against West Europe. The garrisons in the Atlantic will not require material reinforcement. This does not apply to the Pacific, to India, and to the Middle East, consequently our protective measures in those regions must be adequate.

b. U. S. troops will be equipped and trained in time for the operation.

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ION CANCELED
by: Adjt. Gen. 17 May
C. Lambert 20 May 1964
Gilbert H. Grosvenor
Date 20 May 1964

c. American shipping available for movement overseas of the U. S. troops will transport approximately 40% of the number involved by April 1, 1943. If this movement must depend entirely on available U. S. shipping, the date of initiating the invasion of France must be postponed until late summer 1943, by which time U. S. shipping can effect the overseas movement of the entire force.

d. An accurate estimate of the availability early in 1943 of all Allied shipping is being made by the CG, SOS. However, it is believed that when the movement of British reinforcements to the Middle and Far East now projected for 1942 has been effected, and the situation in those areas stabilized, sufficient passenger transports can be made available for the movement of U. S. troops to England to meet the requirements of this plan. Additional cargo vessels will have to be diverted after January 1, 1943 to support this operation.

e. Landing craft necessary for the operation is not available at present in sufficient quantities to support the cross-channel movement. Provision for some 7,000 landing craft considered essential for this operation has been initiated. However, only through intensification of this construction program, immediately after agreement in principle has been reached, can this number possibly be procured.

f. One of our current tasks is to send to Russia sufficient materiel aid to keep that nation in the war as an active participant. Since the execution of the contemplated plan is not feasible in 1942, other means of rendering assistance to Russia will have to be undertaken. This definitely involves air support to the Middle East; although this is a British responsibility, our vital interests are involved.

Development and construction of air fields, bases, cantonments, etc., in the British Isles in preparation for invasion of Western Europe in 1943 must be substantially completed in 1942.

g. An advantage of this plan is that, while it is still in the preparatory stages, if the German army should show signs of imminent collapse, an invasion of Western Europe can be carried out on a limited scale.

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CANCELED
Auth: Adj Gen Regs
Date: 20 May 1964
By: Ltr Lt Col Lawrence
Date 20 May 1964

10. Modified Plan.

The following represents what can be accomplished to effect an invasion of France on or about September 15, 1942 should a decision be made to advance the date of execution of the operation.

a. U. S. troops that can be made available and arrive in England in time to participate. (Figures include 34th Division and 1st Armored Division).

Air Forces.

400 Fighters
333 Combat other than fighters
200 Transport

Ground Forces.

2½ Infantry Divisions and 1 Armored Division, or
1½ Infantry Divisions and 2 Armored Divisions, or
1½ Infantry Divisions, 1 Armored Division, 4 Parachute Bns, and 10 Antiaircraft Regiments.

b. Inclusive of the above, a total of six Infantry, three Armored, and two Motorized Divisions, four Parachute Battalions, and ten Antiaircraft Regiments will be equipped and trained in the U. S. in time to participate in this operation. Shortage in shipping precludes transporting more than the number indicated unless shipping is diverted from another commitment.

c. British troops estimated to be available to participate.

Air Forces.

No data is at hand as to how many planes the British can make available. The minimum considered essential, exclusive of U. S. air forces, is 2,600 fighters, 2,400 combat other than fighters, and all available transport aircraft.

Ground Forces.

15 Infantry Divisions
3 Armored Divisions
1 Parachute Brigade
3 Antiaircraft Groups.

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ATION CANCELED
of Letter of 8 May
Conduct of 20 May 1964
Walter Bedell Smith
Date 20 May 1964

d. THIS LIMITED OPERATION CAN BE JUSTIFIED ONLY IN CASE

(1) THE SITUATION OF THE RUSSIAN FRONT BECOMES DESPERATE, i.e., the success of German arms becomes so complete as to threaten the imminent collapse of Russian resistance unless the pressure is relieved by an attack from the west by British and American troops. In this case the attack should be considered as a sacrifice in the common good.

(2) THE GERMAN SITUATION IN WESTERN EUROPE BECOMES CRITICALLY WEAKENED.

11. The details of necessary Naval support are under study.

12. There is attached a paper commenting upon the employment of U. S. troops in Syria, in Lybia, and in Northwest Africa.

Chief of Staff.



a43999 09

January 16, 1942

Dear George:

Will you let me know what your plans are for reinforcing General Maxwell's Mission in Egypt and General Wheeler's at Basra.

Very sincerely yours,

General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff,
War Department.

HLH/lmb

WAR DEPARTMENT
U. S. MILITARY NORTH AFRICAN MISSION
WASHINGTON

January 2, 1942.

Mr. Harry Hopkins,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Enclosed for your information are two cablegrams, Amseg 87 and Amseg 103, recently received from General Maxwell, whose headquarters are in Cairo, Egypt.


These cables have been taken up with the War Plans Division, who have given them consideration.

Yours very truly,

Stuart L. Bullivant

STUART L. BULLIVANT,
Major, Specialist,
Chief, Home Office.

SLB:kew
Encls.-2



10-26-66

Carl L. Spicer

A.G. 400.3295 (12-21-41)MSC PARAPHRASE EMB/voc--
From: CAIRO December 21,
To: ADJUTANT GENERAL

414 A'SEC 103 MESSAGE IS SENT BY MAXWELL TO RIGGS PERIOD AS A RESULT OF A MEETING WITH BULLIT, IT WAS REQUESTED BY THE HIGHEST RANKING BRITISH AUTHORITY THAT TROOPS BE SENT TO THE MIDDLE EAST AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE PERIOD THESE TROOPS WILL CONSIST OF 500 COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND ALSO 14 THOUSAND MEN TO AID THE PRESENT COMBINED BRITISH FORCES PERIOD THESE TROOPS ARE REQUESTED IN THE FOLLOWING ORDER OF PRIORITY: a) 2 - 2½ TON QM TRUCK REGIMENTS, b) 1 - 10 TON QM TRUCK REGIMENTS, c) 1 - HEAVY MAINTENANCE QM REGIMENT, d) 1 LIGHT MAINTENANCE QM BATTALION, e) 2 CONSTRUCTION SIGNAL BATTALIONS, f) 1 REPAIR SIGNAL COMPANY, g) 1 BATTALION WITH ONE SIGNAL COMPANY, OPERATIONS, h) 6 ENGINEER BATTALIONS MOBILE SHOP COMPANIES, i) 1 ENGINEER SPECIAL INLAND WATERWAYS WITH ONE MAINTENANCE COMPANY, j) 1 ENGINEER HEADQUARTERS RAILWAY DIVISION , k) 2 ENGINEERS BATTALION, RAILWAY OPERATING, l) 1 ENGINEER BATTALION, RAILWAY SHOP. THE ABOVE OUTFITS ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE MEDICAL CORPS AND ORDANCE DEPARTMENT TROOPS THAT HAVE ALREADY BEEN ASKED FOR. IT ALSO SHOULD BE DEFINITELY KEPT IN MIND THAT ALL THE ABOVE-LISTED SERVICE TROOPS THAT ARE SENT WILL BE SUED BY THE MISSION AND UNDER ITS CONTROL, TO ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVES SPECIFIED BY THE BRITISH. THE SERVICE TROOPS WILL BE UNDER THE COMMAND OF AMERICAN OFFICES. THIS REQUEST FOR TROOPS IS SO URGENT THAT WE REQUEST THAT THE PERSONNEL OF THE MOTOR TRANSPORT ARRIVE BEFORE THE CARGO MATERIEL OF THE GROUPS SO THAT THEY (THE MOTOR TRANSPORT PERSONNEL) MAY OPERATE THE CARGO THAT IS HERE AT PRESENT. ALSO THE SAME SITUATION APPLIES TO MAINTENANCE MAINTENANCE MEN AND IT IS REQUESTED THAT THEY CAN BE SENT EQUIPPED ONLY WITH HAND TOOLS AHEAD OF THE SHIPMENT OF POWER TOOLS SO THAT THEY CAN AID IN THE SOLUTION OF OUR PROBLEMS. A SMALL QUANTITY OF SUPPLIES AND ALSO SOME SHELTER CAN BE TURNED OVER TO THESE TROOPS BY THE BRITISH, BUT WE CONSIDER IT ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT ALL OF THE TROOPS, THAT ARE FURNISHED TO THIS AREA, BE ENTIRELY EQUIPPED WITH A HALF-YEAR'S SUPPLY OF SHELTER AND SUPPLIES.

PARAPHRASE

FROM CAIRO DECEMBER 18, 1941

TO ADJUTANT GENERAL- MILITARY MISSIONS 2:17 A. M.

NO 384 AMSEG 87 DECEMBER 16TH

FOR RIGGS FROM MAXWELL FROM DATA AVAILABLE RE AMERICAN ORDNANCE ON HAND AND EN ROUTE COMMA REQUEST EARLY DISPATCH FOR DUTY WITH MISSION ONE ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY BATTALION AND ONE MAINTENANCE BATTALION COMMA ARMORED DIVISION PERIOD THESE TO OPERATE MOBILE ORDNANCE ESTABLISHMENTS IN ADVANCE OF FIXED DEPTS AND SHOPS NOW PLANNED AND BEHIND BRITISH DIVISION SHOPS PERIOD THIS ARRANGEMENT NECESSITATED BY HEAVY BATTLE DAMAGE TO AMERICAN ORDNANCE IN RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND LACK OF BRITISH MAINTENANCE TROOPS PERIOD ADVISE IF ACTION TAKEN PERIOD

FELLERS

COPY gal

10-26-66

Carl L. Spicer

January 2, 1942.

Mr. Harry Hopkins,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Enclosed for your information are two cablegrams, Amseg 87 and Amseg 103, recently received from General Maxwell, whose headquarters are in Cairo, Egypt.

These cables have been taken up with the War Plans Division, who have given them consideration.

Yours very truly,

STUART L. SULLIVANT,
Major, Specialist,
Chief, Home Office.

SLS:kew
Encls.-2

a43405

SECRET

OPERATION MODICUM

1. Code Name.

The code name to be applied to the party leaving Baltimore for England on April 4 by Pan American aircraft will be "Modicum." All reference to this party in trans-Atlantic telephone calls, radios or cablegrams will be by this code name.

2. Fictitious Names.

Members of the party will be referred to by the following fictitious names in all communications where secrecy is essential. These names will be known to those shown on the distribution list below:

Mr. Harry Hopkins--Mr. A. H. Hones
General G. C. Marshall--Mr. C. G. Bell
Commander James R. Fulton--Mr. A. L. Foss
Colonel H. A. Craig--Mr. J. H. Case
Lt. Col. A. C. Wedemeyer--Mr. J. E. White

3. Officers in Charge of Detailed Arrangements.

a. Colonel H. A. Craig is designated as the officer through whom all detailed arrangements pertaining to the flight to and from England will be made. It will be his duty to see that the arrangements indicated below are carried out and to act as liaison officer between British air authorities and Pan American Aviation.

b. Lt. Col. Wedemeyer will, in addition to his other duties, perform such duties as Aide to the Chief of Staff as may be directed. He will also make any other detailed arrangements during the visit in England for the entire party as may be necessary.

4. Schedule of Flight.

Leave Baltimore 7 A.M. April 4 (Eastern War Time). Arrive Bermuda 1 P.M. April 4 (Eastern War Time). Leave Bermuda 9 A.M. April 5, G.M.T. (daybreak). Arrive Lock Erne at 5:45 A.M., G.M.T., April 6 (daybreak). Delays from Bermuda will be on a 24-hour basis.

5. Type and Number of Airplanes.

Flight will be made in Pan American airplane of the Boeing B 314 type Flying Boat. The number of the aircraft is NC18604. It is equipped with a 275 watt transmitter, call sign KHCKH, frequencies 3285, 6573, and for long range daylight 12776.

~~SECRET~~

10-26-66
Carl T. Spicer

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~ - 10-26-66
Carl L Spicer

6. Papers Required on Departure.

The flight from Baltimore to Bermuda will be considered a ferry flight and no ticketing, immigration papers, etc., will be required.

7. Weather Forecasts.

Air Commodore Thornton, British Air Commission, has arranged through the Ferry Command radio facilities to have weather information, forecasts, and facilities made available to PAA upon arrival in Bermuda. He has also arranged to have and will be responsible for proper weather information, route forecasts and local forecasts covering the destination and alternate terminals in the British Isles.

Two route forecasts will be available to PAA at Bermuda, one prepared by the Newfoundland airport, and one prepared by the British at Bermuda.

Air Commodore Thornton will arrange to have a special radio watch for this flight maintained in order that the aircraft will have proper communication at all times with British control stations.

8. Security.

a. The Pan American Aviation will arrange directly with the Navy for a clearance of the aircraft from the United States and for security against United States ships at sea for the initial stages of the flight.

b. Air Commodore Thornton will arrange through the British Air Ferry Command to have appropriate codes and recognition signals or devices turned over to the captain of the aircraft at Bermuda.

c. Arrangements have been made with the R.A.F. to provide for protection for the landing of the Pan American aircraft and for protection for the further flight from Lock Erne to England.

9. Release of Flight from Bermuda.

Prestwick (Air Ferry Command Control--Montreal) shall only release the flight from Bermuda providing contact conditions (1,000 feet and 2 miles) prevail at Lock Erne, the terminal destination, or at one of the other available British alternates. The British have arranged that Prestwick (control station) will, by special arrangement, collect hourly local weather from Foynes and release them only when required by PAA in the event that Foynes must be used as an emergency alternate. All arrangements with Prestwick will be handled by Air Commodore Thornton.

a43hh02

~~SECRET~~

10. Destination of P.A. Plane and Alternate Destinations.

The intended destination of the Pan American aircraft is Lock Erne in North Ireland. In case of necessity one of the following alternates may be used in order of priority:

(1) Lock Ryan,
(2) Islay
(3) Oban
(4) Pembroke
(5) Plymouth
(6) Foynes

The last named will be used only in extreme emergency and in the event that none of the others are available. Horta, Azores, will be used as an alternate as a last resort. P.A. will arrange for swell forecasts from Horta.

11. Flight from Lock Erne to England.

Arrangements have been made with Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal to have the Pan American aircraft met at Lock Erne and for the party to be transported from Lock Erne to London by British aircraft.

12. Return to United States.

Arrangements for the return flight to the United States will be under control of the R.A.F. or the British Air Ferry Command which will issue instructions to the Pan American Airways through Colonel H. A. Craig, member of the party.

13. Delay in Departure from Baltimore.

In case of delays in departure from Baltimore, accommodations will be available in the Lord Baltimore Hotel. If the delay is to be prolonged, instructions will be obtained from the senior members of the party.

DISTRIBUTION:

The President	2 Copies
The Secretary of War	1 Copy
Each member of party	2 Copies
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Chief of Operations Division	2 Copies
Chief of Naval Operations	2 Copies
General Chaney	3 Copies
Air Commodore Thornton	1 Copy
Col. Craig - for P.A. (to be used on board only)	1 Copy

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~~SECRET~~

... 10-21-66

...ature: Carl L. Spu...

a43h403

...it Library
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 4-6-59
Signature- Carl L. Spicer

PSF
Safe file
Marshall

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

February 23, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

In our conversation February 17th you brought up the question of moving troops directly to New Caledonia without the necessity of uniting them with their organizational equipment in Australia. I have had the matter investigated and submit the following:

It is important that troops arriving in New Caledonia be prepared to fight, i.e., that they have most of their equipment at hand. Combat unit loading, each unit and its equipment on the same boat, was not possible.

In this particular instance seven transports sailed from New York in a single convoy on January 23d, with 17,000 troops for New Caledonia and about 4,000 troops for Australia. The Maritime Commission was unable to furnish freighters for their heavy equipment on the east coast so that was sent out on nine vessels from the west coast, between February 12th and 21st, without naval escort.

The troops are due in Australia February 26th, but the freight will not reach there until during the two-week period starting March 15th. To delay the troops while waiting for the freight would have meant delaying the arrival of the naval Borabora contingent in the same convoy and increasing the hazard for the convoy. To send the freight directly to New Caledonia would have delayed the arrival of airplanes destined for Australia which of necessity had to be loaded on these freighters. Also it would have involved a complicated reloading problem in a port of limited facilities which might at any moment be attacked. The troops and their equipment will be assembled in Australia, prepared for a rapid disembarkation in New Caledonia, with the critical equipment first available.

In brief, the voyage is being made to New Caledonia via Australia in order to utilize to the utmost the available capacity of shipping; this at a sacrifice of speed. I fear we will have to submit in part to these conditions until the shipping program has developed to such an extent that cargo space is no longer the limiting factor.

Chief of Staff.

PSF - Safe : Marshall

N. Navy. 387

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

SRS

[redacted]

Date- [illegible]

44—5390

Signature- RHP

Memo for the President:

This is a corrected copy of Admiral Stark's study on "Courses open to us" — which the C.N.O. asked me to substitute for the one Secy. Knox gave to the President about ten days ago.

Respy,
H. R. Harrington

a43:101

PSF, Safe, Surrender

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

February 4, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following summary of Army troop and supply movements will probably be of interest:

December 7 to January 13	572,677 troops
January 13 to January 31	423,359 troops
Total since December 7	996,036

The following movements of troops, planes and other cargo for overseas destinations have occurred:

December 7 to January 13	86,181 troops
	575 planes
	565,800 ship tons.

Troop movements within the United States have included the grouping of large units for super-gymnast and the organization of Army corps groups following the withdrawal of units for Hawaii, Australia and Ireland.

Chief of Staff.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 4-3-59
Signature- Carl L. Spicer

OUTLINE MAP OF THE WORLD

U.S. ARMY FORCES

ISSUE No. 6

~~SECRET~~

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COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
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BASE	GROUND O	GROUND E.M.	AIR O	AIR E.M.	TOTAL O	TOTAL E.M.
(1) GREENLAND	19	387	16	331	35	718
(2) ICELAND	721	(5,771)	54	490	775	(6,261)
(3) NORTH IRELAND	534	10,465	0	0	534	10,465
(4) LONDON, ENGLAND	376	333	48	15	424	348
(5) NEWFOUNDLAND	NA	NA	NA	NA	197	2,189
(6) BERMUDA	111	2,239	5	88	116	2,347
(7) PUERTO RICO	952	(6,205)	534	6,080	1,506	12,145
(8) ST. THOMAS	26	495	0	0	26	495
(9) ST. CROIX	6	183	0	4	6	187
(10) ANTIGUA	23	473	21	259	44	732
(11) ST. LUCIA	12	247	15	172	27	419
Arrived 3-10-42	NA	NA	NA	NA	8	156
(12) TRINIDAD	183	2,837	52	1,897	235	4,734
(13) BRITISH GUIANA	19	271	16	188	54	459
(14) SURINAM	30	627	30	312	60	939
(15) VENEZUELA	12	277	0	0	12	277
(16) CURACAO	57	1,111	0	0	57	1,111
(17) ARUBA	48	1,018	0	0	48	1,018
(18) JAMAICA	17	268	1	24	18	292

BASE	GROUND O	GROUND E.M.	AIR O	AIR E.M.	TOTAL O	TOTAL E.M.
(19) PANAMA	1,830	33,878	986	13,326	2,816	47,204
(20) PERU	NA	NA	NA	NA	15	283*
(21) CHILE	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
(22) ALASKA	1,115	24,301	357	5,725	1,472	28,026
(23) BRITISH COLUMBIA	NA	NA	NA	NA	69	1,734
(24) HAWAII	3,192	55,514	981	7,887	4,173	63,401
(25) CANTON ISLAND	51	1,233	2	35	53	1,268
(26) CHRISTMAS ISLAND	71	1,559	48	266	119	1,825
(27) BORA BORA	NA	NA	NA	NA	190	3,555*
(28) FIJI ISLANDS	0	0	61	835	61	835
(29) NEW CALEDONIA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
(30) AUSTRALIA	951	11,418	1,191	12,025	2,141	23,443
Arrived 3-23-42	NA	NA	NA	NA	330	7,913*
(31) PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
(32) CHINA	63	18	59	36	122	54
(33) INDIA	NA	NA	NA	NA	137	3,099
(34) ASCENSION ISLAND	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
(35) UNITED STATES	NA	NA	NA	NA	155,000	1,810,000 EM

NA - Figures not available
* - Sailing strength

War Department
Statistics Branch General Staff
WDGS-A 3-30-42

a43jj01

PSF
Safe
Marshall

To The President

from the Office of the Chief of Staff

Feb. 14, 1942

9:46 A.M.

From HQ USAFFE

To GEN GEORGE C MARSHALL

No. 274, Feb. 13.

Following supplies received by submarine and blockade runner. REURAD 1040. Jan. 28, by submarine from Australia, 72 rounds 3 INRHYRO AAHRAPNEL for M-1917 gun, 540 boxes caliber .50 AP, 135 boxes caliber .50 tracer. Feb. 3, by submarine from Hawaii, 3,517 rounds 3-inch AA shell HE with mechanical time fuze for M-3 gun. Locally by 3 vessels, approximately 1,500 tons food stuffs.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 4-6-59
Signature- Carl L. Spicer

a43K01

SECRET

March 31, 1942

Dear Mr. President:

Last December, in a conference with you, it was agreed that it was within our economic potential to produce completed munitions, war facilities and military construction to the value of $40 billions in calendar year 1942 and $60 billions in 1943. We feel certain that these are feasible goals although, at the time when they were set, many doubted that they were attainable. At that time, the production schedules for all items, extended at peak, represented commitments amounting only to $27 billions for 1942 and $34 billions for 1943. Thus there was, according to our calculations, margin for additional requirements amounting to approximately $13 billions for 1942, and $26 billions for 1943.

The specific objectives which you set for airplanes, tanks, anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, and merchant shipping were accomplishable within the margin between the then existing production programs and the production possibilities of this Nation.

Since that date the programs which have been formulated by the Army, the Navy, and the Maritime Commission have expanded far beyond the $40 billion and $60 billion estimates. As these programs now stand, they represent munitions and war construction outlays totaling some $62 billions for 1942 and $110 billions for 1943.

The War Department has advised me that it is submitting recommendations to you for the modification of certain of the specific objectives which you have set which would permit the production of armored cars, self-propelled artillery weapons and other arms necessary to provide a balanced equipment for the Army. As you realize, I do not feel qualified to pass on the relative urgency of weapons desired by the Army. However, I have examined the production possibilities and must report that, in my judgment, it will not be possible to provide all of the items set forth in your list of objectives, and at the same time produce everything else now called for under the programs of the Army, the Navy, the Maritime Commission, and Defense Aid, which would call for the total outlays of $62 and $110 billions as stated above.

REGRADED
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a43kk01

It is of critical importance that the Board should have a clear mandate of the items that are to be procured under a maximum economic effort. If requirements are defined short of our utmost potential our planning will, of necessity, fall short of providing for a complete mobilization of our resources. If requirements are set of a dimension far beyond attainment, we shall find ourselves with overexpended facilities for which there are insufficient raw materials, with many finished items and components for which necessary complements are missing, and with general economic confusion and dislocation.

I should feel myself negligent in duty if I did not point out that we are at an impasse in our production planning, in that we still are without definition of a full list of requirements that are consistent with what we have defined as, and still believe to be, practicable overall goals.

Under these circumstances, I feel that I must come to you for instruction upon what is clearly a matter of major policy.

Respectfully,

Donald M. Nelson

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

SMay:jr

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a43kk02

SECRET

COMMENTS ON THE USE OF U. S. TROOPS IN
THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

1. General Estimate.

a. USE OF U. S. TROOPS IN SYRIA.

A U. S. Force in the Syrian Theatre would be a strategically defensive force, capable merely of preventing the Axis from accomplishing some of their strategic aims. It would be incapable of accomplishing decisive results against Germany proper.

b. USE OF U. S. TROOPS IN LIBYA.

A U. S. Force in Libya would be incapable of accomplishing decisive results against Germany proper. It would be basically a strategically defensive force, having however, the opportunity for limited offensive operations with the object of

(1) Eliminating Axis forces from North Africa.

(2) Securing of bases in North Africa from which long range bombing of targets in Europe would be possible.

10-25-41

(Col J. Spaatz)

(3) Preventing Axis domination of the Mediterranean.

c. USE OF U. S. TROOPS IN NORTHWEST AFRICA.

A U. S. Force in Northwest Africa would be incapable of decisive results of an offensive nature. It would be a strategically defensive force, which once established, would

(1) Prevent Axis seizure of West Africa.

(2) Render impossible Axis naval operations based on the West African coast.

(3) Serve as a base for offensive operations having the limited objective of seizing French North Africa.

d. Shipping for movement of troops to any of the above named places will not be available prior to about September 1, 1942.

2. Discussion.

a. USE OF U. S. TROOPS IN SYRIA.

Ground forces employed in Syria and the surrounding country should be of a highly mobile type, strong in armored elements. The area does not lend itself to the employment of large field armies on account of shortage in communication and transport facilities. It is doubtful if a force of greater than ten divisions can be supported in this area.

Six Infantry, two Motorized, and three Armored Divisions

The shipping situation is such that if our present commitments are carried out, including the reinforcement of overseas garrisons to bring them to a safe level, no troops can be dispatched to Syria until about September 1, 1942. At that time shipping for about 82,000 men will become available. On account of the long turn around, it is estimated that it will take until July 1943 to set down in Syria a force of ten or eleven divisions.

The turn-around for shipping to the head of the Persian Gulf or Suez is five months, while to England it is less than two and one-half months. In other words, for every division sent to the Middle East and supported in that area, over two divisions can be sent to England and supported in that area.

Due to the limits imposed by the size of the air forces available and our present commitments, it will be impossible to set up a large offensive Air Force in more than one theater during 1942. The pressure of events has forced us to disperse our Air Forces to such an extent that we now, at best, have only a bare minimum of defensive air strength in any theater. This is one of the reasons why the enemy still retains the initiative both in Europe and in Asia.

Now under consideration is a plan to send one group of medium bombardment, two groups of light bombardment and two groups of pursuit aviation to the Middle East as assistance to the British in holding that area. These would have to come from air forces intended for the British Isles or some other area.

The present situation should not blind us to the principle of concentration of force and our strategic conception must look toward the early establishment of an air force strong enough to achieve decisive results in some one theater.

b. USE OF U. S. TROOPS IN LYBIA.

The considerations outlined above relative to operations in SYRIA would also hold true in the LYBIAN Theater. The forces we could place in this theater and the length of our lines of communication, would be approximately the same as for SYRIA. The sole advantage that this Theater has over SYRIA is that it might better our general strategic position by successful offensive action. This might occur as follows:

(1) Successful offensive operations as they progress would place us in a progressively more favorable position for long range bombing of targets in Europe.

(2) Elimination of Axis forces in North Africa would deny control of the Mediterranean to the Axis.

NLT-25-66
(Chief of Military Archives)

c. USE OF U. S. TROOPS IN NORTHWEST AFRICA.

[redacted]

aid materially in breaking Axis control of the Mediterranean and would prevent an Axis move through West Africa. In this respect, such a force would have unquestioned strategic value. Plans for this operation are based on the assumption that it will be executed with the approval of the local authorities. Our forces, however, must be prepared to face resistance developed by Axis sympathizers among the local forces. In addition this operation must take place within the range of German long range bombardment based in Spain. Our air support during the initial phase of this operation will be limited to two aircraft carriers. Our forces here, when fully established, would still be incapable of decisive action against Germany.

Plans in this theater call for a combined U. S. and British operation and the U. S. Units of this force will be available for movement in the near future.

Available shipping is the limiting factor which fixes the earliest date on which this operation could be conducted. The initial elements of the U. S. Forces in this theater must be combat loaded and an insufficient number of vessels suitable for this task are now in the Atlantic. It is estimated that the earliest date on which this shipping might be availaole is during July 1942 but we have no positive assurance that the situation in the Pacific will permit this. Other shipping required should become available during the latter part of August or the 1st of September 1942 and could then be furnished at the maximum rate that the port facilities in Casablanca can accommodate.

The "turn around" time to this port is much shorter than to the Middle East and compares favorably with the shipping time to England. It is estimated that shipping time would permit deliveries at Casablanca at about 3/4 of the rate to England. This advantage in shipping time is offset to a considerable degree by the limited port facilities at Casablanca. The number of troops which can be debarked at a port is limited by the capacity of the port to handle the supplies and equipment which must accompany them. The port facilities at Casablanca will handle equipment and supplies for about 2 Divisions per month, roughly 44,000 men. As the size of the force ashore grows and the shipping ratio of supplies to troops increases, the rate of 44,000 men per month will decrease.

No reserve of Air power exists in the U. S. and the Air Forces set up for this operation must of necessity be allotted from forces available to other theaters.

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SHIPPING CAPABILITIES IN 1942

(Based on the Army's "18 ships per month Program" as augmented by the needs of recent commitments.)

TABLE I - - Present Commitments

	Present or Enroute Mar. 31,1942	Projected Garrisons	Balance to Move	Scheduled April	May	June	July	August
North Atlantic	18,520	25,640	7,120	12,000	800	360	350	350
Ireland or U.K.	11,770			16,000				
Caribbean	92,200	113,730	21,530	8,000	8,000	3,780	1,750	
Alaska	31,450	41,900	10,450	4,000	4,000	2,450		
Hawaii	79,000	119,430	40,430	13,000	16,000	11,430		
S.W. Pacific (Less P.I.)	67,190	149,190	82,000	39,890	21,000	11,000	10,110	
China India Burma	7,470	14,300	6,830				6,830	
	307,600	464,190	168,360	92,890	49,800	29,020	19,040	350

TABLE II

Troop Ship Capability to Reinforce U.K.
(Combat Loaded Ships Not Included)

	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December
Troop Capacity Scheduled (including British ships)	92,890	49,800	29,020	19,040	350				
Troop Capacity Required	92,890	49,800	29,020	19,040	350				
Balance Available for Movements (Troops) to U.K.	-	-	-	8,300	27,800	41,400	64,700	65,000	65,000
British Ships			Beginning September			22,000	22,000	22,000	22,000
Total Troops in U. K. (Cumulative)	11,800	27,800	27,800	36,100	63,900	127,300	214,000	301,000	388,000

TABLE III

Cargo Ship Capability to Reinforce U.K.
(Assuming 18 per month for Army plus needs of recent commitments)

	April	May	June	July	August	September	October	November	December
Cargo Ships Available	175	243	249	254	238	256	275	293	312
Cargo Ships Required									
Backlog	12	12	12	12	12				
Maintenance*	91	127	143	151	156	170	179	190	204
Initial Movements (Table I)	72	104	94	91	62	44	34	30	-
Total	175	243	249	254	230	214	213	220	204
Balance Available for Movements to U.K.	0	0	0	0	8	42	62	73	108
Total Troops in U.K. (Cumulative)	11,800	27,800	27,800	27,800	38,800	85,600	120,000	166,800	254,800

*Includes maintenance for Table I plus that required for August to December reinforcements to U.K.

Table III indicates that cargo shipping is the limiting factor.

The full capacity of available troop ships can be supported if 14 cargo ships per month, additional, are provided beginning in July, 1942.

If two-thirds of the combat loaded transports with their supporting cargo ships (AK's), are made available the first of September, an additional 15,000 troops per month can be moved to the U.K., making a total of 448,000 troops in the U.K. by the end of 1942 (Table II), and of 314,800 troops (Table III).

SECRET

SECRET

Transportation Division
Services of Supply
April 1, 1942

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

a43LL01

PSF
Safe
Marshall

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

February 13, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Seacoast Artillery Defense of the Outlying Islands of the Hawaiian Group.

1. The following information is furnished reference seacoast artillery armament actual and proposed for the outlying islands of the Hawaiian Group:

We have no fixed or mobile seacoast artillery defenses on any of the islands of the Hawaiian Group other than Oahu, nor are there any projected.

2. The planned defenses of the outlying islands provide for defense against air and surface raids and protection of the airfields thereon from air and ground attack and sabotage. The inclusion of adequate seacoast defense artillery, fixed or mobile, to defend all of these islands against a major attack would be uneconomical in that it would immobilize a large number of troops and materiel; also the proper maintenance of these forces would require an excessive amount of shipping not available at this time. The forces projected are believed adequate to protect the islands against anything except a major attack. These forces comprise antiaircraft artillery, infantry, tanks and field artillery. The field artillery consists of 105 mm. and 155 mm. howitzers which are suitable for beach defense.

Chief of Staff.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 4-3-59
Signature- Carl L. Spicer

~~SECRET~~

a43m01

PF - Info: Marshall

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1942

Dear Mr. President:

A detailed examination of production schedules and possibilities indicates that material progress has been made in attaining production rates for 1942 which will meet the objectives which you have established for tanks, anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns and machine guns. However, there is a serious deficiency in the production rates for armored cars, self-propelled mounts for artillery weapons and artillery weapons required to equip a balanced military force. The requisite increase in productive capacity to meet these deficiencies has been discussed with the War Production Board and Mr. Nelson has advised us that it will be impossible to meet the deficiency in these items from available productive capacity and at the same time provide all of the items set forth in your list of objectives.

A joint committee representing the United States and the United Kingdom has developed the requirements for those nations, the U.S.S.R. and other Defense Aid in tanks, armored cars and self-propelled artillery for the remainder of the calendar year and for 1943. The aggregate requirements for 1942 call for 46,523 units which may be considered of tank type and which include 24,703 tanks, 8,940 armored cars, and 12,880 self-propelled mounts for artillery weapons. The production of these 46,523 units is proposed as the goal for 1942 in lieu of the 45,000 tanks which now represents this goal.

We are also faced with a serious deficiency in artillery weapons which can be overcome only through a modification of the anti-aircraft and anti-tank gun program. The proposed modification would provide for the production of 17,400 anti-aircraft, 25,300 anti-tank, and 9,682 field pieces, an increase of 11,682 over the objective now established for 20,000 anti-aircraft, and 20,700 anti-tank guns.

No modification is recommended in the machine gun objectives nor at this time in the objectives established for 1943 since the peak production rates to be reached this year will suffice to meet the objectives established for 1943 unless military requirements should make further recommendations appear desirable.

a43mm01

Three charts are attached hereto which provide additional information with respect to the proposed shift in production. Chart number one gives, in comparable units, the objectives as now established and the proposed modification. Chart number two lists the requirements recommended by the U.S.-U.K. Tank Committee. Chart number three presents, graphically, the proposed conversion of productive capacity to meet balanced requirements.

The proposed modification does not represent a decrease in production. However, it would result in a substantial reduction in the requirements for certain critical materials such as steel plate, which is also needed in the shipping and Naval programs. It would meet all requests on hand or now foreseen for tanks and, at the same time, would provide the equipment for a balanced military force. It would strengthen our offensive power as it would increase the fire power which could be developed on the battle-front.

In view of the above reasons, the modification proposed herein is recommended for your favorable consideration.

Faithfully yours,

Chief of Staff.

Incls.:
Three Charts

APPROVED:

April 1942.

a43mm02

Three charts are attached hereto which provide additional information with respect to the proposed shift in production. Chart number one gives, in comparable units, the objectives as now established and the proposed modification. Chart number two lists the requirements recommended by the U.S.-U.K. Tank Committee. Chart number three presents, graphically, the proposed conversion of productive capacity to meet balanced requirements.

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In view of the above reasons, the modification proposed herein is recommended for your favorable consideration.

Faithfully yours,

Chief of Staff.

Incls.:
Three Charts

APPROVED:

April 1942.

a43mm02

1942

PRESIDENTIAL OBJECTIVE

TANKS		
LIGHT	19,500	
MEDIUM	25,000	
HEAVY	500	
TOTAL TANKS		45,000
ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS		20,000
ANTI-TANK GUNS		20,700
TOTAL AA and AT GUNS		40,700

MODIFICATION RECOMMENDED

TANKS		
LIGHT	10,588	
MEDIUM	14,000	
HEAVY	115	
		24,703
ARMORED CARS		
LIGHT	6,000	
MEDIUM	1,940	
HEAVY	1,000	
		8,940
SELF-PROPELLED MOUNTS		
FOR 37 & 40mm. AA GUNS S.P.	3,100	
FOR 37mm. AT GUNS S.P.	2,539	
FOR 3" or 57mm. AT GUNS S.P.	7,241	
		12,880
TOTAL TANKS and TANK TYPE		46,523
ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS		
90mm.	2,800	
37 & 40mm.	14,600 (a)	
		17,400
ANTI-TANK GUNS		
37mm.	17,000 (b)	
3" or 57mm.	8,300 (c)	
		25,300
TOTAL AA and AT GUNS		42,700
WHEELED and SELF-PROPELLED ARTILLERY		
75mm. HOW. PK. and S.P.	3,050	
105mm. HOW. WH. and S.P.	5,817	
155mm. HOW. and 4.5" GUN.	815	
		9,682
TOTAL GUNS		52,382

(a) INCLUDES 3,100 MOUNTED ON SELF-PROPELLED VEHICLES.
(b) INCLUDES 2,539 MOUNTED ON SELF-PROPELLED VEHICLES.
(c) INCLUDES 7,241 MOUNTED ON SELF-PROPELLED VEHICLES.

5200.9 (9/27/58)
10-26-66
Carl L. Sp

a43mm04

CHART NO. 2

REQUIREMENTS 1942 AND 1943
TANKS, ARMORED CARS, SELF PROPELLED MOUNTS
EMBODIES RECOMMENDATIONS OF U.S. AND U.K. TANK COMMITTEES
ADJUSTED FOR BALANCED PRODUCTION POSSIBILITIES

ITEM	1942 N E I	1942 L A	1942 CHINA	1942 RUSSIA	1942 U K	1942 U S	1942 TOTAL ESTABLISHED REQUIREMENTS	1942 PRESIDENTIAL OBJECTIVES	1943 L A	1943 CHINA	1943 RUSSIA	1943 U K	1943 U S	1943 TOTAL ESTABLISHED REQUIREMENTS	1943 PRESIDENTIAL OBJECTIVES	REMARKS
LIGHT TANKS	50	322	180	4,002	3,500	2,534	10,588	19,500	280	180	6,000	1,750	9,734	17,944	20,000	
TANK, AERO T-9			270		500		770			270		500		770		200 A MONTH PRODUCTION OBJECTIVE
MEDIUM TANKS		85		4,038	5,777	4,100	14,000	25,000	85		6,000	14,493	14,600	35,178	50,000	TOTAL REQUIREMENTS REDUCED IN 1942 FROM 20,553 TO 14,000 TO PROVIDE CHASSIS FOR SELF PROPELLED MOUNTS MADE IN 1943 U K SENDS RUSSIA 3,750 IN 1942, 4,500 IN 1943
ASSAULT TANKS												8,500		8,500		
HEAVY TANKS						115	115	500							5,000	
								SCHEDULED PRODUCTION							SCHEDULED PRODUCTION	
ARMORED CAR, HEAVY					1,000		1,000	600				1,700		1,700		
ARMORED CAR, MEDIUM		26			750	1,161	1,937	3,000	26				4,819	4,845		
ARMORED CAR, LIGHT (SUB TANK T-9)						11,070	11,070	6,000					13,576	13,576		
SELF PROPELLED MOUNT 37mm AT				300	112	2,127	2,539	2,539			1,500	43	6,906	8,249		
SELF PROPELLED MOUNT 40mm				2,500	600		3,100				11,000	1,000		12,000		PRODUCTION DEPENDS ON USE OF LIGHT AND MEDIUM TANK CHASSIS
SELF PROPELLED MOUNT 3" AND 57mm				600	1,300	177 (582)	2,141				2,600	1,500	72 (437)	8,009		PRODUCTION DEPENDS ON USE OF MEDIUM TANK CHASSIS
SELF PROPELLED MOUNT 105 m/m				500	1,100	1,182	2,782				500	720	3,257	4,477		PRODUCTION DEPENDS ON USE OF LIGHT AND MEDIUM TANK CHASSIS

BRITISH PRODUCTION 1942 & 1943

ITEM	EXPECTED 1942	EXPECTED 1943
LIGHT TANKS, AIR	NIL	NIL
LIGHT TANKS, OTHER	250	1,000
CRUISERS, MEDIUM	4,795 (INCLUDES 450 MK VIII)	9,322 (INCLUDES 2,217 MK VII) (INCLUDES 1,000 MK VIII)
ASSAULT TANKS	6,170	6,758 (INCLUDES ONLY 1,458 HEAVY MK VIII)
HEAVY TANKS		
LIGHT ARMORED CARS		
MEDIUM ARMORED CARS	3,000	3,500
HEAVY ARMORED CARS	NIL	NIL
SELF PROPELLED AT GUNS (MOUNTED ON 57mm)	NIL	NIL
(MOUNTED ON 3.7 OR EQUIVALENT)	100	NIL
(MOUNTED ON MEDIUM CANNON)	NIL	NIL

a43mm05

RECOMMENDED ADJUSTMENTS IN PRESIDENTIAL OBJECTIVES

CHART NO. 3

Estimated Production to Meet Presidential Objectives and Additional Estimated Production for Other Major Items of Program — Quantities Required for Balanced Programs	Production in Excess of Balanced Program Requirements — Calendar Year 1942	Conversion of Excess Production to Increase in Balanced Programs — Calendar Year 1942	Estimated Cumulative Production to Change Deficits to Requirements as of Dec 31, 1943 — Cumulative Totals 1942 & 1943	Recommended Presidential Objectives Required to Achieve the Balanced Programs Shown in Columns 5 & 6 — 1942	1943	REMARKS
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

PSF
Safe
Marshall

February 14, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Airplanes for ABDA.

4-Engine

Arrived in ABDA

From Natal	32
From Hawaii	8
Total	40

En route

Between Tampa (excl) and Natal (incl)	4
Between Natal (excl) and Cairo (incl)	8
Between Cairo (excl) and Ceylon (incl)	12
Total Africa	24
Between San Francisco (excl) and Hawaii(incl)	0
Between Hawaii (excl) and ABDA (excl)	1
Total Pacific	1
Total 4-Engine	65

Pursuit

Arrived in ABDA	326
En route	169
Total Pursuit	495

Dive Bombers

Arrived in ABDA	52
En route	15
Total Dive Bombers	67
Total All Types	627

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 4-6-59

Chief of Staff.

April 3, 1942

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

This is the message that General Marshall referred to at lunch today.

J.R.Deane,
Colonel,General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.

a43nn01

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

file
RMX

[illegible]

From [illegible]
To [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

[illegible] to us. This is not/direct to you but also paraphrases them to me. I have no apt no doubt that not only efficiency but speed will be accomplished if a clear channel of communications be established. Jean Wainwright to MacArthur to Washington.

I am still operating under my old designation as Commander of the United States Army forces in the Far East and will continue to do so until I receive your directive with reference to the Southwest Pacific Area.

My relationships with the Australian authorities are of the utmost cordiality and they are adopting without reservation all suggestions I make. Their forces are being reorganized and reformed and every possible step within the means available is being taken to place this area in a posture of secure defense.

MacArthur

CM-IN-0010 (4/1/42)

Action Copy: WPD

Info. Copies: G-2
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[illegible]
E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(E) and 5(D) or (Z)
OSD letter, May 9, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

SECRET

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FOR

a43nn04

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

Memo for the President

My dear Mr. President

The attached papers
bears very directly on
your comments yesterday
a.m. reference Funk
Carrions to be constructed
or improved. Steam
in today.

H. Gillon Knapp

U.S. ~~SECRET~~.
BRITISH [redacted].

COPY NO. 6

C.P.S. 18.

19th February, 1942.

COMBINED STAFF PLANNERS.

ADDITIONAL LANDING CRAFT REQUIREMENTS.

Note by the Secretaries.

The attached memorandum, prepared by the British Joint Planners, is circulated for consideration by the Combined Staff Planners.

(Signed) E. L. SIBERT

P. O. A. DAVISON

Combined Secretariat.

Washington, D.C.
19TH FEBRUARY, 1942.

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a43.02

ADDITIONAL
LANDING CRAFT REQUIREMENTS.

British planning has continually been handicapped by the shortage of special craft for amphibious operations.

Present British Programme for Europe and Middle East.

2. The present programme of U.S. and British construction of landing craft was originally designed to enable 6 Armoured and 13 Infantry Divisions and 6 Army Tank Brigades to be landed on the Continent from Great Britain in the early summer of 1943. In addition it was hoped to build up by mid-1942 a landing craft fleet in the Middle East, capable of operating an amphibious striking force of 1 Armoured Brigade and 2 Infantry Brigade Groups.

3. Design and production difficulties have slowed down this programme very seriously and, in spite of the U.S. mass production of a most efficient tank landing ship capable of crossing the Atlantic, the plan for landing on the Continent has had to be recast and is now reduced both in tempo and extent. It may even have to be postponed for an appreciable period.

Similarly the Middle East programme has had to be reduced and only training and minor raids can be undertaken this year, in that theatre.

Far East Requirement.

4. The present programme does not include any provision for the Far East theatre of war in which we are likely to have to employ large amphibious forces for the offensive against Japan.

5. We are informed by our Supply Missions that within the next month the final allocations of building capacities are likely to be decided and thereafter it will be too late to increase the landing craft programmes. An early estimate of our combined requirements is therefore required so that the necessary orders for building can be placed. As a guide to the magnitude of the problem, it has been found that to land a British force of 1 division and 1 armoured brigade group requires approximately the following:-

50 T.L.C.	(Tank Landing Craft)
95 M.L.C.	(Motor Landing Craft)
16 S.L.C.	(Support Landing Craft)
95 A.L.C.	(Assault Landing Craft)

Conclusion.

6. We suggest that, at the very least, landing craft on this scale for 1 American and 1 British amphibious force of this size, with sufficient reserve craft, should be ordered forthwith, as an addition to the present programme.

7. We realise that this is, to some extent, prejudging the Pacific Appreciation but consider the matter to be most urgent.

a43003

Safe ; Navy

In reply refer to Initials and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

SECRET

April 4, 1942.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT; NARS Date APR 5 1973

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Galapagos - Permanent United States Air Base, and Pan-American Wild-Life Park.

Vice-Admiral Horne and Lieutenant-General Andrews and other senior Army and Navy officers with whom I have discussed the subject are strongly of the opinion that under no circumstances should our government relinquish our air base in the Galapagos upon the termination of the war ("Free Men's War" or "War of Free Men"?). The reasons are crystal clear -- in this new era of aviation, the Galapagos are the veritable keystone of the outer defenses in the Pacific of the Panama Canal.

This objective should be achieved without doing violence to the Good Neighbor Policy. If at any time in the near future conditions should develop under which we could purchase the entire Archipelago or make a long term lease for our air bases or bases, we should not hesitate to seize the opportunity. But in view of existing political conditions in Ecuador and the troublesome traditions that have grown up concerning this issue in that country, it is likely that a new formula will have to be found that does not appear to involve a permanent surrender of sovereignty to us.

The Liberal, pro-American administration of Dr. Carlos Arroyo Del Rio, President of Ecuador since 1940, is under severe criticism from the Conservative party, which numbers among its strongest supporters the Clergy, and Falangists, and other elements of varying degrees of pro-Axis sympathies. The President is charged with surrender of Ecuador's territory and future greatness in his acceptance of the terms of the Rio settlement of the Peruvian border dispute. He is also being charged with making a secret surrender of Ecuadorean sovereignty in granting us military bases in Ecuadorean territory. His Foreign Minister (a Conservative), Dr. Tobar Donoso, has justtendered his resignation.

a430001

[redacted]

At the same time the Ecuadorean Army is reported to be ready to install the Superior Commander of National Defense Forces, Colonel Ricardo Astudillo, as Dictator. Although trained in Rome, Colonel Astudillo is considered to be pro-American; he certainly is the "man on horse-back" in Ecuador today.

So at the moment conditions are not propitious for negotiating a new treaty on the Galapagos. For this reason I did not attempt to talk with President Arroyo Del Rio during my one day visit to Quito in mid-March. But I did discuss the subject with our Ambassador there, Mr. Boaz Long, and with the President's closest personal and political adviser, Senator Caton Cardenas, who is well and favorably known to me as a man of sound judgment and great discretion. I carefully explained to Senator Cardenas your long standing interest in the Galapagos and the unique fauna and flora found there and how your interests had been enhanced by your visit in the "Houston" four years ago. I further outlined in very general terms the idea you have for making the Galapagos into an International Park for the preservation and perpetuation of wild-life.

I ventured to suggest two ways by which this might be done:

A) By outright sale of the Galapagos to the United States, and then our creating a Pan-American Board of Trustees to govern the Archipelago in the interests of science but under the protection of the United States.

B) By an agreement between Ecuador and the United States under which Ecuador created the Pan-American Board of Trustees and technical sovereignty remained in the name of Ecuador, but the United States would pay the costs of administration, and we would police the Archipelago from a base leased to us for a long term of years.

I made it explicitly clear that you had no idea of exerting any pressure to persuade Ecuador to take any course of action that was not entirely welcome to the government of Ecuador itself, that our government did not seek additional territory anywhere, that we would scrupulously observe the sovereignty of

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT, NARS Date APR 5 1973

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every Republic in the Western Hemisphere, but at the same time your mind would be very receptive to any suggestions originating in Ecuador's government that would lead to formal negotiations to find ways and means of putting into effect the plan you cherished.

Senator Cardenas expressed his personal belief that the President would be enthusiastically in favor of Plan B above, but that it would not be politically wise for him to initiate negotiations until after the Congressional elections in August of this year.

I asked Senator Cardenas to write me by mid-April as to the President's re-actions, and I told him that I had informed our Ambassador, Mr. Boaz Long, of what I was telling him and therefore it would be quite proper for the President to talk directly with Mr. Long on the subject if he desired further information. And I further told the Senator that if President Arroyo Del Rio did not want to talk to anyone at this time about this matter, his disinclination would be understood and his wishes respected.

In closing, I expressed to Senator Cardenas your sincere regret that the laws of Ecuador made it impossible for Dr. Arroyo Del Rio to visit you officially at the White House.

In order to strengthen the hands of the present Administration in Ecuador, it would seem to be prudent for us to give further financial assistance to Ecuador at the earliest opportunity. I understand that a Lend-Lease agreement is ready for signature, but our aid should extend to the broader fields of economic rehabilitation on a comprehensive scale to include agriculture, industry, mining, and, particularly, extensive road-building.

Respectfully,

Paul F. Foster

Paul F. Foster,
Commander, U.S.N.R.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT; NARS Date APR 5 1973

a430003

a43p01

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 21, 1942

[illegible]:

I CALLED U[illegible] [illegible] AND
[illegible] [illegible].

[illegible].

a43p02

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

PSF
Safe
Marshall

February 21, 1942.

The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

The S.S. BRAZIL, the S.S. PRESIDENT GRANT, and eleven cargo vessels of approximately 10,000 ship tons capacity each, are required by the War Department for the movement of troops to Australia and Hawaii. No other vessels are available at this time for this purpose.

The BRAZIL has been assigned by the Maritime Commission to the State Department for the repatriation of enemy diplomats. The Navy Department, to which the PRESIDENT GRANT is at present tentatively assigned, has indicated its willingness to permit the use of this vessel by the Army for one trip to Hawaii.

In the opinion of the War Department, the military situation demands the dispatch of troops without delay to our overseas theaters. A delay of about one month in the repatriation of enemy diplomats will result. The War Department is prepared to make immediately available the S.S. ETOLIN and ACADIA for the transportation of enemy diplomats and prisoners of war from South America to the United States.

The Maritime Commission advises me that the eleven freighters cannot be assigned to the Army, unless a priority above shipments of copper and other strategic materials be assigned. Military necessity demands such priority.

I therefore request that you sign the inclosed letter, directing that the Chairman of the Maritime Commission allot these vessels to the War Department.

Respectfully yours,

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 4-3-59
Signature- Carl F. Spicer

Chief of Staff.

Incl.

a43p03

February 21, 1942

Admiral E.S. Land,
Chairman, U.S. Maritime Commission,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Chairman:

The Secretary of War advises me that military necessity requires the use of the S.S. BRAZIL, S.S. PRESIDENT GRANT, and eleven cargo vessels of approximately 10,000 ship tons capacity each.

Please take the necessary steps to make these vessels available to the War Department at once, regardless of any previous commitment, excepting only vessels required for Russian Lend-Lease use.

At the same time, I am directing the War Department to make available the S.S. ETOLIN and ACADIA for the transportation of diplomats and prisoners of war from South America to the United States. The eventual repatriation of the diplomats from the United States and to the United States will have to await a later vessel.

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

a43p04

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

GF
Safe File
Marshall file
Bot

April 5, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following is an extract of a message sent by General Marshall to General Stilwell April 3, 1942:

Wheeler relieved as Chief of Iranian Mission and remains assigned to Stilwell's Command as Commanding General SOS India, Burma and China. Shingler replaces Wheeler as Chief Iranian Mission. Stilwell will continue to control and supervise Lend Lease affairs for China. Iranian Mission Area remains the same except India is detached and placed under Stilwell. Karachi Base will continue to afford assistance to North African and Iranian Missions as is now being done.

J.R.DEANE,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 4-6-59
Signature- Carl L. Spicer



~~SECRET~~

a43pp01

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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Marshall

February 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

F. D. R.

Copy of memorandum to Admiral Land sent to the Chief of Staff.

a43q01

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LAND

I enclose copy of a memorandum to me from the Chief of Staff of the Army, pointing out the need of much larger tonnage for defense purposes in 1942 and 1943.

After our discussion the other day, I am asking that you and Vickery prepare plans to commission 9,000,000 tons in 1942 and 15,000,000 tons in 1943.

I realize that this is a terrific directive on my part but I feel certain that in this very great emergency we can attain it.

F. D. R.

a43q02

Pic conference Thursday

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

February 18, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The future effort of the Army is dependent upon shipping. More shipping than is now in sight is essential if the national war effort is not to be neutralized to a serious extent. By December 1942, there will be 1,800,000 troops ready for overseas service, and by the end of 1943 about three and a half million. We are now endeavoring to secure from the War Shipping Administration an additional eighteen cargo ships per month for military use, which would permit an overseas force of 750,000 by the end of 1942. This number, however, would be less than half of the troops potentially available.

The present 1943 program for the construction of 10,667,000 dead weight tons will permit an overseas fighting force of about one and a half million men by the end of 1943, again less than half of those to be available. Furthermore, defense aid requirements will not be met in full measure and the war production program will, therefore, be partially ineffective because of lack of ships.

The war effort of the United States, less what can be done by the Navy, will be measured by what can be transported overseas in troops and materiel. The conclusion that the small forces now envisaged are the measure of the capacity of the country and its military might appears unacceptable. Immediate steps are urged to increase the tempo of the ship building program to a much higher figure. The maximum possibilities in this regard should be exploited, in my opinion,, and the Army advised accordingly.

Jerry

Feb 9, 000, 000

4 " 15, 000, 000

1943

Chief of Staff.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Li
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Date- 4-3-59
Signature- Carl L. Spe

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL McNARNEY

I think I told General Marshall to send the enclosed. If it has not gone, will you and Admiral King prepare the gist of it and send it?

F. D. R.

Also enclosed letter to the President, dated April 5, 1942, from Dr. Evatt, enclosing memorandum of suggestions regarding establishment of machinery for the allocation of munitions, and also memo covering joint opinion of Generals MacArthur and Brett and the Australian Chiefs of Staff regarding the danger which threatens Australia.

P.S. Please return enclosures for my files.

a43 99 01

COPY

WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

WASHINGTON

March 24, 1942.

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Admiral King and I have gone over very carefully the proposals of the Australian Government relative to organization and command in the Pacific Theater. While the general subject of strategic theaters of operation is being considered this afternoon by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, King and I agree that a reply to certain of the Australian proposals need not, and should not, be delayed since they concern operational control in the Pacific. Accordingly, we suggest a message by you to the Prime Minister substantially in accordance with the attached draft.

(Signed) G. C. MARSHALL
CHIEF OF STAFF

O. K.

F. D. R.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

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Anticipating general direction by the United States of operations in the Pacific Theater, which is the theater generally east of the meridian of Singapore, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff contemplate establishing a Southwest Pacific Area, south of the Equator and west of longitude 160° - 165° E., to include Australia, the Netherlands East Indies less Sumatra, plus Philippines, New Guinea, Bismarcks, and Solomons, and a South Pacific Area, to include all east of above Southwest Pacific Area and south of Equator, extending Eastward generally to longitude 110° W.

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff consider each of these to be an integrated strategic area.

The Southwest Pacific Area, under Army unity of command, has to do initially with the defense of the land mass of Australia and ancillary islands in the approaches from the northwest and north; it eventually becomes a springboard for offensive operations to the northwest.

The South Pacific Area, under Navy unity of command, has to do primarily with protection and maintenance of lines of communication with Australia and the Far East, and while linked with the Southwest Pacific Area, it must be set up as a distinct strategic entity. New Zealand is located in the South Pacific Area, that is, the lines-of-communication area, because of strategic considerations involving naval bases.

With respect to the Australian proposals on control in the Pacific Theater, the following must be said:- Unquestionably the Australian Government

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

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representatives must have a definite voice in the higher direction of the operations in that theater. This is equally true of the representatives of New Zealand, The Netherlands, Free France, and China. Army, Navy, and Air representatives of these countries should by all means be available to advise and consult with the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, as it is impossible to conduct military operations through such a large group, the executive power for the conduct of these operations should rest with the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the President, as Commander-in-Chief. Proposals of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, made to the President as U. S. Commander-in-Chief, are subject to review by him from the standpoint of higher political considerations and to reference by him to the Pacific War Council when necessary. The interests of the nations whose forces or whose land possessions may be involved in these military operations are further safeguarded by the power each nation retains to refuse the use of its forces for any project which it considers inadvisable.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date

a43 88 04

Dept.

PERSONNEL IN THEATRES OF WAR (less U.K.)

The undermentioned figures are corrected up to Mid-February 1942. It has not been possible to split Dominion personnel within the R.A.F.

Theatre of War	British Personnel.		Indian Personnel.	Dominion Forces	Colonial Forces	Allied Forces	Total less R.A.F.
	ARMY	R.A.F.					
GIBRALTAR	15,382	950	Nil	206	377	12	15,977
TA	17,969	3,900	Nil	Nil	9,107	Nil	27,076
MIDDLE EAST less IRAQ and IRAN but including SUDAN	299,079	68,500	102,000	140,530	59,180	42,310	643,099
IRAQ and IRAN	29,113	7,400	132,000	Nil	Nil	Nil	161,113
WEST AFRICA	13,204	3,600	Nil	Nil	67,769	265	81,238
EAST AFRICA excluding Ethiopian Army	4,750		170	9,697	98,416	112	113,145
INDIA x	46,300	10,000*	427,191	Nil	Nil	Nil	473,491
BURMA x	5,406		36,000	Nil	Nil	20,558	61,964
TOTAL	431,203	94,350 ✓	697,361	150,433	234,849	63,257	1,577,103

x (i) Figures between Burma and India have probably altered by some 10,000 in the last month due to British and Indian reinforcements proceeding from India to Burma.

(ii) Indian figures include gazetted and non-gazetted civilians, embodied Auxiliary Force, embodied Indian Territorial force, Indian State Force units in British India and the Nepalese contingent serving in India. Enrolled and un-enrolled non-combatants have not been included.

(iii) British personnel in Indian units are included under the heading "British Personnel".

* No dinstinction between India and Burma can be made at this stage.

✓ Some 6,000 men returning from Far East have not been included.

a43-01

[redacted]

WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Gymnast Operations.

After our conversation with you Wednesday we have had our staffs re-examine the Gymnast project as a possible plan for the employment of U.S. forces against the Axis powers in the summer and fall of 1942. The advantages and disadvantages of implementing the Gymnast plan as compared to other operations, particularly 1942 emergency Bolero operations, lead to the conclusion that the occupation of Northwest Africa this summer should not be attempted. The attached discussion presents our joint views on this subject.

Chief of Staff.

E. J. King

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet and
Chief of Naval Operations.

1 Incl.
Memo for Pres.on subject.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or E
JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Gymnast Operation.

General.

From only one base, the United Kingdom, can the power of the combined British and United States air effort be exerted in such a way as to strike directly at Germany. Plans are now being implemented, as rapidly as sea transportation and the availability of trained air units permit, to build up a strong air striking force in the United Kingdom. Operations by ground forces, with adequate equipment, can only be successfully carried out against the west coast of Europe in areas within range of aircraft based in the U.K. with adequate aircraft, and in other areas if sufficient carrier-borne aviation is available. In areas beyond the range of land based aircraft, strong carrier-borne aviation is essential for the support of landing operations until a strong land based air force has been established. This applies particularly to Northwest Africa because, even though the French may be willing to cooperate fully, there always exists the definite threat that Axis aircraft now based in the Mediterranean area would move rapidly into Spanish and North African bases, from which they could operate against Casablanca, in such strength that carrier-borne aviation is unlikely to be able to be sufficiently effective during the time required to establish adequate land-based aviation.

The urgency of engaging U.S. Army forces in combat to support the Russian effort in 1942 is evident. If we can spare from other theaters the necessary means to execute Gymnast, particularly such as combat loading vessels, carriers, aircraft, and antiaircraft, other more advantageous operations would be feasible - for example, one against the Brest Peninsula, which we have wished to include in "emergency" Bolero but have been unable to mount due to lack of landing craft, air coverage, etc.

The initiation of Gymnast would mean the creation of another theatre with all the "overhead" involved. It will almost surely develop the need to reduce the 1942 Bolero effort, either initially in order to mount Gymnast adequately or later, when likely difficulties will render necessary a choice between supporting either Gymnast or Bolero, as means will not be available to do both. To carry out Gymnast in 1942, involves consequences of far-reaching importance. The problem of adequate naval escorts, and effective naval air support during the landing and until Army Air Forces are firmly established on land bases, is a critical factor. The U.S.-U.K. line of sea communications must be kept open regardless of the direction of allied strategic effort. This task, absorbing about the entire strength of the Allied Navies available in the Atlantic for this type of duty, is

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By RHP, NLR, Date FEB 19 1974

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aggravated by the growing submarine menace and by the ever present threat of hostile capital ships in the North Atlantic. This plan would require use of naval escorts now engaged in escorting vessels to outlying stations all over the world. The result of thinning out of resources of this kind may bring disaster in the North Atlantic, or convoys to every theater will have to lie in ports for such long periods awaiting proper escort that our already inadequate resources will not be able to meet minimum requirements.

PLAN. The plan Gymnast calls for the occupation of Northwest Africa with a force of 220,000 U.S. troops comprising 6 divisions and 24 squadrons of planes supported by the Navy, including three aircraft carriers with a total of 210 planes, 66 of which are to be Army Pursuit planes. Having secured a landing at Casablanca, Northern French Morocco will be seized. Spanish Morocco, Northern Algiers and Tunisia must be occupied in order to block an Axis threat against those areas. Control can then be extended over all North Africa and the Atlantic shipping lanes along the Northwest Coast of Africa protected.

French cooperation and Spanish neutrality are essential to the successful outcome of the expedition. In this connection, an agent of the State Department in reporting on a recent conversation with Weygand stated, "The General definitely rejects any idea of a landing in North Africa. He considers the morale of a large part of the French troops of North Africa so poor that an American landing here would be met with general apathy if not direct hostility. Because of such a probable attitude in North Africa, Weygand considers that the prospect of Frenchmen fighting Americans should be avoided at any cost."

At the time of execution of this plan the disposition of Axis ground and air forces must be such as to eliminate any possibility of major air or ground units of the Axis operating against the landing forces during the early stages of the venture. A recent report from the Vice Counsel at Casablanca, through the U.S. Naval Attache at Tangier, indicates that the Germans have already made plans to meet a U.S. invasion of Northwest Africa. This report states: "They (Germans) are assembling the materials for 3 armored divisions in Spanish Morocco. They already have one armored division there. I have heard from another very reliable source (A) that they have some 300 tarks there and from a good but not so sure source (B) that they already have 700 tanks there.

"They would also prepare at least 500 Stuka bombers in Spanish Morocco. (Source A above reports there are already some 200-300 Stukas and some 58 Messerschmitts, 110 in Spanish Morocco.) They have already prepared all maintenance supplies such as spare parts, oil, gasoline, bombs, machine gun ammunition and technical personnel for the plans prescribed.

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JCS memo, 1-4-74
By DNR, NARS, Date FEB 10 197

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"They have also collected a large quantity of fast motor launches, both on the coast of Spain and in the Canary Islands, as it is their plan to attack from Spanish Morocco and the French Moroccan coast simultaneously. My source (A) mentioned above, told me only 2 days ago, there were some 250 to 300 fast launches collected on the coast of Spain.

"Once they were certain that the Americans were coming, they would start their drive with the 3 motorized divisions which they believe to be sufficient to help overcome any French resistance and follow up the drive and occupy the ground taken with 10 Spanish divisions plus the landing parties from the motor launches. They give themselves four days to accomplish their plan, leaving them four to get ready for our troops".

CONVOYS. Continued use of British Middle East shipping which provides a lift for approximately 40,000 men would probably meet transportation requirements in so far as personnel is concerned without material effect on 1943 Bolero. Utilization of this transportation prior to October, 1942, would seriously affect the flow of vital reinforcements to the Middle East and India, now of greatly increased importance because of the reverses in Libya. The diversion of sufficient cargo shipping from the U.K.-Middle East run to support this plan would reduce the flow of supplies from the U.K. below the minimum required to maintain the forces now in the Middle East. At the same time, the diversion of these cargo ships would result in the reduction of British imports by approximately one-half million tons over the 6 months period involved.

The U.S., by employing every available escort vessel in the Atlantic, could not establish a new escort route without either serious effect on the movement of ships to the U.K. and elsewhere in the Atlantic, or the transfer of escorting ships from the Pacific. To make full use of port capacity two escort groups would be required constantly for at least six months. Even by reducing shipments to the Middle East to bare maintenance requirements the British could not furnish at most, more than one-half the necessary convoy protection. If, however, they furnish full escort (2) it would require a heavy reduction in the North Atlantic shipping. Due to lack of means British convoys to the Middle East and India do not receive the escort protection provided troop convoys from the U.S. to the United Kingdom. The British convoy methods are on an arc system; from the U.K. to Freetown; from Freetown to the Cape of Good Hope; and from there to the Middle East. Naval escorts rarely leave their assigned areas, meeting convoys by prearranged direction. In a recent case, a single British cruiser escorted a convoy of 40,000 troops through the U.K.-Freetown arc. Such a method would be unacceptable for the escort of American troops to Northwest Africa. In

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event of a Russian collapse and the elimination of Russian shipments, the resultant threat to the Middle East would require a maximum of British shipping and escorts to block a probable Axis advance into that theater.

CARRIERS, COMBAT LOADED CRAFT, ETC. The provision of carriers to provide necessary air support for the operation will seriously weaken carrier strength in other areas. Of the 3 first line aircraft carriers considered the minimum necessary for the operation, only 1 is now available in the Atlantic. Two small converted aircraft carriers will become available during the summer. The original Gymnast plan, developed by the Army and Navy in collaboration with the British, required a minimum carrier capacity of 226 airplanes during the landing stage. Only 8 of the necessary 15 combat loaded transports are now in the Atlantic and 4 more will be available by September (others are in the Pacific and Southwest Pacific). At least 5 and probably 6 of these vessels with their crews will be required for the training of landing craft personnel for 1943 Bolero. If the air force tentatively set up for the Middle East is diverted to this project, it would not be of sufficient strength until December, 1942. The necessary antiaircraft regiments would not finish their training prior to October, 1942.

PORT CAPACITY. Casablanca is the only Atlantic port of Northwest Africa which can accommodate ships of any size. Although the harbor will accommodate 43 vessels, only about 12 can be unloaded at one time. It is estimated that the equipment and supplies for 40,000 troops can be unloaded in 1 month. Due to the limitation of the port and the necessity of providing maintenance supplies for the steadily increasing force ashore the number of troops that can be handled will steadily decrease. To land the entire force would consume at least 6 months. Other small ports will of necessity have to be developed to accelerate the movement.

CONCLUSION. Plans are continuously under study for an African operation should the situation require it. However, it appears that this operation should not be undertaken in the present situation.

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[redacted] DESPATCH FROM COMINCH TO CINCPAC, COMANZAC FORCE, C T F 11, AND C T F 17 DATED FEBRUARY 26, 1942.

FOLLOWING DECISION ON COMMAND AND MY GENERAL COMMENTS ON COMTASKFOR ELEVEN 232214, COMANZACFOR 250100 AND 250900, CINCPAC 250847 AND 251209 X (A) WHILE LEARY REMAINS ON SHORE SENIOR PACFLT OFFICER AFLOAT IN ANZAC HEREAFTER EXERCISE DIRECT COMMAND OF PACFLT

FORCES AND ANZAC FORCES ASSIGNED TO COMMON TASKS BUT LEARY COORDINATE SUPPORTING OPERATIONS OF U S AND AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCES BASED AUSTRALIA AND MORESBY. CANNOT APPROVE WITHHOLDING ANZAC FORCE FROM ACTIVE OPERATIONS MERELY TO FORM A RESERVE. THIS IDEA IS

PASSIVE AND APPEARS LIKELY TO BE PREMISED ON ACNB VIEWS. (B) AGREE THE CURRENT PRACTICE OF USING A SINGLE CARRIER IN AN IMPORTANT OFFENSIVE TASK WITHOUT SUITABLE COVERAGE BY SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE AVOIDED WHENEVER CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT. EITHER TASK FORCE 11 OR 17 PREFERABLY BOTH SHOULD REMAIN ANZAC UNTIL NEW CALEDONIA IS GARRISONED BUT THIS

DEPENDS ON LOGISTICS AND MUST BE DECIDED BY CINCPAC. ADVISE. (C) OPERATIONS IN FORWARD AREAS SUCH AS "OFFENSIVE SWEEPS" ARE SELDOM JUSTIFIED IN THE ABSENCE OF INDICATIONS OF ENEMY PRESENCE SINCE SUCH OPERATIONS MAY DISCLOSE OWN PRESENCE AND INTENTION AND ELIMINATE

ADVANTAGE OF SURPRISE. (D) OUR CURRENT TASKS ARE NOT MERELY PROTECTIVE BUT ALSO OFFENSIVE WHERE PRACTICABLE AS BEST WAY TO PROTECT IS BY REDUCING ENEMY OFFENSIVE POWER THROUGH DESTRUCTION OF HIS MOBILE FORCES PARTICULARLY CARRIERS CRUISERS LOADED TRANSPORTS AND

LONG RANGE BOMBERS. WHILE ENEMY SHORE POSITIONS MAY BE LOOKED ON AS LOCATIONS WHERE ENEMY NAVAL FORCES MAY BE STRUCK, RAIDS WHICH MERELY PUT AIR FIELDS AND FIXED INSTALLATIONS OUT OF COMMISSION TEMPORARILY MAY NOT IN THEMSELVES BE PARTICULARLY PROFITABLE.

(E) NAVAL OPERATIONS AGAINST ENEMY IN BISMARCK SOLOMONS AREA CAN PROBABLY BE BETTER COVERED BY RECONNAISSANCE BY PATROL PLANES AND BOMBERS BASED NE AUSTRALIA USING MORESBY FOR REFUELING. RECOMMEND LEARY MAKE EFFORT TO HAVE US ARMY FIGHTERS SENT TO MORESBY

TO PROTECT THIS VERY IMPORTANT AIR FIELD. (F) WILL TRANSMIT IN SEPARATE DESPATCH MY ANALYSIS PRESENT ENEMY SITUATION AND INTENTION ANZAC

COM SW PACFOR TO COMINCH 271016

LANGLEY WITH 37 P-40's ABOARD ENROUTE TJIJATJAP DISCOVERED 130 MILES SOUTH OF ISLAND BY ENEMY AIR RECONNAISSANCE AND SUBSEQUENTLY DESTROYED BY SQUADRON OF NINE ENEMY BOMBERS. SURVIVORS INCLUDING COMMANDER McCONNELL NOW IN TWO US DESTROYERS. PECOS EN ROUTE COLOMBO

AND IN GENERAL VICINITY LANGLEY WILL TAKE SURVIVORS ON BOARD AND PROCEED EXMOUTH GULF TO JOIN TENDER GROUP THEN TO LOADING PORT WHICH MAY BE CHANGED TO FREMANTLE. NO DETAILS YET OF BOMBING NOR OF SURVIVORS EXCEPT THE COMMANDING OFFICER. THIS IS FIRST BOMBING

OFF THE SOUTH COAST OF JAVA. STEAMER SEA WITCH WITH 27 P40's AND MACHINE GUN AMMUNITION ARRIVING TJILATJAP TOMORROW MORNING TWENTYEIGHTH.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT; NARS Date APR 5 1973

a43s01

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

April 12, 1942

To: GENERAL MARSHALL

War Dept. No 505

The President to General Marshall. Delighted your message to McNarney. All quiet here. I am telling McNarney to continue all preparations.

Please put Hopkins to bed and keep him there under 24 hours guard by Army or Marine Corps. Ask the king for additional assistance if required on this job.

Signed Roosevelt

McNarney

ORIG: SOS

INFO: COPY: AG
FILE
OPD

OR-OUT-2345 (4/13/42)

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a43s501

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April 13, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL McNARNEY:

Dear McNarney:

The President has asked me to give you the below message to be sent to General Marshall:

"Delighted your message to McNarney. All quiet here. I am telling McNarney to continue all preparations.

"Please put Hopkins to bed and keep him there under twenty-four hour guard by Army or Marine Corps. Ask the King for additional assistance if required on this job.

ROOSEVELT"

E.M.W.

a43ss02

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CSWD
April 13, 1942
RET

WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

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PRIORITY

No 2387 April 13th, 1942

From: London
To: Milid

No 2387 April 13th, 1942

Returned Monday morning from weekend at Chequers which included conversations with British Chiefs of Staff, Lord Mountbatten, General Paget, Oliver Lyttelton, A V Alexander, Lord Leathers, Lord Churwell and others. It appears that our proposal will be accepted in principle but relative to avoidance of further dispersions particularly of planes such acceptance will have to be considerably and continuously bolstered by firmness of our stand. I am endeavoring to secure clear comitments as to means to be made available for the preparations and building up from now on of the forces and material necessary to carry out our purpose Virtually every one agrees with us in principle but many if not most hold reservations regarding this or that. Hopkins and I will be present at full cabinet meeting tonight and with defensive committee of the cabinet tomorrow night. I dine with Cigs and leading army officials tonight, attend Chief of Staff meeting tomorrow morning, lunch with King and Queen informally Wednesday and I understand that Prime Minister is arranging dinner for us with the King and the Chiefs of Staff. I leave London Wednesday night by rail with Prime Minister for Salisburn plains to spend day there witnessing various demonstrations and troop organizations probably will proceed to Portsmouth that night with Pm spending Thursday morning in the General vicinity. I hope thereafter to get under way to North Ireland for review of troops and to leave for home probably from vicinity of Prestwick. What is the degree of urgency for my return to Washington? I assume that you are keeping Secretary of War informed my cables. I have hesitated to predict outcome of negotiations and Hopkins has been communicating with President Direct on the

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WAR DEPARTMENT
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INCOMING MESSAGE

From London To Nilid No 2387 Page two

subject. From Marshall to McNarney. Part two. Have received following message: "United Office professional Workers CIO Philadelphia. Pledge fullest support immediate opening second European front " second message from Social Service Employees Union Company Philadelphia: " Pledge every effort behind opening Western front now" Please have suitable acknowledgment prepared in War Department and dispatched.

McClure

Action Copy: SGS

Info. Copy: File

CM-IN-3457 (4/13/42) PM 3:21

~~SECRET~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Bkt

February 27, 1942.

PSF
Safe
Marshall

MEMORANDUM FOR

H. L. H.

TO READ AND RETURN FOR M
CONFIDENTIAL FILES.

F. D. R.

a43+01

Franklin D. Roosevelt brafy

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 4-6-59
Signature- Carl L. Spicer

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

February 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Air transport to China (sketch attached).

Route. The air transport route from Northern India to China will be from Sadiya, India, to Myitkyina, Burma, a distance of two hundred miles. In Myitkyina cargoes will be trans-loaded to barges and floated one hundred miles down the Irawaddy River to Bhamo, Burma. There they will be loaded on trucks and proceed over the Burma Road to Chungking, China.

Planes. Seventy-five transport planes are now being or will be fitted by the Douglas factory in Los Angeles with long range tanks to permit their flight delivery to Calcutta. Fifty of these will be Army transports taken from monthly production schedules up to June 1, 1942. Twenty-five are commercial type transport planes which you authorized to be taken from domestic airlines; the first of these will start moving to Calcutta on March 15th. All seventy-five airplanes will be in Calcutta by June 15, 1942.

Organization. Arrangements are under way to institute the service as soon as the airplanes begin to arrive in Calcutta. Arrangements are now being made with reference to obtaining the barges to be used on the Irawaddy River and also for labor at all points of loading. An Air Corps Ferrying Command group totaling one thousand officers and men under the command of General Earl Naiden, recently detached from General Brett's headquarters, is being set up to organize and operate the Sadiya - Myitkyina air transport route, in collaboration with Chinese National Air Service officials who are thoroughly familiar with the local conditions.

Tonnage capacity. When all seventy-five cargo planes are in operation they will have a capacity of 7500 cargo tons a month. To equal the present capacity of the Burma Road, 17,000 to 20,000 tons per month, an additional one hundred cargo planes would be necessary. Present allocation of cargo planes to China has been made after a close study of the comparative needs in the different theaters of operation.

Planes accompanying General Stilwell. There are five transport airplanes accompanying General Stilwell to China. They should reach Calcutta not later than March 10th and will be available to General Stilwell to use as he deems necessary.

a43+02

Passenger Service. The China National Air Service route from Calcutta to Chungking is being strengthened by the addition of American transport planes. This service consists of passenger airplanes operating on a commercial basis. It is essential that we assist in maintaining its continued operation in order to assure direct connections between Chungking and Calcutta. We are furnishing them with some twenty to twenty-five airplanes. This service, however, does not add in any way to the cargo capacity now carried over the Burma Road.


Chief of Staff.

Incl.
Sketch

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Date- 4-6-59
Signature- Carl L. Spicer



EXPLANATORY NOTES:

(1) Road Imphal to Kalewa is fair weather and to be opened about the end of March, 1942.
(2) Road from Ledo to Ft. Hertz is projected by Chinese. Estimated 6 months to complete. Distance - 135 miles.
(3) Road Ft. Hertz to Bhamo is a fair weather road.
(4) The Chindwin and Irrawaddy rivers navigable for river steamers from Kalewa to Bhamo via Mandalay.

Scale approx. 1" = 120 mi.
February 26, 1942
F. E. Section, MID.
MSC

a43+04

PSF Safe File

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

H. L. H.

TO READ AND RETURN FOR MY CONFIDENTIAL FILES.

F. D. R.

Memorandum to the President from General Marshall - subject: Air transport to China (sketch attached).

a43u01

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

March 3, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Troop and Cargo Movements since December 7, 1941.

The following figures on the above subject may be of interest:

Troops transported by Rail

Dec.7th to Jan. 13th	572,677
Jan.13th to Jan. 31st	423,359
Feb.1st to Feb. 7th	100,847
Feb.8th to Feb.14th	112,905
Feb.15th to Feb.28th	353,248
Total since Dec.7th, 1941	1,563,036

Cargo, Planes and Troops sent overseas

	Cargo* (ship tons)	Planes	Troops
Dec.7th to Jan. 13th	265,000	313	37,200
Jan.14th to Jan. 31st	300,800	293	48,981
Feb.1st to Feb.7th	34,800	None	3,415
Feb.8th to Feb.14th	144,000	29	3,829
Feb.15th to Feb.28th	368,264	190	36,347
Total since Dec.7th,1941	1,112,864	825	129,772

* Defense Aid shipments not included.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 4-3-59
Signature- Carl L. Spicer

Chief of Staff.

a43 v01

~~SECRET~~

PSF
Safe Folder
Marshall

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

MAR 4 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Defenses of Ireland.

I have discussed with Admiral Stark and General Arnold the questions raised in the attached letter from the American Minister in Dublin. We feel that the matter of placing additional American troops in Ireland should not be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff at this time.

As you know, we are in process of sending to Ireland a force of three triangular and one armored division with supporting ground troops, totaling about 105,000 men. Plans contemplate sending an additional 50,000 men, including 22,000 Air Corps, when the units become available. The movement of these forces will require the use of all available shipping for a considerable time.

A comprehensive study is now being made to determine the most effective allocation of American forces to specific areas in 1942. This study will form the basis for decisions by the Combined Chiefs of Staff affecting the use of American forces in all areas.

Chief of Staff.

1 Incl:
Ltr. to The President
from the American
Minister in Dublin,
2-16-42.

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DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 4-6-59
Signature- Carl F. Spaeth

a43w01

February 16, 1942.

Copies have been delivered to GHQ & to Col. Gerow. This original for Col. Handy. JTM

Dear Mr. President : As you know, in Northern Ireland there ~~is~~ are at present but two British divisions and one of our regiments with some odds and ends extra . Before this gets to you it is possible that more of our troops will move in but even so, the situation is dangerous . Within a fortnight I hope to get off to you some sort of rough estimate of what people on the ground feel is requisite in the way of troops and materiel in order to give us a preponderance of force against any possible German invasion.

A British air intelligence officer off the record tells me that he believes it possible for the Germans to land 200.000 air born troops in Southern Ireland in a few days, with fuel and amunition, artillery and three ton tanks. With air bases established they could undoubtedly run in a big convoy landing three divisions in the Cork-Wexford area . If they control the island Britain is prety well cooked, as the life line of supplies will be cut. You know what can be done and what not with the means available. I am writing to you direct, instead of through channels because you will see at once what I mean and its significance and not pooh pooh the possibility and talk about British sea power. Off hand it seems as if three of our tank divisions and six mobile divisions would be a minimum force to make the defense secure, that is on the assumption that Britain could send over two or three more divisions within forty eight hours. If the Germans seize the air fields as they would easily do

a43w02

with only Irish defense to oppose them and then dig themselves into these stone villages it would take an awful lot of doing to get them out. The only possible defense, operating as we must from north of the broder, are swift tank forces formidable enough to snuff out the separate attacks before they get organized. As there are six or eight areas which would probably be attacked simulatneously there must be overwhelming tank strength for each area . Of course, accessory to this is a fighter air force capable of coping with perhaps a thousan bombers and transport planes at one time in eight different areas. If the Russians maul Hitler badly there is all the nore reason for hi to try for a knockout blow like this. However, I don't have to tell you about that. All I can tell you is that I do not think that the British have any realization of the danger they are in. They are stil thinking in terms of invincible sea power.

I am going to feel out ~~theirx~~ the Irish Defense ministry on ~~this~~ the following proposition: If I can get you a squadron of Hurricanes, will you lay out a program of advanced base landing fields which will enable Defense planes from Britain and Northern Ireland to operate over the Cork and Foynes areas . I think we must swallow DeValera's protest and make a token gift to the Irish people (sweeten) which the Germans will know about . A few airplanes would do this best. If the Irish got ugly we have only to stop their gas. You can attend to Dev. later on. German propaganda is spreading the story of our intending to invade Eire industriously. We should do something to counter it without much delay.

Aff

Dmi.

a43w03

Safe: Marshall

March 4, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL STARK
GENERAL MARSHALL

While there is no assurance of war between Russia dnd Japan this Spring, such a war is always a definite possibility. This possibility is enhanced if the Japanese are able to withdraw a relatively large number of troops and planes from the southwest Pacific area, leaving only a containing force there.

I think it would be a good thing if the United Staffs would hold one or two sessions in regard to the position of Great Britain and the United States in the event of such a war.

It should be studied, of course, from all angles, such as an offensive by the United Nations, starting from the southern area, thus compelling Japan to send more forces there; second, from the point of view of the use of Chinese territory by Russia and the United States to conduct various kinds of offensives against Japan; third, from the point of view of opening up the Aleutian Islands route to Kamchatka and Siberia; the latter would also include, during the Summer months, the possibility of sending supplies to the Russian forces by an even more northerly route -- past Wrangel Island to the Arctic coast of Siberia and thence south.

F. D. R.

a43x01

EMBASSY OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
WASHINGTON, D.C.

March 4, 1942

My dear Mr. Hopkins:

I have received instructions from my Government to raise once again the question regarding deliveries to the U.S.S.R. of the "Douglass" commercial airplane.

The present vast extent of the front lines demands great quantities of large commercial airplanes for the purpose of transporting troops to points at which reinforcements may be required at any particular time.

Taking into consideration the fact that it was difficult for the United States Government to deliver 600 airplanes as recently requested, my Government now asks whether it will not be possible to deliver immediately at least 100 and 25 airplanes monthly thereafter.

The Government of the U.S.S.R. is willing to accept not only new airplanes, but any airplanes available, including used airplanes.

It will be deeply appreciated if the United States Government will endeavor to use every means possible to effect delivery of these airplanes, for which the need is most pressing.

Sincerely yours,

Maxim Litvinoff
Ambassador

The Honorable

Harry L. Hopkins

The White House

Washington

a43y01

March 6, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. LOVETT:

We are getting urgent requests from Russia for transports. You recall that some time ago they asked for an unconscionable number but it seems to me that any they can get are important.

I am enclosing a copy of a letter I got from Litvinoff. Don't worry about the number he asks for. The important thing is, do you think we can give them any? You see he says he will take used airplanes.

I would think from a strategic point of view transports in Russia today are as important as any place in the world.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

Enclosure.

cc: General Burns.

a43z01

March 6, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BURNS:

I want this matter of transport planes for Russia referred to the Air Committee. In referring it you should indicate whatever importance you place from a strategic point of view on the Russians getting some transports.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

a43202

March 6, 1942

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I have your letter about the transport planes. I don't know what we can do about it but I am looking into it at once.

I have also asked the Lend-Lease Administration to look again thoroughly into the whole nickel business but, as you know, that is very tight here.

Very cordially yours,

HARRY L. HOPKINS

His Excellency
Maxim Litvinoff,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Washington, D. C.

a43203

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

S/P/S
For warm ack
4/3/42 GHS

April 2, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL BURNS:

I wonder if you could put this formally in the mill.

I think there must be a great deal of merit to some way finding some transport planes for Russia and finding them damned soon.

Please return this correspondence.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

a43z04

CCS 400.3295 U.S.S.R. (4-10-42)

[redacted]

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

April 10, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HARRY L. HOPKINS

Action was taken by the Board April 8th on the Russian request for Transport airplanes.

An assignment was made of 10 C-47 transports in May and 15 C-47 and 4 C-53 transports in June. The C-47 is the cargo and troop carrier, the C-53 a passenger transport.

The Board considered it advisable to limit the firm commitment of transports to Russia to June in view of the impending extension of the Protocol. Additional transports after June can be included in the new Protocol.

Correspondence attached to your memorandum of April 2 on this subject is returned as per your request.

J. H. BURNS
Major General, U. S. Army
Executive
Munitions Assignments Board

April 11, 1942

Col. Jamieson telephoned this morning requesting that no action be taken on this. lmb

DECLASSIFIED
JCS letter, 9-13-72
& OSD letter, 5-3-72
By RHP, NLR, Date DEC 4 1973

[redacted]

a43205

[redacted]

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

April 27, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HOPKINS

1. The recommendation of the United States members of the Munitions Assignments Board, reference taking a reasonable number of transport planes from United States air lines for Russia, was considered today by the Joint United States Chiefs of Staff.

2. General Marshall made a presentation of the transport situation as he saw it in connection with operations.

3. He indicated that the air line transportation was included in the United States requirements and was counted on as a reserve against requirements for operations at an earlier date than the one originally contemplated.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Secretariat to return the paper to the United States members of the Munitions Assignments Board not favorably considered.

HARRY J. MALONY,
Brig. General, U. S. A.

DECLASSIFIED
JCS letter, 9-18-73
& OSD letter, 5-3-72
By RHP, NLR, Date DEC 4 1973

a43z06

[redacted]

SAFE FILE: Marshall, George C.: 4/15/42-1944

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

April 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached hereto are three radiograms just received, two from General Marshall giving his plans and the other from General MacArthur, which is self-explanatory.

JOSEPH T. McNARNEY,
Major General,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Incls.
3 Radiograms.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

a44a01

[redacted]

ADJ 10
Filed 0450/15
MP

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

CSWD
April 15, 1942
138 P. M.

INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: American Embassy London
To: Milid

No. 2411, April 15th, 1942

To assist Air Ministry in construction of air fields and construction on airdromes, they desire that 7 Battalions of Aviation Engineers and 7 Engineer Regiments, General Service, fully equipped for performance these tasks, should be sent to England earliest practicable date. They state that such special labor and machinery is entirely lacking for this purpose. From General Marshall for Gen McNarney.

General Service Regiments would be additional to the 3 Regiments indicated in your cable number 20 as earmarked for Chaney. Chaney states that he will require approximately 5 additional General Service Regiments during next few months. His total requirement of 8 General Service Regiments in England should be accorded a higher priority than the 7 Regiments requested above. The 7 Battalions of Aviation Engineers would be from the 10 Battalions requested by Chaney in his 978. Advise whether Air Ministry's request can be met furnishing proposed schedule on arrival.

I leave tonight with PM for Salisbury Plain to witness demonstrations Thursday returning that night.

[redacted]
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

8

[redacted]

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

a44a02

[redacted]

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

We plan to leave here Friday afternoon for Londonderry by plane reviewing US troops Saturday AM and proceeding to Stanraer Scotland from where we hope to depart that evening on flight home.

McClure

Radio 978 is CM-IN-0680.

Action Copy: OPD

Info. Copies: FILE
SGS
S/W

CM-IN-3944 (4/15/42) 3:25 PM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 6(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

a44a03

[redacted]

COPY No. 8

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ANDI 11
dcp
filed 15/2in.

[redacted]

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

CSWD
April 15, 1942
1:38 p.m.

INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: London
To: Milid

No. 2413, April 15, 1942

Last night at 10 Hopkins and I met with Defense Committee of Cabinet PM presiding. Our proposal was formally accepted after oral presentation by me and by Hopkins followed by general comments by members and Chief of Staff PMGPM in impressive pronouncement declared a complete agreement and a deep appreciation of the purpose and time of our visit. He stated he would communicate the sense of their agreement and their intention of going ahead immediately and ener-
getically with all preli[redacted]

PO 66
filed 2345/15
MP

[redacted]

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

CSWD
April 15, 1942
12:39 P. M.

INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: Australia
To: Adjutant General

No. Ag 277, April 15, 1942

On April 13 and 14 a flight of 3 Baker 17's and 10 Baker * under the personal command of Brigadier General Ralph Royce attacked the enemy in the Philippines at Nichols Field, Batangas, Cebu and Davao with the following results: At Nichols destruction of hangars and damage to runways; at Davao 1 bomber destroyed and several damaged, 2 transports hit 1 probably sunk, 2 seaplanes damaged 1 shot down, troop concentrations dispersed, docks and warehouses damaged; at Cebu 3 transports sunk, 2 others hit and several close misses, shot down 3 planes, damaged several on the ground, and damaged docks; at Batangas 1 freighter sunk. 1 of our planes was lost but the crew was saved.

MacArthur

*Came (macrtfrokxes). Service is being made.

Action Copy: OPD

Info. Copies: AG
LOG
FILE
A-2
SGS
CGAAF
G-2
JIC
ONI
Maj. Hammond
BPR

[redacted]
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

CM-IN-3922 (4/15/42) 1:52 PM

[redacted]

COPY No. 22

44a 05

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

PSF
Safe
Marshall

August 24, 1942

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

I wish you would ask General Arnold to submit to you his judgment of the number of combat aircraft by types which should be produced for the Army and our Allies in this country in 1943 in order to have complete air ascendency over the enemy.

This report should be prepared without consideration for existing schedules or production possibilities or any other competing military requirements. I am asking for this because I would like to know what the theoretical requirements are to get complete control and domination of the air.

I realize fully, however, that there are limiting factors to the creation of air power, such as the availability of pilots, high octane gas, transportation and the competition of other essential critical munitions of war. Hence, I would like you and Admiral King to submit a second schedule based on these realities and the proper relationship of air power to the Navy and our ground forces.

Copy to: Admiral King.

HLH/lmb

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 7 1972

a44aa01

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

April 18, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached hereto are two radiograms received from General Marshall. One is addressed to you personally and he directed that the other radiogram be sent to you also.

JOSEPH T. McNARNEY,
Major General,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Incls.
2 Radiograms from
General Marshall.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 (9/27/58)



a44501

~~SECRET~~

...ied 18/1050a
dp

CSWD
April 18, 1942
5:48 a.m.

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: London
To: Milid

No. 2432, April 18, 1942

Information contained in War Department message number 320 concerning planes for India; President's cable number 133 to Hopkins same subject and my message to McNarney indicating result of conference with Portal, have been shown to the former naval person. The last provides details for a basis of mutual agreement which has been incorporated in a message number 2419 to McNarney which he is directed to attach to this message to you. For the President from General Marshall.

I communicated to the Secretary of War favorable result of final interview with Defense Cabinet Wednesday night and assume that he transmitted this information to you.

Yesterday (Thursday) while Harry rested in country with Harriman specifically in pursuance of your instructions to me, I attended extensive military demonstration. The former naval person took me in his train to Salisbury Plains for an all day demonstration of weapon firing, infantry assault with supporting weapons, armored brigade attack with artillery support. parachute and glider operation of airborne division; a walk through inspection of tank brigade and a formal review in my honor by the Grenadier Guards.

I will see former naval person this morning (Friday). Harry and I leave this afternoon for Londonderry to review U. S. Troops in Ireland tomorrow, thence Saturday afternoon to Stranraes for departure

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~~SECRET~~

COPY No. 9

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a44602

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

that evening by Clipper. Route in accordance with weather, probably via Bermuda. Admiral Pound joins us at Stranraer.

I think our trip has been successful.

McClure

Action Copy: SGS

Info. Copies: FILE
OPD
OPD (Col. Gailey)

CM-IN-4790 (4/18/42) 9:22 AM

~~SECRET~~ COPY No. 9

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a44603

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5200.9 (9/27/52)

~~SECRET~~

APRIL 17, 1942.
8:42 A. M.

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

U R G E N T

From: London,
To: G-2

No. 2419, April 17th, 1942,

Air Ministry agrees to loan repeat loan from British allocations of up to 10 liberator and 24 B-25 aircraft to bring U. S. Bombardment Squndrons in India up to full strength with U. S. crews. Do this.

From Marshall to McNarney. With regard to Pursuit aircraft Air Ministry feels that they should be taking gravest risks in Middle East if Kitty Hawks now allotted to that theatre are used for any other purpose. The use of Ranger they believe is of great value in speeding up deliveries to India and Middle East and request use of any vacant space in the ship for as many Kitty Hawks as possible for the Middle East.

So far as practicable use Ranger for transport of U. S. Pursuit for India to Africa and give all additional space to British Kitty Hawks for Middle East. U. S. to provide ferry pilots for same.

A copy of this message is to be attached to the message from me to the President which will follow this shortly today.

McClure.

Action Copy: SGS

Info. Copies: TAG
File
OPD
CGAAF
G-2

CM-IN-4481 (4/17/42) 8:03 AM

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/68)
Date-

~~SECRET~~

COPY No. 34

a44604

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

PSF
Safe
Marshall

August 24, 1942

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

I am receiving almost daily a variety of military requirements for 1943 and 1944. These come from the Army, Navy, Maritime Commission and our Allies. While the most important of these requirements is the proposed increase of the Army, there are others which affect our production quite as much, if not more.

Furthermore, I believe that our production schedules in certain respects, particularly concerning combat aircraft and escort vessels, are probably too low and, therefore, need to be revised. I am enclosing a separate memorandum to you on aircraft, which indicates my anxiety in regard to this.

What I should like to see is a fresh and realistic look at 1943 over-all requirements from a strategic point of view. This implies that certain assumptions must be made on which estimated requirements for United States forces of all types in the various probable theaters of war, by number and general composition, are determined. It naturally follows that these assumptions must include judgments as to the strength of our Allies in 1943 and the probable strength of our enemies. The ability to transport and supply these forces overseas, of course, is an essential factor in determining our requirements.

This review - and I do not imply a detailed analysis - should be made by you and Admiral King jointly and your respective staffs.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 7 1972

a446601

The British are our partners, hence we must have the fullest and frankest collaboration with them. Lend-Lease and merchant shipping must naturally be integrated in an overall requirement picture.

I feel that we may have our major impact with the enemy in the fall of 1943. Therefore it seems to me that a supreme effort from a production point of view should be given to producing the weapons and military units that we can bring to bear on the enemy by that time.

I think our general policy should be to put our munitions to work directly against the enemy as promptly as possible. We must always remember that the enemy is not going to wait for us to become fully prepared.

Pending a final approval of total requirements, which I hope will be in my hands not later than October 1, I am prepared to authorize an increase in the Army by December 31, 1942. I should like to discuss with you at once the exact increase which should be authorized because I fully realize that you must continue with your augmented plans.

Copy to: Admiral King.

HLH/lmb

a44 5602

Bat

~~SECRET~~ - F Safe File Marshall

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

April 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Our Memorandum from General Sikorski.

I agree with your general observations concerning the points made by General Sikorski in his memorandum of April 13. With respect to his concrete suggestions concerning a general staff, he has proposed in almost exact detail, matters that we have been considering through two agencies. One of these is Colonel Donovan's organization, the other is the Psychological Warfare Committee of the War and Navy Departments. Without exhaustive study of the matter it would appear that the representative Staff Officers of the occupied countries could well be integrated with the machinery we have already instituted for the briefs General Sikorski outlines. This will be especially true if you should approve the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that recommends the placing of Colonel Donovan's committee under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In the meantime I will have your memorandum, together with General Sikorski's suggestions, studied more thoroughly by the General Staff.

Chief of Staff.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 4-3-59
Signature- Carl L. Spiess

~~SECRET~~

a44c01

August 25, 1942

SECRET AND PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

I am enclosing two cablegrams I received, one from the Prime Minister and one from Averell Harriman, relative to our taking over the responsibility for the development and operation of that part of the Persian railroad now under British control.

I wonder if you would be good enough to have a plan drawn up which would accomplish this and also let me have your judgment as to whether we should accede to these requests.

Harriman and General Spalding, who, I understand, has been making a study of the transportation into Russia, will both be back on Monday and I suggest that whoever prepares this plan for you consult both of them.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date JUN 6 1972

a44cc01

COPY

[redacted]

CAIRO, August 23, 1942 - 0134 Z

PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM HARRIMAN

Reference to the Prime Minister's cable to you requesting that the responsibility for the development and operation of that part of the Persian Railroad now under British control be taken over by the United States Army and also the ports serving it.

This request has resulted from protracted discussions between us all here and expresses the considered judgment of the British officers involved both in Iran and Cairo.

Generals Maxwell, Spalding and other United States officers who have been studying the situation agree (a) that with proper management and personnel and with additional equipment the capacity of the railroad to Teheran can be increased to six thousand long tons a day (b) that the British have not the resources or personnel to carry out this program even if we should supply the equipment (c) that unless the United States Army undertakes the task the flow of supplies to Russia will dry up as the requirements of the British forces in the theatre increase (d) that the importance of the development of this railroad to its maximum cannot be over-emphasized (e) that the condition in the Prime Minister's cable of the British retaining control of traffic to be moved is reasonable offers no practical difficulty and should be accepted.

We therefore recommend that the task be undertaken.

Although the mileage of the railroad is not great its operation presents difficult problems due to heavy grades, long tunnels and climatic conditions as well as those of a political nature in dealing with the Iranians and the Russians and the task should not be undertaken unless it is accepted as one of great importance and be given the necessary priority for both the full personnel and equipment needed.

It is therefore recommended (A) that a top calibre railroad man with the position of operating vice-president or general-manager of a western railroad be drafted and commissioned in the Army with rank of Brigadier General. He should be vigorous and

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

a44cc02

COPY

[redacted]

FROM LONDON
AUGUST 22, 1942

FORMER NAVAL PERSON

TO PRESIDENT - [redacted] AND PERSONAL

NO. 135

Your 166 of 16th July. I have delayed my reply until I could study the Trans-Persian situation on the spot. This I have now done both at Teheran and here, and have conferred with Averell, General Maxwell, General Spalding and their railway experts. The traffic on the Trans-Persian Railway is expected to reach three thousand tons a day for all purposes by end of the year. We are all convinced that it ought to be raised to six thousand tons. Only in this way can we ensure an expanding flow of supplies to Russia while building up the military forces which we must move into Northern Persia to meet a possible German advance.

To reach the higher figure, it will be necessary to increase largely the railway personnel and to provide additional quantities of rolling stock and technical equipment. Furthermore, the target will only be attained in reasonable time if enthusiasm and energy are devoted to the task and a high priority accorded to its requirements.

I therefore welcome and accept your most helpful proposal contained in your telegram, that the railway should be taken over, developed and operated by the United States Army, with the railroad should be included the ports of Khorranshahr and Bandarshahpur. Your people would thus undertake the great task of opening up the Persian corridor, which will carry primarily your supplies to Russia. All our people here agree on the benefits which would follow your approval of this suggestion. We should be unable to find the resources without your help and our burden in the Middle East would be eased by the release for use elsewhere of the British units now operating the railway. The railway and ports would be managed entirely by your people, though the allocation of traffic would have to be retained in the hands of the British military authorities for whom the railway is an essential channel of communication for operational purposes. I see no obstacle in this to harmonious working.

a44cc04

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

The changeover would have to be carefully planned to avoid any temporary reduction of effort, but I think it should start as soon as possible. Averell is cabling you detailed suggestions.

PRIME

a44cc05

[redacted]

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

Safe : Marshall
5-3-42

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

While on an inspection trip in the South I was notified of your directive to increase the U.S. ground forces in Australia by 25,000 (to a total of 100,000) and the air combat force by 100 planes (to a total of 1,000 planes). The Staff has been studying the matter pending my return, but without delaying to receive their detailed report on the tonnage involvements, I wish to bring certain phases of the matter to your immediate attention.

My mission to England was greatly embarrassed by the fact that we could propose only 2 1/2 divisions to participate in a cross-channel operation by September 15th. Not only was this a very small force but in order to gather even that number of troops in the British Isles we were forced to set the late date of mid-September. The British, particularly the First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound, were strongly opposed to attempting such an operation so late in the season.

Your directive of May 1st relating to the ground forces in Australia would make it impossible for us to contribute more than a division and a half for the cross-channel operation, with an added deficiency in supporting troops.

There is another serious factor involved in the increase of U.S. ground troops in Australia, and that is the length of the turn-around for the ships involved. In order to increase the Australian set-up by approximately a division and a half, we would be forced to eliminate from our troop concentration in the British Isles double the number of troops, or three divisions. This would virtually eliminate the United States from ground participation in a 1942 offensive on the Continent, and would seriously limit our participation in early April, 1943.

The reduction in combat planes, so far as it concerns the cross-channel operation, is not quite so serious, although it would be unfortunate, in my opinion. What I do feel, though, in this

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OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

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matter of calculated hazards, is that rather than cut the allotment of U.S. combat planes to Great Britain for the purpose of increasing our strength in Australia, I would be inclined to give the increase to Hawaii and Alaska to protect our own interests, where we are definitely accepting a certain hazard under the present schedule of allocations. Admiral Nimitz and General Emmons urgently recommend 200 heavy bombers for Hawaii. We have 32 there at the present time. Admiral King desires 96 (an operating strength of 70) to which we are committed by December next.

Also, Admiral King has not accepted our present allotment of planes to the line of communications between Hawaii and Australia, and I am rather in agreement with General DeWitt as to the hazard we are accepting in Alaska and the Aleutians with the small aviation force available in that region. However, I have preferred to accept that hazard in order to stage an early offensive on the Continent of Europe. But I would recommend against continuing that hazard on the basis of reducing our planned effort from the British Islands in favor of an increase in Australia.

To sum up, I believe that the most important consideration is the gathering of the largest force of ground troops possible in the British Isles at the earliest possible date. The 2 1/2 divisions mentioned in the original memorandum I submitted to the British authorities was all that we could firmly promise in the light of the conditions at the time. That number is insufficient and must be increased and I have been hopeful that some additional tonnage could be made available for this purpose. If instead the number is to be decreased by more than 50%, then our recent proposal to the British Government for 1942 has, in effect, largely been cancelled.

Chief of Staff.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

[redacted]

May 1, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Aircraft and Troops for Australia.

The President remarked at the meeting of the Pacific War Council held on April 29, 1942, that it was his desire that the total number of planes assigned to the U. S. Army in Australia be raised to one thousand, the distribution as to types being left to the discretion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Further, the President directed that I inform the Chiefs of Staff that it was his desire to have in Australia 100,000 troops in addition to the personnel of air forces required to maintain the plane program referred to in paragraph one of this memorandum.

Very respectfully,

J. L. McCrea

JOHN L. McCREA,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

a44d03

August 27, 1942

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL MARSHALL

FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I have received from Mr. Donald Nelson relative to aircraft production for the balance of 1942 and for 1943.

A supplement is attached showing a breakdown by types of planes. You will note that the probable production of all types for the balance of this year and next is greatly below the original Victory Program and substantially below the War Production Board's 6-K objective.

Frank Knox

Enclosures.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 11
MAR 28 1973
By RHP, NARS Date

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COPY

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Office of
DONALD M. NELSON
Chairman

The President
The White House

My dear Mr. President:

Your letter of August 12th to the Secretaries of War and Navy and to myself on the subject of aircraft production has received our most careful attention. It is desirable now to re-appraise our position from the standpoint of past deliveries, retarding factors and remedial measures necessary to secure the more rapid acceleration we all desire.

The replies to your letter from Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox were prepared in cooperation with representatives of the Aircraft Production Division of the War Production Board and, I believe, give you a correct picture of deliveries compared to schedules during the first seven months of 1942 and, in addition, list the main factors that have contributed to the prevention of greater accelerations.

There are a number of matters pertaining to the aircraft program of such vital importance that I am taking the liberty of presenting them here, since they were discussed and agreed upon at the "clinic" which you requested be held by representatives of the several agencies involved.

1942 Program

On January 3rd of this year you announced an aircraft program objective of 60,000 planes for 1942. This has subsequently served as our directive, toward the attainment of which every effort has been made. Although many of our associates have from the first indicated that they considered it unlikely that we could reach this figure, I have, nevertheless, felt it would be unwise to advise you of their doubts until the time had arrived when we could give you convincing evidence of what within closer limits the final figure would be. That time has now arrived.

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Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-18-71
By RHP, Date MAR 28 1973

Under the existing conditions of aircraft priority assignments, manufacturing facilities, and material supplies available to aircraft, it is probable that our 1942 deliveries will not exceed 48,000 planes. The flow time of materials in the aircraft industry is from five to seven months, so that it is not now possible greatly to accelerate output during the remainder of 1942. Every additional plane that can be turned out will be, so as to add as many possible to this number. I suggest a "green light" for the whole aircraft program, except primary trainers. With a stimulus, for instance, such as would be given by extending special preference to every item required for aircraft whether tool, material, or equipment, I believe our 1942 total airplane deliveries can be raised to something over 50,000, of which approximately two-thirds will be tactical airplanes (56% combat and 10% cargo and communications). The remaining 34% will be trainers.

1943 Program

Your announced directive for 1943 was 125,000 airplanes. Although little can be done to improve 1942 output, drastic steps taken now will substantially increase 1943 production. There are, however, several factors involved of which we feel you should be cognizant, and these together with attainable objectives, will be briefly touched upon in following paragraphs.

Weight Increase

As our program progresses, the percentage of heavy bombers will increase and training airplanes diminish. The disparity of weight is so great that, whereas the average airframe weight was about 4,000 lbs. at the beginning of 1942, it will be almost 9,000 lbs. at the end lf 1943. For 1942, the average weight will be approximately 5,600 lbs., which will increase to an average of 9,000 lbs. for 1943. A 108% increase in number of airplanes produced (60,000 to 125,000) would represent almost a 200% increase in terms of airframe weight, and an increase of the same general order in the productive effort required. It is also important to note that, with an increasing proportion of bombers, the number of engines used will increase more than in proportion to the number of airframes.

Spares

The global war in which we are engaged makes necessary the establishment of great numbers of bases, widely separated. To keep our airplanes flying at these bases under war conditions, it has been necessary continually to increase percentages of spares. The latest directive for spares requirements for 1943 as established by the Services calls for very greatly increased percentages compared to those scheduled or actually being received in 1943. The manufacturing load is increased proportionately, with attendant reduction in the program of completed airplanes.

a44dd03

Engines

One of the major limiting factors in the aircraft program is the production of high horsepower engines. Facilities for the manufacture of these are being rapidly expanded. In addition to the engines which are being manufactured for original installation in planes, it is necessary for us to manufacture an additional fifty percent which are to be usdd as spares.

Gliders

The glider program, introduced subsequently to the announcement of your program, is competitive with the aircraft schedules in instruments and in some equipment and materials. Its importence has given it a high prioity position.

Changes

Combat experience makes changes necessary although it is always the aim to incorporate alterations at a stage of production which will cause the least possible interruption of manufacturing flow. This postponement of the time when changes are incorporated is not always a wise or practicable policy from the standpoint of military effectiveness. Changes will remain always an uncertain element in production forecasts.

The Program

Under the existing priority position for the aircraft program, and indications of the material supplies available, and with due consideration for the above factors, our forecast of probable 1943 deliveries is 92,000 airplanes. Although your directive of 125,000 airplanes for 1943 has remained as our ultimate objective and is being used as the basis of planning expansion of facilities, nevertheless, our target schedule for materials and equipment allocations is 107,111 (about 16% higher than our forecast so as to permit maximum possible delivery increase consistent with proper allocation policy, but 14% less than the ultimate objective). To attain this quantity, 107,111 will require that the unqualified "green light" signal for aircraft in all of its components including facilities, machine tools, basic materials and all other factors entering into the completed airplane, described above in the discussion of 1942 problems, be continued through 1943. I suggest that the aircraft program as a whole be preferred over all other production and that great caution be taken to avoid the giving of highest priority to special projects believed to be of an emergency character. Only in this way can there be any reasonable assurance of obtaining the target objective.

a44dd04

We fully appreciate the need of aircraft in ever-increasing quantities and assure you of the continuing best efforts of us all in getting the largest possible number, yet I urge that you accept our judgment that the figure 107,111, which represents about what we are likely to deliver even with the "green light", is the maximum realistic target figure and should be adopted both for allocation and expansion purposes, on the premise that a target set too high above a feasible goal may result in establishment of more facilities than can effectively be used, and this would be to the detriment of the scheduled program. Materials and labor expended in obtaining such facilities will not only cause us to get less planes than we otherwise would have produced, but unnecessarily detract from other vital parts of the program.

However, it is important for you to know that by the end of 1943 our target schedule of 107,111 airplanes provides for an annual rate of production of just over your directive figure of 125,000, of which approximately two-thirds will be combat types.

Remedies

We have ordered a listing of all items of tools, materials and equipment, the lack of delivery of which is in any way retarding the aircraft program. Our "clinic" considers the aircraft part of our war production effort as so outstandingly important that we feel justified in giving every such item a priority position so high as to assure its delivery when required. Your approval of the program as outlined is requested.

Respectfully yours,

/s/ D. M. NELSON

Donald M. Nelson

Approved:

/s/ ROBERT P. PATTERSON

For the Army: Acting Secretary

a44dd05

/s/ RALPH A. BARD

Acting for the Navy:

[redacted]

1942 - 1943
AIRCRAFT PROGRAM ANALYSIS

1942

	President's program	W.P.B. 8-K Objective	Probable Production Under Existing Conditions	Gain by "Green Light" Support
Long Range, Heavy & Medium Bombers	11,300	7,464	6,824	557
Light, Dive, Torpedo & Scout Bombers	11,000	7,738	7,065	617
Pursuits	16,000	11,942	10,709	998
Observation & Transports	6,700	7,348	6,745	565
TOTAL TACTICAL	45,000	34,492	31,343	2,737
Total Trainers	15,000	18,079	16,272	
GRAND TOTAL	60,000	52,571	47,615	2,737

Total Under "Green Light" Support 50,352

1943

	President's Program	W.P.B. 8-K Objective	Probable Production Under Existing Conditions	Gain By "Green Light" Support
Long Range, Heavy & Medium Bombers	30,000	22,525	19,272	3,653
Light, Dive, Torpedo & Scout Bombers	17,000	19,382	17,056	2,626
Pursuits	38,000	27,985	24,048	4,517
Observation & Transports	15,000	10,660	9,988	951
TOTAL TACTICAL	100,000	80,552	70,364	11,747
Total Trainers	25,000	26,559	21,668	3,332
GRAND TOTAL	125,000	107,111	92,032	15,079

Total Under "Green Light" Support 107,111

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Commerce Dept. Letter, 11-15-72
By RHP, Date MAR 28 1973

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August 27, 1942

My dear Mr. Nelson:

I have received your letter relative to aircraft production for the balance of this year and 1943.

I have sent it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their comments as to how nearly these production figures meet our requirements during this period.

I note that in all categories the figures are considerably below the original program and even substantially lower than the recent War Production Board revised objective.

Sincerely yours,

The Honorable
Donald M. Nelson,
Chairman, War Production Board.

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By RHB, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 5, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR
THE CHIEF OF STAFF

I fully appreciate the needs set forth in the Chief of Staff's memorandum of April 27th in regard to transport planes for Russia, and the need for transport planes in Panama and in Alaska and in later operations in several other places.

But it does not make much sense to me, in view of these great needs not only in the future but at the present, merely to carry out the recommendation of these transport planes of U. S. commercial airlines by earmarking them for Army use.

Please let me know just how many U. S. commercial airline planes carrying passengers and carrying U. S. mail there are in the United States, together with their age, carrying capacity and radius.

The old expression "pigs is pigs" should be translated into the modern term "planes is planes".

a44e01

No matter what planes are in civilian hands at the present time, they are available for Army and Navy use, and the Army and Navy say they are short of planes.

F. D. R.

a44e02

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

4/27/42

Dear Harry:

In view of your intimate concern with this matter I thought you would like to see the attached memo to the President, through your hands.

Yours,

WDC

a44e03

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

April 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Transport airplanes for Russia.

Successful execution of the European invasion plan that I recently presented, in your name, to the authorities in London involves the employment of large numbers of highly trained parachutists and air-borne troops. Consequently the availability of transport planes becomes a question of the most critical importance, not only with respect to the operational phases of the plan but also as it affects the program of intensive training, which must begin immediately.

To supply transport planes to Russia at this time will directly endanger success of the invasion plan. In London I found that a principal reason for original British reluctance to agree to an invasion of Europe in 1942 was the fact, in their opinion, that essential materiel means could not be made available in time. They were especially concerned as to availability of landing craft and transport planes. Under this latter item my memorandum listed U.S. allocations of only 200 transport planes during the coming summer, with approximately an additional 200 to be in England by late fall. This number was wholly inadequate, but I was able to secure their acquiescence to the general plan by pointing out that, in addition to the approximately four hundred airplanes specifically promised, the United States possesses, in its commercial airlines, an immediately available reserve in this critical item.

The figures given to the British were calculated by charging against all planes allocated to the United States our firm commitments to other countries and our minimum requirements for other purposes. They did not involve an allotment for Russia since the War Department had previously reported that it was impracticable to include this item in the new protocol for Russia. The Army's minimum requirements, in exact figures, include 389 planes to arrive in England by late fall, 284 for the Ferry Command, 111 for training of parachute and air-borne troops, and 196 to supply and maintain air operations in Australia, Hawaii, the Caribbean and Alaska. To this total of 980 must be added a modest figure for attrition, making an aggregate requirement of 1150 transport planes. We have on hand 111, of which 57 are in the Far East and 54 are doing all the transport work in this hemisphere and providing only 10 for the training of 3,000 parachute troops. Immediate expansion in the training program is mandatory.



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OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

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Without undertaking additional commitments and obligations, our total assets, including all U.S. allocations from new production, will leave us with a clear shortage of 379 transport airplanes. This exceeds the total number now operating on commercial lines by approximately 129.

I therefore submit two urgent recommendations:

First: That we undertake no commitment involving the provision of transport airplanes for Russia.

Second: That all transport planes of the U.S.Commercial airlines be immediately earmarked for Army use. They may be continued on their present status until required for military operations.

Quite obviously it is essential to keep up the flow of materiel resources to Russia. I believe we should strive to increase shipments in every practicable way and, subject to your approval, intend to increase the aggregate of such transfers to the maximum permitted by the availability of munitions and by possibilities in transportation. I have in mind, particularly, the hope of providing the Russians with greater strength in mechanized items. But the greatest service to Russia will be a landing on the European continent in 1942, and we must not jeopardize that operation or risk the sacrifice of the troops engaged by scattering the vital materiel required for what we know will be a hazardous undertaking.

I have not made a point of our serious lack of transport planes and parachute troops in Panama for the prompt suppression of revolutions or Fifth Column enterprises threatening the Canal, nor a similar and very serious lack of such planes in Alaska to meet the possibilities of isolated infiltrations in that vast region.

Chief of Staff.

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OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By RHP; NARS Date MAR 28 1973

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PSF
Safe
Marshall

Bmk

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

August 31, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Five ships containing the tanks and self-propelled guns for the British in the Middle East, which left here July 10th, are due in Aden today. The sixth vessel, containing 33 of the 100 self-propelled mounts, was sunk while in convoy in the South Atlantic. It was replaced by a sea train carrying duplicate equipment, which is due in Egypt on September 12th.

George C. Marshall
Chief of Staff.

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Date 4-6-59
Signature- Carl L. Spicer

SECRET

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PSF - Safe = Marshall

Port

~~SECRET~~

May 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL GEORGE MARSHALL:
Chief of Staff

1. I have yours of May sixth regarding the Pacific Theatre versus "Bolero". In regard to the first paragraph I did not issue any directive on May first regarding the increase of combat planes to Australia to a total of 1,000 and the ground forces to a total of 100,000. I did ask if this could properly be done. I understand now that this is inadvisable at the present time and I wholly agree with you and Admiral King.

2. In regard to additional aircraft to the South Pacific Theatre, it is my thought that all we should send there is a sufficient number of heavy and medium bombers and pursuit planes in order to maintain the present ~~strength~~ objective there at the maximum.

3. I do not want "Bolero" slowed down.

4. The success of raiding operations seems to be such that a large scale Japanese offensive against Australia or New Zealand can be prevented.

F.D.R.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 7 1972

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Headquarters of the Commander in Chief,
Cominch File Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

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By Authority of Art. 0445,
OPNAVINST 5510.1C by OP
09B9C Date 7/12/72
By JS Date JUL 1 1972

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MEMORANDUM TO JOINT U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF.

Subject: J.C.S. 48 - Defense of Island Bases in the Pacific.

1. In paragraph 5 of the memorandum from the Joint Planners forming a part of J.C.S. 48, the statement appears: "The Army members of the J.P.S. are reluctant to recommend any increase in aviation in the Pacific Area at this time due to the fact that any increase in this area means not only a corresponding decrease in the main effort but also an inordinate delay in its initiation." I agree that there must be no undue delay in the deployment of available forces in the main effort; but I am not in agreement with the recommendation that forces in the Pacific be kept at a bare minimum.

2. The PACIFIC Theater is an area for which the United States bears full strategic responsibility. The recent Japanese successes in BURMA, added to previous successes, leaves the Japanese free to choose any new line of action they see fit, including an attack in force on AUSTRALIA, on the AUSTRALIA-HAWAII line of communications, on HAWAII, or on ALASKA. Even now they are massing strong land, sea, and air forces in the Mandate Area beyond our range of observation.

3. The basic strategic plan on which we are now operating is to hold in the Pacific. I am not convinced that the forces now there or allocated to that theater are sufficient to "hold" against a determined attack in force by the Japanese, an attack which they can initiate very soon. The mounting of BOLERO must not be permitted to interfere with our vital needs in the Pacific. I am convinced that the Japanese are not going to allow us to "hold" but are going to drive and drive hard.

4. The disastrous consequences which would result if we are unable to hold the present position in the Pacific Areas are self-evident. We have already seen, in the Far East and in Burma, the results of being "spread out too thin"; we must not commit the same error in the Pacific Ocean Areas.

5. Important as the mounting of BOLERO may be, the Pacific problem is no less so, and is certainly the more urgent - it must be faced now. Quite apart from any idea of future advance in this theater, we must see to it that we are actually able to maintain our present positions. We must not permit diversion of our forces to any proposed operation in any other theater to the extent that we find ourselves unable to fulfill our obligation to implement our basic strategic plan in the Pacific Theater, which is to hold what we have against any attack that the Japanese are capable of launching against us.

E. J. KING.

[redacted]

a44f02

[redacted]

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

May 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: The Pacific Theatre versus "Bolero."

1. The following issues have arisen involving conflicts between the requirements for the "Bolero" operation on the one hand and the Pacific theatre on the other:

a. Your directive of May 1st regarding the increase of combat planes to Australia to a total of 1,000 and the ground troops to a total of 100,000.

b. A memorandum from Cominch, Admiral King, on May 4th stating a requirement of the following additional aircraft for the South Pacific theatre: 35 heavy and 83 medium bombers and 55 pursuit planes (i.e. a heavy group, a medium group plus 2 squadrons and one pursuit group (less 1 squadron). A 25 per cent increase in these figures is necessarily involved as a reserve.)

Another issue has been raised by a British request of May 4th for additional pursuit planes for the Middle East to enable them to retain an equivalent number of British planes in the United Kingdom.

2. With reference to your directive referred to in subparagraph a. above, I submitted a preliminary memorandum to you on May 4th, (copy attached) recommending against a further diversion of planes and shipping (for ground troops) to the Australian theatre. Admiral King, I believe, is in agreement with this view.

3. With reference to par. 1b above Admiral King's memorandum is attached hereto. (See also the attached chart.) In brief, he states that the Pacific theatre is an area for which the United States bears full strategic responsibility; that the Japanese are free to choose any new line of action they see fit, including an attack in force on Australia, on the Australia-Hawaii line of communication, on Hawaii, or on Alaska; and that the Japanese are now massing strong land, sea, and air forces in the Mandate Area. Admiral King further states: "The basic strategic plan on which we are now operating is to hold in the Pacific." He is not convinced that the forces now there or allocated to that theatre are



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By Authority of ORder Sec. Army by TAG per 720814
By OS Date

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sufficient to hold against a determined attack by the Japanese. He states: "The mounting of BOLERO must not be permitted to interfere with our vital needs in the Pacific." Admiral King calls attention to the disastrous consequences which would result if we are unable to hold the present position in the Pacific; to the results of being "spread out too thin" in the Far East and Burma; and states that we must not commit the same error in the Pacific Ocean Areas. He further states: "Important as the mounting of BOLERO may be, the Pacific problem is no less so, and is certainly the more urgent - it must be faced now." * * * "We must not permit diversion of our forces to any proposed operation in any other theatre to the extent that we find ourselves unable to fulfill our obligation to implement our basic strategic plan in the Pacific theatre, which is to hold what we have against any attack that the Japanese are capable of launching against us."

4. The Army view follows. While I agree that we must hold in the Pacific, I do not concur that this is our "basic strategic plan." My view, and I understood it to be your decision prior to my visit to England, was that our major effort would be to concentrate immediately for offensive action against Germany from the British Islands. The most pressing need, in the opinion of the Army General Staff, is to sustain Russia as an active, effective participant in the war. That issue will probably be decided this summer or fall. Every possible effort, we think, must be made to draw off German forces from the Russian front. We believe that this may be done by combined British and American operations in Western Europe. Hence, the urgency of "Bolero." Only by a complete and whole-hearted acceptance by all concerned, British and American, and by the exertion of every practicable effort on the part of all, can "Bolero" have any chance of success. The increases in U.S. Army Air Force suggested for Australia and the South Pacific Islands, if executed this summer, would have the effect of postponing, by more than two months, the initiation of an American air offensive in Western Europe. The increase of U.S. ground forces to Australia would, in effect, eliminate the U.S. from participation in the most difficult and vital phase of "Bolero," the landing operation.

5. If the "Bolero" project is not to be our primary consideration, I would recommend its complete abandonment. We must remember that this operation for 1942 depends primarily upon British forces and not our own. They have far more at stake than do we and are accepting very grave hazards to which our own risks are not comparable. They have accepted the "Bolero" project with a firm understanding that it would be the primary objective of the United States. If such is not to be the case, the British should be formally notified that the recent London agreement must be canceled.

By Authority of Order Sec. Army by TAG ltr 720814
By [illegible] JUL 17 1972

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6. As far as Australia and the South Pacific area are concerned, it is impossible to make every point in the island chain impregnable to "any attack the Japanese are capable of launching." The enemy still retains the initiative and, because of his freedom of movement, is able to concentrate the bulk of his strength at any point of his own choosing. Moreover, our forces in the island garrisons throughout that region have no positive effect on the enemy, unless he chooses to attack them, except for heavy and medium bombers. Additional forces allotted there must come from those set up for "Bolero." All over the world we are striving now to meet our firm commitments in air equipment. Beyond this, new and urgent requests are constantly received for our air forces for the Middle East, India and Burma, and for additional strength in the British Isles. There is no reserve to draw on. The initial air forces set up for "Bolero" are still undergoing organization and training.

7. The specific point at issue between the Army and Navy is the allocation of approximately 215 Army combat planes to the South Pacific. Equally critical is the increase required to raise our forces in Australia to a strength in the air of 1,000 planes and on the ground to a total of 100,000 men. Both these questions are really only included parts of the broader one of whether or not we are now to decide that no further commitments will be made in U.S. air and ground forces where such commitments will reduce the strength of our concentration in England or postpone the time when we can undertake active operations there. I have not mentioned the hazard we are accepting in the Alaskan-Aleutian theatre now under threat.

8. I present this question to you as Commander-in-Chief, and request that you discuss the matter with Admiral King, General Arnold and me, and give us a formal directive for our future guidance.

Chief of Staff.

3 Incls.
Incl. 1 - C/S memo, 5/4/42.
Incl. 2 - Ad. King's memo. 5/4/42.
Incl. 3 - Chart.

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By Authority of order Sec Army by TAG per 320.814
By JS Date

a44f05

OPD
DDE
Ext. 2904

May 3, 1942.

COPY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

While on an inspection trip in the South I was notified of your directive to increase the U.S. ground forces in Australia by 25,000 (to a total of 100,000) and the air combat force by 100 planes (to a total of 1,000 planes). The Staff has been studying the matter pending my return, but without delaying to receive their detailed report on the tonnage involvements, I wish to bring certain phases of the matter to your immediate attention.

My mission to England was greatly embarrassed by the fact that we could propose only 2 1/2 divisions to participate in a cross-channel operation by September 15th. Not only was this a very small force but in order to gather even that number of troops in the British Isles we were forced to set the late date of mid-September. The British, particularly the First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound, were strongly opposed to attempting such an operation so late in the season.

Your directive of May 1st relating to the ground forces in Australia would make it impossible for us to contribute more than a division and a half for the cross-channel operation, with an added deficiency in supporting troops.

There is another serious factor involved in the increase of U.S. ground troops in Australia, and that is the length of the turn-around for the ships involved. In order to increase the Australian set-up by approximately a division and a half, we would be forced to eliminate from our troop concentration in the British Isles double the number of troops, or three divisions. This would virtually eliminate the United States from ground participation in a 1942 offensive on the Continent, and would seriously limit our participation in early April, 1943.

The reduction in combat planes, so far as it concerns the cross-channel operation, is not quite so serious, although it would be unfortunate, in my opinion. What I do feel, though, in this

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By Authority of order Sec Army by TAG ltr 720814
By JS

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[redacted]

matter of calculated hazards, is that rather than cut the allotment of U.S. combat planes to Great Britain for the purpose of increasing our strength in Australia, I would be inclined to give the increase to Hawaii and Alaska to protect our own interests, where we are definitely accepting a certain hazard under the present schedule of allocations. Admiral Nimitz and General Emmons urgently recommend 200 heavy bombers for Hawaii. We have 32 there at the present time. Admiral King desires 96 (an operating strength of 70) to which we are committed by December next.

Also, Admiral King has not accepted our present allotment of planes to the line of communications between Hawaii and Australia, and I am rather in agreement with General DeWitt as to the hazard we are accepting in Alaska and the Aleutians with the small aviation force available in that region. However, I have preferred to accept that hazard in order to stage an early offensive on the Continent of Europe. But I would recommend against continuing that hazard on the basis of reducing our planned effort from the British Islands in favor of an increase in Australia.

To sum up, I believe that the most important consideration is the gathering of the largest force of ground troops possible in the British Isles at the earliest possible date. The 29 divisions mentioned in the original memorandum I submitted to the British authorities was all that we could firmly promise in the light of the conditions at the time. That number is insufficient and must be increased and I have been hopeful that some additional tonnage could be made available for this purpose. If instead the number is to be decreased by more than 50%, then our recent proposal to the British Government for 1942 has, in effect, largely been cancelled.

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Chief of Staff.

[redacted]

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By JS JUL 17 1972

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DEPLOYMENT OF AIR FORCES IN THE PACIFIC THEATER

SUMMATION OF PACIFIC THEATER

	NAVY PROPOSAL	ARMY PROPOSAL June 30,1942	ARMY PROPOSAL Eventual Plan (Dec 31,1942)	
(Combat)	1661	1081	1444	(including reserves)
	930	666	930	(no reserves; includes 300 on carriers)
LS	2591	1747	2374	

ditional planned or in area:
210 USAAF Transport, Observation and Photo.
570 RAAF, RNZAF and NEI

CENTRAL PACIFIC

	NAVY PROPOSAL Operating	Reserve	Total	ARMY PROPOSAL June 30, 1942 Operating	Reserve	Total
Bombers (H)	70	26	96	70	10	80
Bombers (M)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bombers (L)	13	11	24	7	2	9
Pursuit	245	132	377	163	26	189
Totals			497			275

CANTON ISLAND

F.D.R. to Marshall

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

September 3, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

I want you to see this. I am greatly distressed. Perhaps you might think this over until I see you early next week.

F. D. R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 7 1972

Memorandum to the President from General Marshall, dated Sept. 2, 1942 re message from General Eisenhower re letter the latter received from British Chiefs of Staff saying French official states Americans are working on plans for operations in French Morocco. Also, French official stated that he had heard same thing from Mr. Bullitt while the latter was in London.

a44ff01

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

H. H.

Will you check on this and speak to me about it?

F. D. R.

Isaac:-

Since this was written, the President has issued specific instructions to Bar Dept about this matter. Hope this can be filed

H.L.H.

a44g01

[redacted]

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

May 7, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Analysis of Air Transportation Requirements for the war program

1. Referring to your Memorandum of May 5, to the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff regarding transport airplane requirements for military operations of the United Nations, the following recommendations are submitted:

a. That an immediate analysis be effected to determine the minimum requirements in transport aircraft to provide essential air transportation service required for the conduct of our war effort. This analysis will be based upon the premise:

1. Domestic air carriers: That only personnel engaged directly in the prosecution of our war program will travel by commercially operated airplanes and that no cargo or mail will be carried except that required by our military services or in the production of supplies destined for the military service.

2. American air carriers operating outside the United States: The transportation of personnel, cargo and mail will be limited to the requirements of the war program and to the requirements of our international policies.

2. It is believed that such analysis will indicate the possibility of effecting a substantial reduction in the number of airplanes now operated by our airlines while retaining in this country a highly mobile group of transport aircraft that could be concentrated, in a few hours, for the movement of several thousand troops to any threatened area within the Western Hemisphere.

3. With regard to your request as to the number of United States commercial airline airplanes, together with their age, carrying capacity and range, there is submitted herewith a tabulation giving that information.

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OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

[redacted]

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4. It is desired to point out that:

a. Five TWA Stratoliners and four Pan American Clippers are operating under contract with the Air Force Ferrying Command.

b. All other Pan American Clippers are operationally controlled by the Navy.

c. Fifty four other types of airline transports are now operating in military transportation under contract with the Air Service Command for the movement of military cargo from factory and depot to Army activities within the Western Hemisphere.

Secretary of War

g.c.m.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

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SCHEDULE OF CIVIL TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT

TYPE	NUMBER OWNED DOMESTIC	PAA	TOTAL	AVERAGE AGE	SEAT CAPACITY EACH	CRUISING RANGE - WITHOUT RESERVE
Douglas DC3	221	36	257	4 years	21	1075
" DST	38	-	38	4 years	28	510
" DC2	13	3	16	6 years	14	750
Boeing 314	-	5	5	3 years	74	1151
" 307	5	3	8	3 years	33	1300
" 247D	25	-	25	7 years	10	900
Lockheed 10	16	3	19	5 years	10	750
" 18	13	3	16	2½ years	14	550
Sikorsky S40A	-	2	2	10 years	41	1000
" S42B	-	5	5	5 years	36	1200
" S43	-	4	4	5 years	16	800
Martin 130	-	2	2	6 years	46	1980
Total	331	66	397			

Note: Cruising range is calculated without provision for reserve fuel; range given is on basis of exhaustion of fuel. Fuel available is calculated on the basis of normal tankage and upon fuel available to be carried with full passenger or cargo load.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RHP, NARS Date MAR 28 1973

[redacted]

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PSF
Safe
Marshall

GRACE:

MR. HOPKINS SUGGESTS THE PRESIDENT SEND THIS.

LOIS

a449901

September 3, 1942

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

Do you know what the present British plan is relative to an offensive in Burma and what the possibilities of such an enterprise are? And what the British consider to be the probabilities of the Japs striking at India?

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 7 1972

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

May 13, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information is furnished concerning the location of aircraft detector installations in the Middle Atlantic Area:

1. The aircraft detector sets now operating in the Middle Atlantic Area are located at:

Montauk Point, New York
South Manor, New York
Twin Lights, New Jersey
Atlantic City, New Jersey
Bethany Beach, Delaware
Accomac, Virginia (Two Stations)
Cape Henry, Virginia (Two Stations)


These locations are shown on the attached map.

2. These stations are capable of detecting planes at distances up to one hundred (100) miles from the detector sites. With allowances for the time required to identify the planes and pass the information through the information center, they thus provide early warning information for alerting Washington at least twenty (20) minutes before the planes could reach the city.

Chief of Staff.

1 Incl.
U.S. Map showing
locations of aircraft
detector sets.

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Gilbert

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Safe
Marshall

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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

File
Secret
1407

September 8, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Operation of Persian Communication Facilities.

A plan has been drawn up for the operation of certain Persian communication facilities as requested in your letter of August 25. As formulated at present, the project contemplates the operation of certain ports and truck roads as well as railroads.

The plan has been turned over to the Combined Staff Planners for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, after which it will be promptly submitted to you for final approval.

Chief of Staff.

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Date- 4-6-59
Signature- Carl L. Spicer

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Safe File
Marshall

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

May 19, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

A radio has just been received stating that General Stilwell and his party are expected to arrive in Imphal about May 21. Arrangements have been made for General Stilwell to meet with Generals Wavell and Alexander in Calcutta on May 23. It is expected that he will then leave for Chungking.

George C. Marshall
Chief of Staff.

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Date- 4-3-59
Signature- Carl L. Spencer



~~SECRET~~

a44:01

PSF
Safe Marshall

GRACE:

MR. HOPKINS SUGGESTS THIS BE SENT THIS AFTERNOON.

LOIS

a 44 ;; 01

Safe: Marshall

September 9, 1942

~~SECRET~~

Dear George:

Do you know what the British intentions are relative to either attacking the Japanese flank in Burma or defending against the Japanese thrust into India?

What forces have they got to do either?

Sincerely yours,

General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff,
War Department.

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a44:02

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

A radiogram has just been received from General Gruber at New Delhi, stating that General Stilwell and his entire party arrived at Imphal on May21st, and that all were well with minor exceptions.

Chief of Staff.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 4-3-59
Signature- Carl L. Spencer



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[redacted]

Safe: Marshall Bot.

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

September 11, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: British Plans Relative to Burma.

The British plan for the recapture of Burma, which follows, was obtained through discussion with the British Planners in Washington. It was drawn up in London and sent to General Wavell who, it was explained, will either adopt it or use it as a basis for the development of a plan of his own.

Concept of the Operation. The British intend to conduct operations at the most propitious time subsequent to the monsoon season, (a) with the objective of seizing territory in Burma and thus creating conditions favorable to (b) a more extensive offensive effort, when appropriate forces become available, to open the Burma Road and expel the enemy from the Burma area.

The initial phase of the plan involves the employment of two or three divisions and will be initiated in December or January. The plan visualizes landings at Akyab (1), on attached map, and Sandoway (2) simultaneously with a land advance through the mountain passes into upper Burma. It is hoped that the operations resulting from this initial phase will permit the attainment of the line: Akyab (1)-Kalewa (3)-Katha (4)-Myitkyina (5). This phase of the plan would have no effect on the opening of the Burma Road (6) but would have for its objectives the raising of Chinese morale, the containing of Japanese ground forces now in Burma, and perhaps a diversion of Japanese air strength to Burma from other areas.

The principal phase of the plan, as envisaged, is largely amphibious in nature. Its implementation will be delayed pending the release of landing craft from Special Operations now under way. This phase of the plan involves the employment of a force of approximately 9 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, and 62 squadrons of aviation. The plan includes the neutralization of the Andaman Islands (7) and a combined land, sea, and air opera-



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OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT; NARS Date APR 5 1973

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tion with the object of seizing Rangoon (8), and possibly Moulmein (9), the operation continuing from these bases until the recapture of Burma is accomplished.

Date for execution of principal plan. The military resources for the execution of the principal phase of the plan might possibly be available early in May, 1943. However, the monsoon season begins at that period of the year and would delay the initiation of this phase of the plan until October, 1943.

The forces for these operations could be drawn from the following units now in existence or to become available in India by December 31, 1942:

Ground Forces:

Infantry Divisions:		9 — two of which are all British.
Armored Units	:	1 Indian Tank Brigade.

NOTE: Very few, if any, of these divisions are complete. At least half are short one brigade each; several lack artillery units; and nearly all lack some special units and equipment.

Three additional Indian Infantry Divisions and two Armored Divisions will become available in the spring of 1943.

Air Forces:

About 36 squadrons totalling 433 planes.

Summarizing the present available forces, it appears that there are enough units for the initial phase of the operations as envisaged by the British plan. For the principal phase, assuming that no divisions are transferred to the Middle East, or elsewhere, the required ground forces would appear to be available, but a serious shortage of air units would exist: only 36 squadrons of aviation as against 62 called for in the plan.

The probabilities of the Japs striking at India. The British consider a Japanese thrust at the close of the monsoon season (November) to be a possibility. However, they are con-

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fident that their present forces could successfully resist a penetration. Their estimate of Japanese capabilities and their own ability to prevent invasion of India by the enemy is based upon a continuation of the political and economic control that they now exercise in that country. While they do not anticipate difficulty in handling the internal affairs of India, a deterioration of this situation would definitely embarrass them and might strongly militate against the success of projected military operations.

Security of plan. The British Planners are concerned about the secrecy of the plan for the recapture of Burma. They request that the Chinese not be informed of the plan, fearing that if past experience is a criterion, the security of the plan might be compromised.

Chief of Staff.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT; NARS Date APR 5 1973

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

Brief

PSF
Safe File
Marshall

June 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached message has just been received from General DeWitt's headquarters, Western Defense Command.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

J. R. DEANE,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.

Encl.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 4-3-59
Signature- Carl F. Spicer



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C O P Y

From W.D.C.

12 June 1942 2024 GCT

Additional info attack on enemy ships Kiska Harbor eleven-12 June received Alaska Defense Command. Reference our special this date, Navy PBY's scored three bomb hits on a heavy cruiser, one bomb hit on gun boat and one bomb hit on destroyer in Kiska Harbor. In addition, one destroyer and one heavy cruiser on a westerly course outside of Kiska Harbor were bombed with little damage. Extent of damage to ships bombed inside harbor not reported.

Weckerling

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...) DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-3-59

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

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[redacted]

RPB/vhw

PRELIMINARY TEST OF DESTROYER TYPE RADAR

Preliminary tests of destroyer type Radar, model designed and built by the Naval Research Laboratory, were conducted by the USS SEMMES during the period 10 - 22 June, 1941. The results obtained from this test indicate excellent performance on both ship and aircraft targets, ranges up to 30 miles being obtained on the former and in excess of 60 miles on the latter.

This apparatus operates on the same frequency but at a much higher power than the already installed battleship and carrier models. The antenna is considerably smaller and is mounted on top of the foremast. The accuracy of bearing and range is not the primary function of this particular model but is sufficient to give target bearings within 2° and ranges within 250 yards. Additional equipment will be furnished final models to permit accurate ranging with this instrument for gunnery purposes.

Deliveries of this type of equipment in quantity begins 1 October 1941.

Deliveries of the submarine model, also designed and built by the Naval Research Laboratory, also begins 1 October.

The production of this and other Radar production models by the Naval Research Laboratory marks the culmination of over 10 years of pioneering research by the Navy.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT, NARS Date APR 5 1973

a44kk01

PSF Safe : Marshall

TELEGRAM

The White House
Washington

June 19 1942

For the President:

One copy only

Following just received

Memo for Mr. McIntyre:

Quote

GUMER LUTOG PUFUP TYBYC GYMYC LINAV

RADYP RYLYC PULAN KEMIN NAGEM NUBUG DARWE

NOBOF MODUB BUTEB LANEW KOTEK COTUZ

GYSZE BUTEB BYZAX POCAF MACYN KURUD

GOZAZ DEVIR LUTOG DOPOL PUDEN.

UNQUOTE

McIntyre

GENERAL MARSHALL STATES YOUR GUEST JUST TALKED TO HIM STOP HE IS PESSIMISTIC REGARDING BOLERO AND INTERESTED IN AUGUST GYMNAST AND ANOTHER SIMILAR MOVEMENT IN NORWAY

GC MARSHALL CHIEF OF STAFF

end

1230pm/d

a44L01

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Safe [illegible]

[illegible]

[1942 ?]

Date- 4-6-59

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

MEMORANDUM of proposed shipping adjustments

Ireland

Reduce present plan for sailing January 15 of 16,000 as follows:

4100 troops to sail January 15
7000 troops on Queen Mary February 1
9000 troops on Andes, Uruguay and Orion on February 15, 20
4400 troops on George Washington February 24

Total 24,500 to sail January 15 to February 24

(Note: Cargo tonnage extremely short. British must provide shelter, or lumber to winterize tents)

Iceland

Reduce present plan for sailing January 15 of 8,000 as follows:

2,500 troops on January 15

(Note: Remainder as shipping becomes available. Probably about 2500 per month)

British

Near East and Far East

7,000 Queen Mary to load in England
5,100 from Cairo on Mt. Vernon - now in Far East
11,200 from Cairo on second round trip of West Point and Rakefield - now engaged in first round trip for Far East.

Total 23,300 British troops for Near and Far East on U.S. ships and Queen Mary.

U.S. Far East

21,800 troops to sail from New York January 20

{ 20 21 + 110
3 to 4 weeks to get ready to sail

[illegible]

[redacted]

250 Pursuit planes
86 Medium Bombers
57 Light bombers

220,000 Cargo tons

4 1/2 millions gals. gasoline

(Note: Troops, air and supporting services, except reenforced brigade for New Caledonia -/0,000 men.)

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[redacted]

[redacted]

a44LL02

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

6/19/42

Mr. President:

The enclosed paper has been read by me and by Generals Arnold, McNarney, Eisenhower and Handy. We all are in complete agreement with the Secretary of War. [illegible]

a44mCl

PCP-Safe; Marshall

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

Printed in its entirety in Stimson, On Active Service, p. 420-423.

June 19, 1942.

PERSONAL AND [redacted]

Dear Mr. President:

While your military advisers are working out the logistics of the problem which you presented to us on Wednesday, may I very briefly recall to your memory the sequence of events which led to and the background which surrounds this problem. I hope it may be helpful to you.

1. Up to the time when America entered the war, the British Empire had, by force of circumstances, been fighting a series of uphill defensive campaigns with insufficient resources and almost hopeless logistics. The entry of Japan into the war and the naval disasters at Pearl Harbor and the Malay Peninsula imposed new defensive campaigns in the theatres of the Far East.

2. After the discussions with Mr. Churchill's party here last December the need for a carefully planned offensive became very evident. Russia had successfully fought off the entire German Army for six months. Winter had begun and the shaken and battered German Army would be helpless to renew its offensive for nearly six months more. The one thing Hitler rightly dreaded was a second front. In establishing such a front lay the best hope of keeping the Russian Army in the war and thus ultimately defeating Hitler. To apply the

a44m02

rapidly developing manpower and industrial strength of America promptly to the opening of such a front was manifestly the only way it could be accomplished.

3. But the effective application of America's strength required prompt, rapid and safe transportation overseas. The allied naval power controlled the seas by only a narrow margin. There was a dangerous and increasing shortage of commercial shipping. With one exception the Axis Powers controlled every feasible landing spot in Europe. By fortunate coincidence one of the shortest routes to Europe from America led through the only safe base not yet controlled by our enemies, the British Isles.

4. Out of these factors originated the Bolero plan. The British Isles constituted the one spot

(a) where we could safely and easily land our ground forces without the aid of carrier- based air cover.

(b) through which we could without the aid of ships fly both bomber and fighting planes from America to Europe.

(c) where we could safely and without interruption develop an adequate base for invading armies of great strength. Any other base in western Europe or northwest Africa could be obtained only by a risky attack and the long delay of development and fortification.

(d) where we could safely develop air superiority over our chief enemy in northern France and force him either to fight us on equal terms or leave a bridgehead to France undefended.

5. The psychological advantages of Bolero also were manifest. The menace of the establishment of American military power in the British Isles would be immediately evident to Hitler. It at once tended to

remove the possibility of a successful invasion of Britain, Hitler's chief and last weapon. It awoke in every German mind the recollections of 1917 and 1918.

6. A steady, rapid, and unrelenting prosecution of the Bolero plan was thus manifestly the surest road, first to the shaking of Hitler's anti-Russian campaign of '42, and second, to the ultimate defeat of his armies and the victorious termination of the war. Geographically and historically Bolero was the easiest road to the center of our chief enemy's heart. The base was sure. The water barrier of the Channel under the support of Britain-based air power is far easier than either the Mediterranean or the Atlantic. The subsequent over-land route into Germany is easier than any alternate. Over the Low Countries has run the historic path of armies between Germany and France.

7. Since the Bolero plan was adopted, subsequent events have tended to facilitiate our position and justify its wisdom.

a. The greatest danger to America's prosecution of the Bolero plan lay in the Pacific from Japan where our then inferiority in aircraft carriers subjected us to the dangers of enemy raids which might seriously cripple the vital airplane production upon which a prompt Bolero offensive primarily rests. The recent victory in the mid-Pacific has greatly alleviated that danger. Our rear in the west is now at least temporarily safe.

a44m04

b. The psychological pressure of our preparation for Bolero is already becoming manifest. There are unmistakable signs of uneasiness in Germany as well as increasing unrest in the subject populations of France, Holland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Norway. This restlessness patently is encouraged by the growing American threat to Germany.

8. Under these circumstances an immense burden of proof rests upon any proposition which may impose the slightest risk of weakening Bolero. Every day brings us further evidence of the great importance of unremittingly pressing forward that plan. When one is engaged in a tug of war, it is highly risky to spit on one's hands even for the purpose of getting a better grip. No new plan should even be whispered to friend or enemy unless it was so sure of immediate success and so manifestly helpful to Bolero that it could not possibly be taken as evidence of doubt or vacillation in the prosecution of Bolero. Enemies would be prompt to jump at one or the other of these conclusions.

9. While I have no intention of intruding on any discussion of logistics by the staff, one or two possible contingencies have occurred to me which would bear upon the wisdom of now embarking upon another trans-Atlantic expedition such as Gymnast.

a. Assume the woret contingency possible: Assume a prompt victory over Russia which left a large German force free for other enterprises. It is conceivable that Germany might then make a surprise attempt at the invasion of Britain. She

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would have the force to attempt it. She may well have available the equipment for both an air-borne and water-borne invasion. One of our most reliable military attaches believes emphatically that this is her plan — a surprise air-borne invasion from beyond the German boundaries producing a confusion in Britain which would be immediately followed up by an invasion by sea. Our observers in Britain have frequently advised us of their concern as to the inadequacy of British defenses against such an attempt.

Obviously in case of such an attempt it would be imperative for us to push our forces into Britain at top speed and by means of shipping additional to that already allocated to the project. In case a large percentage of allied commercial shipping had been tied up with an expedition to Gymnast, such additional reenforcement of Britain would be impossible.

b. On the other hand, if German invasion of Russia is prolonged, even if it is slowly successful, the increasing involvement of Germany in the east tends to make increasingly easy an allied invasion into France and the acquisition of safe bases therein against Germany.

c. Thus German success against Russia, whether fast or slow, would seem to make requisite not a diversion from Bolero but an increase in Bolero as rapidly as possible.

a44m06

d. Furthermore, Bolero is the one overseas project which brings no further strain upon our aircraft carrier forces. Gymnast would necessarily bring such a strain and risk. It could not fail to diminish the superiority over Japan which we now precariously hold in the Pacific.

10. To my mind Bolero in inception and in its present development is an essentially American project, brought into this war as the vitalizing contribution of our fresh and unwearied leaders and forces. My own view is that it would be a mistake to hazard it by any additional/expeditionary proposal as yet brought to my attention.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L Stimson

Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.

a44m07

~~TOP SECRET~~

Safe: Marshall
PEF

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

MAY 17 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

General Eisenhower requested that the attached message be forwarded to you. This is in reply to your message to him, dated 13 May, on the French situation.

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Chief of Staff

10-26-66
Carl L. Spaatz

Return to Originating Office of War Dept.
Showing Action Taken



~~TOP SECRET~~

a 44.nm01

TOP SECRET

From: General Eisenhower

To : General Marshall

S-51959 personal from General Eisenhower to General Marshall

I have received from the President a personal message, dated 13th May, on the French situation. I have also read General Smith's personal message to you, dated 14th May, commenting on the message from the Président. General Smith's radio presents some of our problems in French collaboration and represents in general, the views of this headquarters.

Today I have a message from the Prime Minister, saying that he now considers it advisable to defer asking General DeGaulle to come to London until D-Day. In this way no question of security will be involved, and we would still have time to work out some of our more difficult problems with DeGaulle, because it will be a considerable period before questions of Civil Government become acute.

I request that you have the following delivered to the President as my reply to his message:

"You may be quite certain that my dealings with the French Committee will be confined to military matters and related civil administration, and will be conducted on military level. I understand your anxiety in the matter and I assure you that I will carefully avoid anything that could be interpreted as an effort to influence the character of the future government of France. However, I think I should tell you that so far as I am able to determine from information given to me through agents and through escaped prisoners of war, there exists in France today only two major groups, of which one is the Vichy gang, and the other characterized by unreasoning admiration for DeGaulle. This may merely be an indication of the 'shell shock' to which you refer, but its effect will be a practical one when we once shall have succeeded in liberating areas that will fall outside the strictly military zone, and should therefore be turned over to local self-government. It is possible that we then shall find a universal desire to adhere to the DeGaullist group. I fully share your apprehension as to the

TOP SECRET

10-26-66

Carl J. Spaatz

a44.mm02

intentions of some members of the French Committee concerning the future, but I am merely presenting to you the picture that may develop inside France itself.

"I will not, of course, express any such opinions to the French Committee, nor will I concede them any exclusive right to deal with me in the handling of French liberated territories. Actually, I cannot foresee any development which would call for early establishment of civil control over large sections of France. I will keep you informed of all developments.

"Because this is an Allied Command, I hope that your desires on this subject, of which I am already aware, can eventually come to me as a joint directive of the two governments. This would help me."

10-26-66

Carl F. Spaatz

[redacted]

a44mm03

~~SECRET~~

BF
Safe File
Marshall

July 3, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: North Atlantic Air Ferry Route.

The expansion of the present North Atlantic Air Ferry Route to include additional airdromes in the Hudson Bay, Baffin Island, and Labrador areas will materially contribute to the facilities along this general route for rapidly placing military aircraft in the European Theater.

By reducing the time during which aircraft are in transit, this air route will in fact increase the fighting strength of our air arm which should be a vital contribution to our planned operations in that theater.

I strongly recommend that this project be pushed as vigorously as possible within the limitations imposed by shipping and construction materiel.

The Board in taking this action merely implemented the recommendations of the War Department.

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Chief of Staff.

G. M.
O.K.

F. D. R.

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Date- 4-3-59
Signature- Carl F. Spaatz

COPY TO ACCOMPANY ORIGINAL

~~SECRET~~

a44n01

June 2, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL

When you get over there, tell General Eisenhower that I have read his memorandum to you but that I still think he does not quite get the point.

He evidently believes the fool newspaper stories that I am anti-deGaulle, even the kind of story that says that I hate him, etc., etc. All this, of course, is utter nonsense. I am perfectly willing to have deGaulle made President, or Emperor, or King or anything else so long as the action comes in an untrammeled and unforced way from the French people themselves.

But it is possible in an election so to influence it, so to restrict the vote, so even to count the vote, that the people in power can swing it overwhelmingly their way.

. Let me cite an example which I happen to know about. In a town of four or five hundred people in German-occupied France, the Mayor, now about sixty, was first chosen about 1917 because he could not go to the front on account of a club foot. He has been a magnificent success as Mayor, has been reelected every couple of years since then. The people in the village learned through the underground that the French National Committee for Liberation had picked another man to be imposed on them, even though there was nothing against the present Mayor, who had had no dealings with Vichy but has merely administered his own arrondissement. The man chosen by the Committee is well described as an unsuccessful politician and, in all probability, a porch-climbing robber.

I want Eisenhower to do what we have done in Italy -- i.e., have a British and American representative go to the community and talk with a number of leading citizens, such as the cure, the doctor, the avocad, the leading merchants, some leading farmers and see who should be installed, if anybody.

a44nn01

As a matter of fact, most of these arrondissement officials are not pro-Vichy. They have gone about their local duties and kept out of the other problem altogether.

I do not agree when Ike says that there are only two major groups in France today -- the Vichy gang, and the other characterized by unreasoning admiration for deGaulle. I wonder how he knows this because nobody else knows anything really about the international situation in France. Most of the people who get out come out with the help of the French National Committee, and they are rightly grateful.

Tell Ike that it is my thought, based on talks with many people who have come out of France recently, that he has overlooked the biggest group of all -- bigger than the Vichy group and bigger than the deGaulle group. It consists of those people who do not know what it is all about. Probably the great majority of them are anti-Laval and, by now, anti-Petain. Probably most of them like the symbol of deGaulle and his early actions in 1940, but they have not made up their minds as to whether they want deGaulle and his Committee as their rulers.

It is awfully easy to be for deGaulle and to cheer the thought of recognizing that Committee as the provisional government of France, but I have a moral duty that transcends "an easy way". It is to see to it that the people of France have nothing foisted on them by outside powers. It must be a French choice -- and that means, as far as possible, forty million people. Self-determination is not a word of expediency. It carries with it a very deep principle in human affairs.

As a matter of practical fact, Ike has plenty of time because for some time every square kilometer under his control will be a part of the military zone. I count on his good judgment in case Germany collapses or in case he can move his armies toward Germany at the rate of ten miles a day.

Good luck to him. We shall be thinking much of him and his problems.

F. D. R.

a44nnCd

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(5/27/68)

10-26-66

From: General Eisenhower

To : General Marshall

Carl L. Spicer

S-51959 personal from General Eisenhower to General Marshall

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a44nn04

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10-26-66

Carl L. Spruce

a44nn05

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P.S.F. Safe File Marshall file Brief

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

Date- 4-3-59
Signature- Carl L. Spicer

July 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Relief of Troops in Outlying Bases.

The relief of troops stationed at outlying bases is a very definite problem under war conditions and one to which the War Department has given a great deal of thought. Definite limitations have been imposed by shipping which have materially curtailed the desired rotation of military personnel in remote bases.

The present plans contemplate the relief of these personnel involved, as shown below. These plans are, of a necessity, applicable only insofar as they conform to the military requirements existing at the time.

On small island and remote bases in active theaters, relief will be effected at the end of an eight months' tour. In the case of Canton, Christmas, and Fanning Islands, personnel will be replaced from the Hawaiian Islands. Military personnel at Ascension and in Liberia will be transferred to other theaters or returned to the United States at the end of a like period. At Bora Bora, Tongatabu and other small Pacific bases, men will be transferred to neighboring major islands, or possibly to New Zealand, for rest periods.

On the island bases in inactive theaters, such as Bermuda and small Caribbean islands, relief will be made at the end of two years of service unless pertinent considerations make earlier relief advisable.

At large island bases where climatic and living conditions are most severe, as in Iceland and Efate, troops will be relieved by transfer to more healthful stations as soon as practicable, and subsequently with a view to effecting rotation within a period of not to exceed one year.

In theaters with large land areas, troops will be moved from one area to another to provide relief, as required, although they will be retained in the theater for the duration of the War. In general, this will apply to the Australian, Hawaiian, and Alaskan Theaters.



[redacted]

a44.01

The Army Air Forces have a plan under study to return about 5% of their personnel in active overseas stations to the United States each month, with a view to providing combat-experienced men for instructional purposes in new units.

In Australia a system is at present in effect whereby Air Force personnel are moved from urban areas (Sydney), to advanced areas (Townsville), to combat fields (Port Moresby), and thence back to urban rest areas to start the cycle anew within five or six months.

In brief, I can assure you that every effort is being made, and will continue to be made, to provide for an effective rotation of personnel.

Chief of Staff

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Marshall

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 20315

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAB-S

20 MAY 1964

Mr. C. Philip Bauer
Office of Civil Archives, NARS
Room 8E, Archives Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Bauer:

At your request we have reviewed the documents submitted by the National Archives for possible regrading. In view of the short time available for our review, we selected the two documents contained in the collection that were deemed by us to be most susceptible to declassification by this office without extensive coordination. They were: a. the undated "Memorandum for the President" by General Marshall originated sometime in April 1942; and b. the "Memorandum for the President" by General Marshall dated 30 July 1942.

Our review has determined that item a contains UNCLASSIFIED Army originated information and has accordingly been regraded UNCLASSIFIED; and that while item b contains both Army-originated and Presidential information, the Department of the Army has no objection to its declassification.

No further action to determine the security status of the remaining documents submitted for review has been taken.

Sincerely yours,

J. C. Lambert

J. C. LAMBERT
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

Inclosures

1

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
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CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

DECLASSIFIED AUTHORITY NND 969078 BY NARA DATE 12-18-96
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Safe File: Marshall Bkf

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL:

Some time ago the Prime Minister stated that our cipher experts of the United States and British Navies were in close touch but that he was under the impression that there was not a similar intimate interchange between our two Armies. I wonder if you could take this up with General Dill and let me know.

F.D.R.

a44p01

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

H.L.H.

I think we should do something about this if it has not already been done.

F.D.R.

a44p02

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 6, 1942

Dorothy:

Mr. Hopkins has been holding this all this time. I assume that the question has been discussed since the letter was written and that this can be filed.

Lois

a44p03

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HARRY HOPKINS:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY.

F.D.R.

a44p04

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

February 25, 1942.

My dear Mr. President,

One night when we talked late, you spoke of the importance of our cipher people getting into close contact with yours. I shall be very ready to put any expert you care to nominate in touch with my technicians. Ciphers for our two Navies have been and are continually a matter for frank discussion between our two Services. But diplomatic and military ciphers are of equal importance, and we appear to know nothing officially of your versions of these. Some time ago, however, our experts claimed to have discovered the system and constructed some tables used by your Diplomatic Corps. From the moment when we became allies, I gave instructions that this work should cease. However, danger of our enemies having achieved a measure of success cannot, I am advised, be dismissed.

I shall be grateful if you will handle this

a44p05

matter entirely yourself, and if possible burn this letter when you have read it. The whole subject is secret in a degree which affects the safety of both our countries. The fewest possible people should know.

I take advantage of the Ambassador's homeward journey to send you this by his hand, to be delivered into yours personally.

With every good wish & my kindest regards Believe me,

Yours sincere friend,

Winfield Churchill

The President of
The United States of America.

a44p06

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Date- 7-3-78
Signature- C. L. Sykes (per JRE)

July 15, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Presidential approval was given on March 13th to a directive proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which would authorize the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to evacuate to the mainland of the United States for internment in concentration camps Japanese residents of the Hawaiian Islands, either United States citizens or aliens, who were considered by appropriate authorities in the Islands to constitute a source of danger.

It has been found that this procedure is not feasible, as through application for a writ of habeus corpus any United States citizen can obtain release from custody. Consequently, agreement was reached by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy that family groups of Japanese ancestry should be evacuated to the mainland for resettlement, rather than internment. Tentative arrangements have been made with the War Relocation Authority for the resettlement of up to fifteen thousand persons.

We now wish to recommend that the directive approved on March 13th, 1942, be rescinded, and that the following be substituted therefor:

"No United States citizen of any derivation whatsoever, either naturalized or native-born, now residing in Hawaii, and considered by appropriate authority in the Hawaiian Islands to constitute a source of danger to our national security, will be transferred to the continental United States for internment. Such individuals will be interned in the Hawaiian Islands under authority vested in the Military Governor. Further, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is authorized to evacu-

a44201

SECRET

~~SECRET~~ Sec'y Marshall

ate to the United States, for re-
settlement in areas to be established
by the War Relocation Authority, up
to fifteen thousand persons, in family
groups, from among the United States
citizens of Japanese ancestry who may
be considered as potentially danger-
ous to national security."

Approval of the foregoing by the President is respectfully requested.

E. J. KING
Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet

G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff

OK F.D.R.
7/12 CT

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Date- 4-3-59
Signature- Carl S. Spicer

a44802

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

July 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: The situation in the Middle East.

Reports received from General Auchinleck through the British War Office indicate that a situation has developed in which the Germans are massing their means for an attack against the British center in order to gain complete control of the dominating observation of RUWEISAT RIDGE (see attached sketch). The Germans necessarily are weakening both of their flanks which will offer the British an opportunity to counter-attack in both the north and south.

Both sides are apparently weak in general reserves and any success gained by either will probably be the result of gaining surprise by a rapid shifting of troops. General Auchinleck summarizes his reports by indicating that local successes which the British have gained against Italian troops should have the effect of strengthening German doubts as to the value of Italian troops and further lowering the Italian morale. He felt that the Australians should have a good chance in their attack on the north flank since they were opposed mostly by Italians, and his only note of skepticism was in the fact that the Australians are not highly trained in open, mobile warfare and cannot undertake swift, wide movements.

General Auchinleck has ordered both of his Corps to press their attack from the north and the south in order to relieve pressure on the center. He also proposes to concentrate his air effort against the Axis drive in the center. He feels that the operations now in progress may be the climax of the whole battle.


Joseph T. McNarney
Acting Chief of Staff.



10-25-66
Carl L. Spaatz

a44r01

Sketch Situatio. Libia
July 16 - 1942.



a44r02

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 29, 1942.

MEMORANDUM TO GO WITH MEMORANDUM FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR, DATED JULY 25, 1942, IN RELATION TO PROPOSALS IN MESSAGE No. 625 FROM MARSHALL AND KING IN LONDON.

This memorandum from the Secretary of War is not worth replying to in detail -- because it is contradictory in terms and fails to meet the objective as of the Summer of 1942.

The situation at this time is as follows:

1. In the Pacific area Japanese forces have penetrated as far south as New Guinea and they are in occupation of the Netherlands' East Indies and Timor and the Malay States and Burma. In the North they are in possession of the Japanese Mandated Islands, Guam and Wake and three small Islands in the Western Aleutians. They seem to be making little progress westward or southward. The Battle of Midway has set them back at least for several months.

2. It seems unwise to attempt a major offensive in the Pacific area because of the time involved -- one to two years -- and the total lack of effect on Germany of such a major offensive. Success against Japan in one year or two years would not win the war if Germany puts Russia completely out of action, occupies the Near East and the Persian Gulf and starts down the west coast of Africa. On the other hand, helping Russia and Britain to contain Germany this Autumn and undertake an offensive in 1943 has a good chance of forcing Germany out of the war, in which case Japan could not conduct war in the Pacific alone for more than a few months.

The Secretary of War fails to realize the situation which prompted me to send Hopkins, Marshall and King to London to urge "Sledgehammer" or, failing that, some definite offensive, using American ground troops in 1942. They find that "Sledgehammer" is impracticable and, therefore, make the other proposal, with which the British agree.

a44s01

The Secretary of War says in effect:

(a) "Sledgehammer" should not be abandoned.

(b) He offers no alternative for 1942.

(c) He agrees to further preparations for "Bolero" which is, however, one year off.

(d) He speaks vaguely of some kind of major operation in the Pacific area.

He, therefore, abandons any offensive by U. S. ground troops in the European or African Theatres in 1942 and would merely build up for a European offensive in 1943 and some kind of Pacific offensive at the same time. In this he gives, in effect, no help to Russian resistance in 1942.

F. D. R.

a44s02

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

July 23, 1942.

Personal and ~~confidential~~.

Dear Mr. President:

A couple of hours' reflection over the somber news which you gave me this morning has produced this summarized picture of the situation which we discussed:

1. When Churchill was here in June one thing that was deliberately agreed upon by him and all of us in our conference in your study was that we should all go ahead tentatively but with the utmost speed in reenforcing and preparing ourselves in the British Isles for a possible offensive until the middle of September.

2. That then the whole matter should be reconsidered in the light of the then situation with a view to determining what was possible.

3. The British have violated this program by suddenly confronting us ten days ago with a Cabinet decision two months before the agreed time and made without the light which the arrival of young, vigorous, forward-looking Americans in the British Isles might have shed upon the situation.

4. In view of the recognized fatigued and defeatist mental outlook of the British government, this violation of understanding was most serious and tended to destroy vital and fundamental possibilities. From what I have heard from many visiting witnesses to Great Britain, the impact of our arriving forces might have a revolutionary effect.

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a44s03

5. While the prosecution of other plans for 1942 will be taken up and studied vigorously under your directive, it seems to me very clear that the flow of men and munitions into Great Britain should go on with undiminished speed. It is just beginning to reach its full volume and that should not be checked. An ultimate Bolero is agreed upon by all hands and such an immediate and continuous flow is essential to insure a Bolero in 1943.

6. That being done, we may still see what we may see in September.

7. Furthermore, the British objections to Sledgehammer do not apply to enlarged air attacks upon Germany in 1942. On the contrary, such enlarged air attacks, engaged in by British and American air forces as promptly and as effectively as possible, may soon be our only method of helping Russia. The shipments which are now going over are most important to such a possibility.

Yours faithfully,

Henry L. Stimson

Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.

a44s04

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

July 25, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

My views as to the proposals in Message 625

These proposals bear on their face the inevitable results of an attempt to compromise fundamentally opposed principles and policies. The U.S. has been seeking to establish a prompt offensive to ultimately destroy Hitler in Europe and in the meanwhile to keep Russia in the war. The U.K., while professing the same purpose, is equally if not more insistent upon a present attempt to preserve its empire in the Middle East. The result is as follows:

The message begins with an announcement of the British decision which has wrecked the American plan, evidently put there by the American delegates to explain their subsequent compromise.

First: Paragraph first is a statement of what has been saved from the American plan. Its provisions are sound and good so far as they go.

Second: Paragraph second states the extent of the contribution which can safely be made by the U.S. to the British aim of defending the Near East without weakening the American plan. This contribution was fully discussed when Mr. Churchill was here last and abandoned by the British because the contribution could not reach Egypt in time to be effective in the present fighting.

a44505

Third: Paragraph third represents an attempt to obey the direction for an immediate offensive in the face of a Russian collapse not based upon the sound logistics of the original American plan (Sledgehammer and Bolero), which for lack of British cooperation has had to be discarded.

Instead of being an actual offensive it states on its face that it is the "definite acceptance of a defensive encircling line of action for the continental European theater except as to air operations and blockade".

Upon the American forces it deliberately proposes the following diversion in the face of an assumed victorious Germany:

A. Isolated in the British Isles, a large American force composed of our best combat troops deliberately trained for offensive action, yet not large enough alone to assume such an offensive in Europe and inhibited by lack of cooperation against such an offensive.

B. In northwest Africa, a substantial American force several hundred miles distant from its allies at Algiers. These forces might conceivably be easily contained by relatively small German forces advancing through the Iberian Peninsula and Spanish Morocco just as 30,000 German troops under Rommel are now containing the entire British forces in Egypt and Syria.

These U.S. and U.K. forces, even if successfully landed and united, would be unable

a44s06

(1) to take an offensive against Germany in Europe,

(2) to protect the Persian oil supply at Basra,

(3) to prevent the juncture of Germany and Japan in the Middle East,

(4) or to perform any other function than

(a) the establishment of air bases on the north African coast

(b) to harass the Italian peninsula

(c) to make a little more secure but not safely control the Mediterranean Sea.

C. Isolated in Australia, a substantial American force too small

(1) to effectively strike at the extended line of Japan by an attack through the Javanese Archipelago

(2) to thus protect the Persian oil fields and India

(3) to regain Burma and establish effective bases in China

Fourth: The inevitable effect of this plan is thus

A. To secure to Germany the initiative in this war for an indefinite time and thus give her ample opportunity to consolidate her military and economic position.

B. To give the same opportunity to Japan in the Pacific area where Japan's effective consolidation would be even more securely accomplished than that of Germany due to the absence of any effective resistance from enslaved peoples.

a44s07

Fifth: I suggest that the fundamental mistake of the proposals in paragraph third is this:

A. It is proposed that we wait until the collapse of Russia is practically certain.

B. It then proposes that we should take steps in the face of a victorious Germany which can no longer be effective to help Russia but which will dangerously weaken our own position vis-a-vis both Germany and Japan.

I believe this is a fundamental mistake. I believe that as we approach the time when Russia's defeat seems possible we must consolidate our own forces in as sound a position strategically as is possible. It should be a position from which ultimately they may launch an overwhelming attack against Germany if and when that time finally arrives. The only such place is the British Isles.

In the meanwhile they should strike offensively at Germany's partner Japan in a method which would not only eliminate the Japanese danger to us but be by far the most effective help to our allies as follows:

1. By check-mating Japan's att ck against Iran and India.
2. By falling on Japan's back in Siberia.
3. By opening access to China through Burma.

The great advantage of the American plan of Bolero and Sledgehammer was that it, so far as it went, preserved these strategic opportunities.

a44s08

To Hopkins Marshall and King.

Replying your telegram of 25 July and Marshall-King telegram No. 625 of 24 July proposals contained therein for 1942 - 1943 approved in principle details and time to be settled after conference with you, Marshall and King following your return.

Please inform British Chiefs of Staff it is my opinion Gymnast should be started with Landing Ops later than October 30, 1942, and that plans to that end proceed at once.

Till former Naval Person I am delighted that decision is made. We will go ahead full speed. ~~Emphasize~~ Emphasize absolute necessity secrecy. I take your view about ~~the~~ [illegible] statement.

Roosevelt

a 44s09

The attached copy was sent to us by the NA. The original has not been found among the Presidential papers.

EBD

E. B. Drewry 11-10-64

DSF; Safe Memos

a44401

SIFICATION CANCELED
authority of Letter of
Maj. Gen. J.C. Lambert of
20 May 1944
By Herbert M. Thompson
Date 20 May 1964

~~SECRET~~

This message delivered to Major McCarthy 6:30 A.M., who in turn is to deliver it to the President at Hyde Park, N.Y.

(74

July 30, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following is a hasty reply to the questions in your message to me via Mr. Hopkins at 12:10 today:

PART ONE

a. "Are there any moves that we can make immediately that might favorably affect situation in the Middle East?"

No, none that can affect the immediate situation. The number of planes now enroute or preparing to leave the United States represent the greatest number that can be maintained with American materiel and personnel now available in the Cairo area. If we did have additional planes available at this time, it would be unwise to dispatch them to the Middle East because of our inability to keep them in service.

b. "What is your personal opinion about the coming course of events?"

Army G-2 estimates Rommel may reach Cairo in one week; Army Operations say two weeks and a minimum of another week to re-fit before further movement, which will probably be directed towards destruction of the remaining British forces. I feel that we need 48 hours more to judge the capacity of Auchinleck to meet the situation, as he is now in field command." Rommel is greatly extended and if checked by destruction of his supply bases and interruption of his supply lines, he would be in a difficult position.

PART TWO

1. "What assurances have we that the Canal will be really blocked? Do we know the specific plan? Could you talk to Dill about this at once? An effective block of the Canal is essential."

The British have plans to block the Suez Canal at the point of passage through two rocky sections, presumably by blasting. Sir John Dill estimates that six months would be required to reopen the Canal.

* The British tell me A now has - 1 -
300 Tank in question.

[redacted]

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ICATION CANCELED
Authority of letter of
Gen. Gen. J. C. Handbut
20 May 1964
By Gilbert N. Lemoyne
Date 20 May 1964

~~SECRET~~

2. "From what point or points would the British operate from Africa by air, land and sea?"

By air, from the upper Nile region.
By land, probably a divided withdrawal, the bulk going south if Rommel does not cut them off, as now appears possible; the remainder to the Northeast to join the British forces there for the purpose of protecting the Mosul oil fields and Basra. The transfer and the supply of these forces would be very difficult.
By sea, from Massawa, Mombasa, Durban and Diego Suarez.

"Also from what point or points in Asia Minor?"

From Asia Minor point 5/4: by air operating from Palestine area; by ground as indicated above; by sea from Aden and Colombo.

3. "What would Rommel's or Germany's next move be? Do you think it would be Cyprus and Syria? Is the objective the Mosul oil fields?"

The primary objective is destruction of the British Army; next the occupation of Cyprus and Syria; and eventually the seizure of the Mosul and Basra area. Action will probably also be taken to cut our air ferry route.

4. "What British forces could be moved to these areas and what would be the probably strategic defense of the oil fields?"

British troops now at sea enroute to the Middle East, one armored division, one infantry division. The number of troops that can be evacuated from Egypt will depend entirely upon the rapidity and success of Rommel's movement. Rail lines to the northeast and shipping in the Red Sea are dangerously exposed to interruption by air attack. Movement south trhough Egypt will necessarily be slow. There are now in Syria and Palestine one Australian division, one armored car regiment and one infantry brigade group; also 15,000 native Syrians, 8,000 free Greeks, 5,000 Poles, all with limited equipment, and approximately 40,000 Poles in uniform with almost no equipment. In Iran and Irak, there are one and possibly two Indian infantry divisions, one Indian armored division (partially equipped); in Cyprus, one infantry brigade group, two armored regiments, one armored car regiment, and two anti-aircraft regiments.
The probable strategic defense of the oil fields would initially be to hold Palestine and Syria, but this would depend upon success of Russian defense in the North.

~~SECRET~~

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5. "Will you give me your judgment on kind of air and land force in Syria that would tend to hold Turkey in line?"

To defend Syria and hold Turkey in line would require a sufficient force to defeat Rommel, approximately four armored divisions, two motorized divisions, and three infantry divisions, with about ten air groups. An open Mediterranean would permit very heavy reinforcements to Rommel, which eventually could be employed in this area, and this would necessitate an ever increasing expansion of the forces listed above - an expansion far beyond our capacity.

6. "What consideration should be given to strong defense of Basra or Black Sea area?"

Defense of the Black Sea area will necessarily depend on the Russians. The Basra area is of great importance. Its port facilities are limited. Further, the sea lines of communication to Basra are long and vulnerable, presenting an impracticable proposition for major military operations against strong enemy movement out of the Mediterranean. The forces that may be assembled in this area immediately from Egypt and now enroute to Egypt can fight a defensive and a delaying action over a considerable period of time provided (1) the Russian front does not collapse; and (2) all existing facilities and equipment in the Basra area are used. This would mean that Russian supply through this port would stop. A major effort in this region would bleed us white.

Chief of Staff.

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED
By authority of Letter
Ltr. Gen. J.C. Lambert
of 30 Jan 1964
By [illegible]
Date 20 May 1964

[redacted]

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PSF
Safe
Marshall

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM TO MR. HARRY HOPKINS:

Attached is a draft of aproposed directive which has been concurred in by both General Marshall and Admiral King.

JOHN R. DEANE,
Colonel,G.S.C.,
Secretary, General Staff.

a44u01

[redacted]

Published in Matloff and Snell,
Strategic Planning for Coalition
Warfare, 1941-1942, pp. 384-385.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Not of record
See Dr. Def. Files
FDR

July 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL MARSHALL
ADMIRAL KING

Subject: Instructions for London Conference - July, 1942.

UK

1. You will proceed immediately to London as my personal representatives for the purpose of consultation with appropriate British authorities on the conduct of the war.

2. You will carefully investigate the possibility of executing SLEDGEHAMMER, bearing in mind the vital urgency of sustaining Russia this year. This is of such great importance that grave risks are justified in order to accomplish it. If you consider that, with the most complete and wholehearted effort on the part of the British, SLEDGEHAMMER is possible of execution, you should strongly urge that preparations for it be pushed with the utmost vigor and that it be executed in case Russian collapse becomes imminent. The geographical objective of a cross-channel operation in 1942 is not of vital importance, providing the great purpose of the operation can be achieved, i.e., the positive diversion of German air forces from the annihilation of Russia. SLEDGEHAMMER should be executed on the basis of our remaining in France, if that is in any way practicable.

3. If you are convinced that SLEDGEHAMMER is impossible of execution with reasonable chances of serving its intended purpose, inform me. In that case my views as to our immediate and contined course of action are that we should continue our present plans and preparations for ROUNDUP, while carrying out planned activities and present commitments in other areas. We should proceed at top speed with ROUNDUP preparations, intensifying air attacks and making frequent and large-scale Commando raids. This action should be continued until it is evident that Russia can not, any longer, contain appreciable German forces. Material aid to Russia should continue with the bulk delivered through Basra, the northern convoys to Russia to be suspended.

4. You will, with the British authorities, investigate the courses of action open to us in the event of a Russian collapse. In this investigation, and in the recommendations you make as to the course to be pursued, you will be guided by the following principles:

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[redacted]

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a. Our aim must continue to be the complete defeat of the Axis powers. There can be no compromise on this point.

b. We should concentrate our efforts and avoid dispersion.

c. Effective coordinated use of British and American forces should be sought.

d. Available U.S. and British forces should be brought into action as quickly as they can be profitably used. It is very important that U.S. ground troops are brought into action against the enemy in 1942.

e. Any course of action adopted should include support of an air offensive from the British Isles by strong U.S. air forces and the assurance of the security of that base for operations against Germany by U.S. ground reinforcements.

5. The subjects listed below are considered as appropriate for discussion with the British in arriving at our course of action in case of Russian collapse. Your discussion will not necessarily be restricted to these subjects. The United States will not be committed to a course of action to be followed in the event of Russian collapse without my specific approval.

a. A continental invasion in 1943. This course of action may be impracticable unless strong German forces are contained on the Russian front. However, it should be investigated.

b. All-out effort in the Pacific against Japan with the view to her defeat as quickly as possible.

c. Operations in the Middle East with U.S. air forces now planned, with such ground forces as can be reasonably sustained, while at the same time using the bulk of our strength against Japan. The purposes of the Middle East operation would be to secure the area; to protect vital oil resources and to cover the Russian flank (if any remains).

6. You will take note that the state of Russia in the spring of 1943 may be such as to make ROUNDUP impracticable, by reason of the resistance that Germany can then bring to bear in France. It is this possibility that emphasizes the urgent necessity to do SLEDGEHAMMER this year when it is certain that Germany's effort against Russia will afford the best opportunity that can be expected to do any part of BOLERO.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

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July 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL
ADMIRAL KING
HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR LONDON CONFERENCE - JULY, 1942.

1. O.K. (initialed)

2. The military and naval strategic changes have been so great since Mr. Churchill's visit to Washington that it becomes necessary to reach immediate agreement on joint operational plans between the British and ourselves along two lines:

(A) Definite plans for the balance of 1942.

(B) Tentative plans for the year 1943 which, of course, will be subject to change in the light of occurences in 1942, and which should be initiated at this tine in all cases involving preparation in 1942 for operations in 1943.

3.

(A) The common aim of the United Nations must be the defeat of the Axis Powers. There cannot be compromise on this point.

(B) We should concentrate our efforts and avoid dispersion.

(C) Absolute coordinated use of British and American forces is essential.

(D) All available U. S. and British forces should be brought into action as quickly as they can be profitably used.

(E) It is of the highest importance that U. S. ground troops be brought into action against the enemy in 1942.

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4. British and American material to Russia must be carried out in good faith. If the Persian route of delivery is used, preference must be given to combat material. This aid must continue as long as delivery is possible and Russia must be encouraged to continue resistance. Only complete collapse, which seems unthinkable, should alter this determination on our part.

5. In regard to 1942, you will carefully investigate the possibility of executing SLEDGEHAMMER. Such an operation would definitely sustain Russia this year. It might be the turning point which would save Russia this year. SLEDGEHAMMER is of such grave importance that ~~grave reasons are~~ every reason calls for the ~~to~~ accomplishment of it. You should strongly urge immediate all-out preparations for it, that it be pushed with utmost vigor, and that it be executed whether or not Russian ~~resistance~~ collapse becomes imminent. In the event of probable Russian collapse, SLEDGEHAMMER becomes not merely advisable but imperative. The principle objective of SLEDGEHAMMER is the positive diversion of German Air Forces from the Russian Front.

6. Only if you are completely convinced that SLEDGEHAMMER is impossible of execution with reasonable chances of serving its intended purpose, inform me.

7. If SLEDGEHAMMER is finally and definitely out of the picture, I want you to consider the world situation as it exists at that time, and determine upon another place for U.S. Troops to fight in 1942.

It is my present view of the world picture that:

(a) If Russia contains a large German force against her, ROUNDUP becomes possible in 1943, and plans for ROUNDUP should be immediately considered and preparations made for it.

(b) If Russia collapses and German air and ground forces are released, ROUNDUP may be impossible of fulfillment in 1943.

8. The Middle East should be held as strongly as possible whether Russia collapses or not. I want you to take into consideration the effect of losing the Middle East. Such loss means in series:

(1) Loss of Egypt and the Suez Canal.

(2) Loss of Syria.

(3) Loss of Mosul oil wells.

(4) Loss of the Persian Gulf through attacks from the north and west, together with access to all Persian Gulf oil.

(5) Joining hands between Germany and Japan and the probable loss of the Indian Ocean.

(6) The very important probability of German occupation of Tunis, Algiers, Morocco, Dakar and the cutting of the ferry route through Freetown and Liberia.

(7) Serious danger of all shipping in the South Atlantic and serious danger to Brazil and the whole of the East Coast of South America. I include in the above possibilities the use by the Germans of Spain, Portugal and ~~other~~ territories.

(8) You will determine the best methods of holding the Middle East. These methods include definitely either or both of the following

(a) Sending aid and ground forces to the Persian Gulf, to Syria and to Egypt.

(b) A new operation in Morocco and Algiers intended to drive in against the backdoor of Rommel's armies. The attitude of French Colonial troops is still in doubt.

(9) I am opposed to an American all-out effort in the Pacific against Japan with the view to her defeat as quickly as possible, ~~unless no plan can be worked out for British and American unity of action in Europe and Africa, beginning in 1942.~~ It is of the utmost importance that we appreciate that defeat of Japan does not defeat Germany and that American concentration against Japan this year or in 1943 increases the chance of complete German domination of Europe and Africa. On the other hand, it is obvious that defeat of Germany, or the holding of Germany in 1942 or in 1943 means probable, eventual defeat of Germany in the European and African theatres and in the Near East. Defeat of Germany means the defeat of Japan, probably without firing a shot or losing a life.

(10) Please remember three cardinal principles -- speed of decision on plans, unity of plans, attack combined with defense but not defense alone. This strictly the immediate objective of U.S. ground forces fighting against Germans in 1942

(11) I hope for total agreement within one week of your arrival.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

July 16, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS
GENERAL MARSHALL
ADMIRAL KING

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR LONDON CONFERENCE -- JULY, 1942.

1. You will proceed immediately to London as my personal representatives for the purpose of consultation with appropriate British authorities on the conduct of the war.

2. The military and naval strategic changes have been so great since Mr. Churchill's visit to Washington that it becomes necessary to reach immediate agreement on joint operational plans between the British and ourselves along two lines:

(a) Definite plans for the balance of 1942.

(b) Tentative plans for the year 1943 which, of course, will be subject to change in the light of occurences in 1942, but which should be initiated at this time in all cases involving preparation in 1942 for operations in 1943.

3. (a) The common aim of the United Nations must be the defeat of the Axis Powers. There cannot be compromise on this point.

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(b) We should concentrate our efforts and avoid dispersion.

(c) Absolute coordinated use of British and American forces is essential.

(d) All available U. S. and British forces should be brought into action as quickly as they can be profitably used.

(e) It is of the highest importance that U. S. ground troops be brought into action against the enemy in 1942.

4. British and American material promises to Russia must be carried out in good faith. If the Persian route of delivery is used, preference must be given to combat material. This aid must continue as long as delivery is possible and Russia must be encouraged to continue resistance. Only complete collapse, which seems unthinkable, should alter this determination on our part.

5. In regard to 1942, you will carefully investigate the possibility of executing SLEDGEHAMMER. Such an operation would definitely sustain Russia this year. It might be the turning point which would save Russia this year. SLEDGEHAMMER is of such grave importance that every reason calls for accomplishment of it. You should strongly urge immediate all-out preparations for it, that it be pushed with utmost vigor, and that it be executed whether or not Russian collapse becomes imminent. In the event of [redacted]e Russian collapse, becomes probable

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SLEDGEHAMMER becomes not merely advisable but imperative. The principle objective of SLEDGEHAMMER is the positive diversion of German Air Forces from the Russian Front.

6. Only if you are completely convinced that SLEDGEHAMMER is impossible of execution with reasonable chances of serving its intended purpose, inform me.

7. If SLEDGEHAMMER is finally and definitely out of the picture, I want you to consider the world situation as it exists at that time, and determine upon another place for U. S. Troops to fight in 1942.

It is my present view of the world picture that:

(a) If Russia contains a large German force against her, ROUNDUP becomes possible in 1943, and plans for ROUNDUP should be immediately considered and preparations made for it.

(b) If Russia collapses and German air and ground forces are released, ROUNDUP may be impossible of fulfillment in 1943.

8. The Middle East should be held as strongly as possible whether Russia collapses or not. I want you to take into consideration the effect of losing the Middle East. Such loss means in series:

(1) Loss of Egypt and the Suez Canal.

(2) Loss of Syria.

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(3) Loss of Mosul oil wells.

(4) Loss of the Persian Gulf through attacks from the north and west, together with access to all Persian Gulf oil.

(5) Joining hands between Germany and Japan and the probable loss of the Indian Ocean.

(6) The very important probability of German occupation of Tunis, Algiers, Morocco, Dakar and the cutting of the ferry route through Freetown and Liberia.

(7) Serious danger to all shipping in the South Atlantic and serious danger to Brazil and the whole of the East Coast of South America. I include in the above possibilities the use by the Germans of Spain, Portugal and their territories.

(8) You will determine the best methods of holding the Middle East. These methods include definitely either or both of the following:

(a) Sending aid and ground forces to the Persian Gulf, to Syria and to Egypt.

(b) A new operation in Morocco and Algiers intended to drive in against the backdoor of Rommel's armies. The attitude of French Colonial troops is still in doubt.

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9. I am opposed to an American all-out effort in the Pacific against Japan with the view to her defeat as quickly as possible. It is of the utmost importance that we appreciate that defeat of Japan does not defeat Germany and that American concentration against Japan this year or in 1943 increases the chance of complete German domination of Europe and Africa. On the other hand, it is obvious that defeat of Germany, or the holding of Germany in 1942 or in 1943 means probable, eventual defeat of Germany in the European and African theatres and in the Near East. Defeat of Germany means the defeat of Japan, probably without firing a shot or losing a life.

10. Please remember three cardinal principles -- speed of decision on plans, unity of plans, attack combined with defense but not defense alone. This affects the immediate objective of U. S. ground forces fighting against Germans in 1942.

11. I hope for total agreement within one week of your arrival.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

a44a11

DRAFT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 24, 1942.

FOR HOPKINS, MARSHALL AND KING

RE: YOURS OF JULY 23RD.

It seems to me from a common sense viewpoint that ROUNDUP is dependent on two very grave contingencies. First, concentration on ROUNDUP from now on and, therefore, abandonment of GYMNAST or any other new assignment of American troops in 1942. Second, the maintenance of resistance by Russia on Western Front without which ROUNDUP would be impracticable.

Therefore, if the American objective of putting ground forces into useful action in 1942 is maintained, ROUNDUP as planned must be abandoned as the primary objective at this time.

In its place, if we leave out of consideration Norway and Persian Gulf, we have the choice between GYMNAST and reinforcements to Egypt.

I still think that GYMNAST is preferable on the ground that because of relative distances we can obtain control of Mediterranean more quickly and more surely than if we decide on mere reinforcements in Near East.

I wish you would consider in relation to GYMNAST this plan which I spoke of before you left, namely, that the initial operations be wholly American, using British and American transport; that the American mission, after

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securing bridgeheads and ports, be directed due east through Algiers and Tunis; that after the initial task is successfully completed, British ground troops and air, in ~~relatively small~~ sufficient number, 410 American controlled ports and 1000 south in direction of Dakar ~~such relatively sufficient forces as~~ as we can ~~would be necessary to~~ secure the bulge of Africa, ~~including~~ Dakar.

I think previous logistic figures of troops to be landed per month are much too low because transports need not be combat loaded if the initial expedition obtains control of ports.

For example, I see no reason why we cannot put 80,000 American troops and air into the initial operation, using many of our troops now in England and Ireland, together with expeditionary force from the United States.

Time is of the essence to prevent German air concentration as you indicate.

I should like to have you give favorable consideration to this problem with the purpose of accomplishing it if it possibly can be done.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1220, July 24, 1942.

W.C. Mott
W.C. Mott
Lieut., U. S. N. R.

a44v02

PSF: Safe – Marshall

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dorothy:

Do you have a copy of this in your files? It was sent from Hyde Park when we were up there. I find I have two copies. I think Grace probably had the original.

Lois

a44w01

TELEGRAM

AUGUST 19, 1942

~~SECRET~~

TO: GENERAL MARSHALL

COULD I HAVE TOMORROW BRIEF OUTLINE PLAN AND LOGISTICS TORCH, INCLUDING AIR.

FURTHERMORE WILL YOU GIVE ME NUMBER AND TYPES OF COMBAT PLANES IN VARIOUS THEATERS, INCLUDING CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES, INDICATING WHETHER OR NOT THE PLANES ARE READY FOR COMBAT. INCLUDE PLANES ON THE WAY TO VARIOUS THEATERS.

Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 7 1972

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PSF Safe Marshall

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

August 20, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following, regarding the detachment of 50 Rangers who participated in the Dieppe Commando operation, has just been received from General Eisenhower.

> It appears from early reports that the American contingent in the Dieppe operation may have suffered extremely heavily. Almost the entire American contingent accompanied an assault force which by accident encountered an enemy coastal convoy. Apparently only remnants of this particular assaulting force escaped. Details are meagre and reports conflicting. I will keep you informed as to the details. General Truscott (the senior U. S. officer on duty with Lord Mountbatten's Commando Staff) has just returned but is unable to add much to the above.

Chief of Staff

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Date- 4-3-59

Signature- Carl L. Spicer



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Burt

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 21, 1942

THIS CAN BE FILED.

H.L.H.

a44y01

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 28, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL

I have read with interest the memorandum from General Vladislaw Sikorski sent to me by you. In the main he is right though perhaps he underestimates the time required to establish the second front in Europe. I think he is correct in saying, as an illustration, that one armored division of the allies operating in Western Europe in 1942 is more effective than five such divisions in 1943.

I think he overestimates the value of insurrections in those countries which have been conquered by Germany.

However, his thesis of a general staff representing these countries is worth considering. Such a staff could not, of course, be led by an officer of any one of the occupied countries. I do not believe that a British officer would be accepted by all of them as readily as an American officer. Such an organization need not be a general staff at the outset. It might better

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be called a planning unit under American leadership.

Do you think anything more need be done?

F. D. R.

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~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

April 23, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached is a memorandum prepared by General Vladislaw Sikorski which he asked me to give you and which I think you will find interesting. This is an exact copy except for the captions which have been added in my office.

Chief of Staff.

Incl.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/68)
Date- JAN 13
Signature-



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M E M O R A N D U M

Subject: Study of European Operations.

Russian-German Situation

There is no doubt that in the nearest future Soviet Russia will have to face a new German offensive. The concentration of the German land forces seems to be drawing to its close. Divisions which had been transferred to western Europe for the winter months of 1941-1942 as well as the newly organized units have either already arrived or are on their way to the eastern front. The Germans will endeavor to crush the Soviet Union by means of operations carried out on a vast scale. It will most probably be their supreme offensive effort, and its result will bear upon the ultimate issue of the world conflict.

The Soviet Government are applying special tactics towards their Allies, whom they maintain in ignorance of their forces and possibilities. It, nevertheless, seems certain that, notwithstanding the great power of resistance of their peoples, the Soviet Government are considering not so much the prospect of a compromise with the Third Reich, as the possibility of a war crisis, if they were left to themselves in complete isolation at the approach of the spring campaign.

Alternative Results of Russian-German Situation

Under the above circumstances, it would appear correct to anticipate one of the following alternatives with regard to the final issue of the imminent developments on the eastern front:

1. Either Russia will successfully resist the German offensive, and, even in spite of further loss of territory, will occasion the further considerable wastage and exhaustion of the potential of the German armed forces. In this case, no matter how far the Red Armies would be pushed back, the final issue would be evident: Germany would be defeated.

2. Or the German offensive will be sufficiently powerful to threaten the complete destruction of the Soviet Army. In that case, Great Britain with the United States and their cooperating Allies would find themselves in 1943, or perhaps even in the late autumn of 1942, in the face of German forces sufficiently powerful to eliminate any possibility of an allied offensive action on the continent. A similar course of events would completely reverse the present dislocation of the German armed forces in Europe. The armored and motorized divisions from the eastern front as well as the major part of the Luftwaffe would take the place of the inferior divisions of the Landsturm, which are at the moment stationed in western Europe, and the second-rate units would be sent to occupy the conquered areas of Russia.

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Conclusions as to Effect of the Above on Allied Operations

The conclusions are easily drawn and clear.

Should the first alternative arise, it would be necessary to take advantage, even at a great price, of the engagement of the whole German forces on the Russian front and the almost complete exposure in western Europe, in order to obtain a decisive issue by an offensive on the continent and by striking at the heart of Germany.

It would be necessary to commence the immediate realization of the conditions preliminary to this action, which would be started by the attainment of mastery in the air over western Europe and the detailed preparation of a landing.

The second alternative should be avoided at all costs. The defeat of Russia would put in doubt the final issue of the war, or at any rate prolong for many years the armed struggle, which would have to be calculated to exhaust the enemy and leave no possibility to seek an issue by an open battle on the continent. Even in the anticipation of a successful German offensive in the East, the only sure and effective assistance to the Russian effort would be the establishment of a second front. The estimate of the forces left by the Germans in western and central Europe at the time of their first offensive against Russia in 1941, is commonly known. The principle of economy of effort is a canon of German strategy and during the current year will undoubtedly be applied to a similar extent. It should be expected that Hitler will concentrate to the maximum his forces in the East for the offensive of 1942 and only leave the remnants of inferior units for defense in the West. Accepting this hypothesis, based upon the knowledge of the adversary and confirmatory information on the part of the intelligence service, the conclusion which had already been previously mentioned in a letter to the British Prime Minister that one armored division thrown on the continent in 1942 would prove more effective than five such divisions in 1943, finds confirmation.

Allied Landing on European Continent

There can be no doubt that independently of the date at which the Allied Forces will be capable of landing on the European continent and regardless of what area is chosen for that purpose, it will be a united and common operation of the land, naval, and air forces.

This operation should be directed by one man in command of the whole armed forces and disposing of one General Staff for the whole of the forces.

Such a Staff should be established without delay, in order to commence the study and preparation of the future, undoubtedly difficult

a44y06

and complex, operations. It would consist of officers from the General Staffs of those Allied countries whose forces will be employed, and of the countries upon whose territory the landing operations will take place.

Decisive Factors in Final Issue of War

The following three factors will be decisive of the final issue of the war in Europe and should, therefore, already be considered at the present stage:

(a) the armed forces of the Soviet Union,

(b) the armed forces of the Allies, particularly those forces which will be destined to land on the continent and establish a second front,

(c) the countries occupied by Germany.

Consideration of Countries Occupied by Germany

The first two of the above factors do not require further comment. The third has so far not been sufficiently appreciated.

The German bases and lines of communication, especially those connected with the eastern front, are situated on the territories of countries which have been invaded during the previous campaigns. Those countries have not recognized the German occupation and each one of them is continuing to a smaller or greater extent, and on their own, an underground struggle, which undoubtedly yields certain results and obliges the Germans to keep up in those countries considerably larger forces of occupation. These results, however, could be more considerable in spite of the occupation and notwithstanding the circumstance that at the present moment they do not possess the conditions for open action. During the final contest with Germany, this factor will carry far greater significance than it is generally supposed, provided that the effort of the united nations will be directed on uniform lines, prepared methodically, and coordinated with the whole war plan.

This vital problem is directly connected with Poland.

The extent of what has so far been done in the direction of organizing the future action of the occupied countries is insufficient. The solution of the problem should be considered on the following lines.

Common Staff for Occupied Countries and their Duties

A common staff should be established for all the countries in Europe under German occupation. This staff would consist of G.S. officers of those occupied countries which may be seriously considered in connection with the future armed risings. The tasks of this staff would be:

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(a) to prepare plans for the future insurrections of the conquered countries, in coordination with the general war plan, and particularly with the plans connected with landings on the continent;

(b) to prepare plans of assistance for the insurrections from without, in the first place by the air force and airborne units;

(c) to establish and develop liaison with the occupied countries;

(d) to issue instructions to the secret military organizations of the occupied countries in order to coordinate their purposes with the established insurrection plans;

(e) to unify the direction of diversion and sabotage on the rears of the Germans, both in the East and in the West, and of the intelligence service;

(f) to supply the secret military organizations with arms, equipment for diversion, liaison, men etc.

It seems certain that only a radical change in these two domains connected with the conduct of the war would secure, or at any rate greatly hasten a decisive victory over the principal enemy.

April 13th, 1942.

a44y08

PSF
Safe
Marshall

August 21, 1942

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

I wish you would explore very carefully the merits and possibilities of our putting an American air force on the Caucasian front to fight with the Russian armies. Churchill, while in Moscow, cabled that Stalin would welcome such cooperation. If such an enterprise could be accomplished would it be advisable to have British air also represented?

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 7 1972

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SAFE FILE: Miscellaneous

Safe : Miscellaneous

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PARAPHRASE

Telegram no. 1537 Dated: 10/7/41 2 p.m.

From: CAIRO Rec'd: 10/8/41 3:28 p.m.

FROM ROBINSON FOR MARITIME COMMISSION FROM PIBURN FOR GENERAL BURNS.

One. Working at Attaka and Suez for 9 vessels with 40,000 tons cargo during September gives mean daily average (a) of 285 tons on actual time in port, (b) 294 tons on time occupied from commencement to completion of discharge.

Two. Owing to air raids, we lost 9 ship days during the month.

Three. Slight improvement in Attaka discharge has occurred recently, due in part to the fact that there is now in use a section of the new lighter wharf and improvement in the handling of cased motor transport by Port Said labor.

Four. The improvement in discharge alongside the north quay was being maintained and daily discharge from the WEST KYSKA and ARKANSAN averaged respectively, 426 tons and 439 tons.

Five. Attaka assembly plant has been able to clear up everything in arrears because of the recent felling off in the number of cased motor transport and at present the plant is

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is not operating at full capacity, due to the receipt of insufficient motor transport. Shuttle service is being used to reship for assembly at Attaka cases discharged from our vessels at Port Sudan. It is the desire of military authorities that all American vessels carrying casedD motor transport shall discharge at Suez in the future.

Six. September figures for Port Sudan show a daily average of 385 tons. There has been congestion at this port owing to diversion of steamers from Suez, the full arrival program as reported in my message of September 17 being beyond Suez's ability to handle.

KIRK.

SA/E:DCB:MBJ
10/9/41.
Copies to:
Mr. Hopkins (3)
General Spalding (2)
General Burns (1)

(Sent to Maritime Commission by IN)
SA/E 10/9/41.

a45a02

Safe: Miscellaneous

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 5, 1942

To: The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of War
The Secretary of the Navy

Please appoint one man to represent the Treasury, one man from G-2 to represent the Army, and one man from ONI to represent the Navy, to serve as a committee for the next 30 days to inspect for the President, as Commander-in-Chief, all outgoing and incoming diplomatic pouches of the Governments of Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal, and France.

Also to inspect during the next 30 days all outgoing [redacted] pouches for the State Department to the Embassy [redacted] Legations of the above-mentioned countries; also all outgoing and incoming diplomatic pouches addressed to those countries to which Ambassador Biddle at London is accredited.

There shall be no subordinate to represent any member of this committee of three, and no person shall be informed of any suspicious contents of said pouches except the President of the United States. All reports will be made to the Commander-in-Chief and only to the Commander-in-Chief.

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October 5, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF WAR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Please appoint one man to represent the Treasury, one man from G-2 to represent the Army, and one man from ONI to represent the Navy, to serve as a committee for the next 30 days to inspect for the President, as Commander-in-Chief, all outgoing and incoming diplomatic pouches of the Governments of Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Portugal, and France, and Eire.

Also to inspect during the next 30 days all outgoing pouches from our State Department to our Embassies and Legations in the above mentioned countries; also all outgoing pouches from our State Department to Ambassador Biddle in London. The object is, of course, to see whether our own pouches are being used from this end to convey information to other governments without our knowledge, even though these governments may be a part of the United Nations.

There shall be no subordinate to represent any member of this committee of three, and no person shall be informed of any suspicious contents of said pouches except the President of the United States. All reports will be made to the Commander-in-Chief and only to the Commander-in-Chief.

I am having made only this one directive, which I am sending to the Secretary of the Treasury with the request that he communicate it verbally to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. No copies shall be made, nor shall any reference thereto be reduced to writing. This is in the interest of complete secrecy.

F.D.R.

a45b02

copy

October 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The Secretary of the Treasury just telephoned to say that the Irish Legation here in Washington has six diplomatic pouches going to the Irish Legation in Vichy, France. Ireland was not included in the directive so he has no authority to act. He feels that it is rather unusual to have six going at once, and as it is a matter of seconds, can you O.K. this memo to go ahead and open them for inspection?

G.G.T.

(In Pres. handwriting

Yes. F.D.R."

a45b03

Safe: Miscellaneous

Part

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

Please read enclosed and turn over to Gaston as part of his new work.

F.D.R.

J.E.Hoover report to Hopkins Oct. 6 re one copy of "Ship Reports" or "Ship Table" consisting of 46 pages which were compiled by members of Swedish Legation. also copy of Pres. letter to Sumner Wells Oct. 6th re above subject.

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